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Introduction

The conventional wisdom presented in Part II holds that the choice of
tax entity for a new, closely held or private, small income venture is a
passthrough entity. In particular, the Limited Liability Company (LLC),
the new kid on the block in the 1990s, is the conventional choice, due to
its limitation of liability coupled with its hassle-free single level of federal
income taxation. 1 Part III shows that the contrary reality in taxland is that
either the regular or Subchapter C corporation ("C Corporation") or the
Subchapter S corporation ("S Corporation") tends in most market segments
to be the tax entity of choice for small businesses conducted in an entity
form rather than as a sole proprietorship. As discussed in Part Ill, in all
but one state new corporation formations (without differentiation between
C and S Corporations) outnumber new LLC formations-usually by a
margin of2:1 to 3:1 or greater for 1995-1998.2
Notwithstanding the concern of conventional wisdom over double taxation of C Corporations and shareholders3 (first inside at the corporate level
and second outside at the shareholder level), profitable, small income,
private C Corporations and their mostly high income, active owners apparently pay less federal income tax at the owner and entity levels combined
than they would under direct passthrough taxation with tax-free withdrawal
of profits, as in a single level of taxation LLC or S Corporation. 4 Part III
reveals that thirty-seven percent of C Corporations (over 750,000,
accounting for five percent of C Corporation income) report, on the
average, about $40,000, which is taxable at fifteen percent (with sixty-one
percent reporting no income or a loss). 5 In sharp contrast, eighty percent
of their owners are taxable at the higher individual income brackets (from
31% to 39.6% before phase outs). 6 Furthermore, a second level of
outside shareholder-level taxation on the retained earnings is avoided at

1. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the
Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REv. 393, 393-94 (1996); Don W. Llewellyn & Anne
O'Connell Umbrecht, No Choice of Entity After Check-the-Box, 52 TAX LAW. 1, 2 (1998); Larry E.
Ribstein, The New Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 325, 331 (1997). For the
"new kid on the block" metaphor I am indebted to Jimmy G. McLaughlin, Commentary: The Limited
Liability Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45 ALA. L. REV. 231, 231 (1993); see also
Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Hechtman, The Limited Liability Company: The New Kid in Town,
20 J. CORP. TAX'N 334, 334-35 (1994); Mark Rosencrantz, Comment: You Wanna Do What? Attorneys
Organizing as Limited Liability Pannerships and Companies: An Economic Analysis, 19 SEATILE U.
L. REV. 349, 359 (1996).
2. See infra notes 312-27 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 150-51, 156-62, 173-74, 190-97, 200 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 128-32, 145-49 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 142-43, 147, 169-71 and accompanying text. Phase-outs of personal exemptions,
deductions, and wage taxes can raise the top effective rate to 45%. See infra note 148 and
accomoanving text.
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least half the time, when the shareholder holds the small C Corporation
private stock (or public C stock received in a tax-free reorganization for
such private stock) until her death without receiving dividends. 7 When the
taxation is not avoided, it is greatly reduced on a present value basis by a
long-deferred and often installment-reported capital gains sale. 8
Part ill calculates that the splitting of business income between (1)
compensation to shareholder-employees taxed at higher individual income
graduated rates and (2) profits left in the private C Corporation taxed at the
lowest graduated corporate rates 9 amounted, for 1993, to an annual tax
expenditure or subsidy of $3 to $4 billion as to such 750,000 profitable
small income, mostly private C Corporations. 1 For 1993, there was also
an at least equal annual tax expenditure benefitting about 33,500 moderate
income, mostly private C Corporations (average income of around
$2,000,000 subject, on the average, to a fiat thirty-four percent corporate
income tax), accounting for over ten percent of C Corporation income. 11
For this latter segment of private companies the spread is between the fiat
thirty-four percent inside corporate rate and the highest outside individual
rate of forty-five percent federal income and wage taxes combined. 12
The Statistics of Income Division (SOl) of the Internal Revenue
Service projects average annual decreases of 1.12% in 1999-2005 of
corporate income Form 1120-A tax returns (filed by the smallest income
and asset C Corporations, with gross receipts, total income and assets each
not in excess of $500,000). 13 This asset category shows disproportionate
losses and a very small share of corporate income. 14 Such future decline
might tum out to be attributable mostly to a shrinkage in the number of C
Corporations reporting no income or a loss (sixty-one percent in 1993) 15
due to the phase-out over this period of the C Corporation tax advantage

°

7. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 137-40, 147-69 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
13. See Frank Zaffino, Projections of Returns To Be Filed in Calendar Years 1999-2005, 18 SOl
BULLETIN No. 3, at 178, 184 tbl. 1 (1999).
14. For example, for 1993, Forms 1120-A with net income reported $971,130,000 toJal net
income; $28,496,000 by C Corporations with zero assets; $609,994,000 by C Corporations with assets
under $100,000; $227,187,000 by C Corporations with assets over $100,000 and under $250,000; and
$105,453,000 by C Corporations with assets over $250,000 and under $500,000. 1993 CORPORATION
SOURCE BOOK OF STATISfiCS OF INCOME 245 ln.67 (Pub. 1053 rev. Mar. 1993) [hereinafter 1993
CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK]. This was 1.7% of C Corporation income ($971,130,000 ..;571,922,088,000 = 1.7%). See id. at ln.67 (col. 1) (providing that the toJal net income reported on
Form 1120-A is $971 ,130,000); id. at lns.66, 69 (col. 1) (subtracting the toJal net income reported for
all industries with and without net income ($658,666,005,000) by the amount of toial net income
reported on Form 1120-S ($86,743,917,000) to arrive at $571,922,088,000).
15. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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(in obtaining preferential individual income tax treatment of medical and
other fringe benefits provided to shareholder-employees) over passthrough
entities and self employers. 16 Thus, choosing a small income, private C
Corporation as a tax entity, in order to obtain its inside shelter, might
continue during this period. In any event, SOl projects a 1.38% annual
increase in returns filed by larger income and larger asset C Corporations
during the next six years. 17 Accordingly, use of the inside graduated rate
tax shelter by the 33,500 moderate income C Corporations will most likely
continue to grow in the future, absent statutory reform.
Based on anecdotal evidence and clues in the literature and the popular
press, Part III also speculates as to the reasons for the continued vitality of
S Corporations, the entity of choice for 2,450,000 returns in 1997 and the
fastest growing type of business tax entity between 1999 and 2005, as
projected by the SOL The SOl predicts that S Corporations will surpass
C Corporations in number in 2000 18 and will account for an increasing
percentage of the total corporate sector income, which is already up from
11% in 1993 to 17.6% for 1996. 19 LLC commentary predicted to the
contrary, largely on the basis of the numerous restrictions and limitations
applicable to S Corporations as compared with LLCs. The apparent reasons for the popularity of S Corporations in a check-the-box world, with
Service approval of LLCs, range from the practical, 20 to the mundane, 21
and even arcane. 22
Part III also shows that LLCs are, in fact, tending to become the entity
of choice for taxpayer market segments involving the SOl categories of (1)
real estate industries and (2) professional services industries, which
constitute together over fifty-six percent both of LLCs and of all
partnerships. 23 Real estate businesses tend to be less suited to a C
Corporation,24 somewhat less suited to an S Corporation,25 and more
suited to an LLC. 26 Professional service industries are even less suited
than improved real estate businesses to C Corporations, since the C
Corporation inside graduated rates are barred to them. 27 However, they

16. See infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 116, 287-89 and accompanying text; Susan Wittman & Roben Grant, S
Corporation Refilms, 1996, 18 SOl BULLEflN 40 (1999).
20. See infra notes 234-42.
21. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 247-72 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 65 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.

890

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 78:885

are well-represented in the ranks of S Corporations. 28 The same pattern
of concentration of real estate businesses and service businesses in all
partnerships29 indicates that what Professor Hamill calls the "meteoric
pace" 30 in the growth of LLCs, which has been the motor driving the
increase in the number of all partnerships since 1994, appears to have been
more at the expense of other types of partnerships than C and especially S
Corporations. This supposition is supported by the fact that while the
number of LLCs is continuing to grow at a phenomenal rate, the number
of general partnerships has recently declined, and net growth in the number
of limited partnerships has been limited. 31
Part IV maintains that the use of private C Corporations as an inside
tax shelter by high income individual owners violates the fundamental tax
principles of both horizontal (like amounts of income should be taxed
equally) and vertical equity (the effective rate of taxation should increase
with ability to pay, i.e., the principle of progressivity). 32 This disparity,
not the smokescreen of double taxation of close C Corporations, is intolerable from a populist perspective, but is not a surprise. Populism distrusts
aggregations of economic power due to their political ability to obtain
special privileges such as preferential tax rates. 33
Part V tells the political story of Congress's intent over the past two
decades. Congress's intent has been that the large income, mostly public
C Corporations enjoy lower effective rates of taxation or tax cuts through
generous capital recovery and other preferential rules, and small income
mostly private C Corporations also enjoy lower effective rates of taxation
or tax cuts through increasingly generous inside graduated rates. This
concern with reducing effective tax rates was most strikingly illustrated in
a ninety-two-to-zero Senate roll call vote in 1981. 34 Part V concludes that
any hope for congressional enactment of the ideal tax treatment as to
private C Corporations35 requires a clear-eyed view of the realities of

28. Wittman & Grant, supra note 19, at 43 (reporting that for 1996 26% of netS Corporation
income attributable to the services division-business services ($8.2 billion) and professional services
($12.1 billion)-accounted for 85.2% of the income of the services division).
29. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
30. Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1454, 1460-61 (1998).
31. See infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
34. See 127 CONG. REc. 16,254 (1981) (deciding in favor of an amendment lowering federal tax
rates on incorporated small businesses); see also id. at 16,251-54 (presenting the floor discussion of
the proposed tax amendment).
35. That is, mandatocy passthrough for private corporations as recently called for in Professors
George Yin and David Shakow's ALI Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises.
GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJEcr:
TAXATION OFPRIVATEBUSINESSENTERPRISES REPORTERS' STUDY 109-10, 145-46(1999); see George
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choice of tax entity on the ground, 36 the potent political support for the
private C Corporation inside shelter37 and the powerful small business
myth in the political rhetoric. 38 The various shibboleths of conventional
wisdom constitute conceptual stigmatisms clouding vision and precluding
any effective appeal to Congress for reform. Past attempts, as in the 1984
Treasury Tax Reform Proposals, 39 to eliminate the subsidy of graduated
inside rates for small amounts of C Corporation income have resulted
instead in it being increased, as in the ensuing Tax Reform Act of 1986. 40
II.

Conventional Wisdom: Avoidance of Double Taxation, Plus
Limitation of Liability Without S Corporation Restrictions, Make
LLCs the Tax Entity of Choice for Small Business

A.

Overview of Entity Taxation

1. Corporation Taxation.-A business entity is taxed as a C
corporation if it is organized as a corporation under state la.w4 1 or if it is

K. Yin, AIJ Reporters, Study on Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct.
4, 1999, available in Westlaw at 1999 TNT 191-68 (providing an oveiView of the Reporter's study);
see also John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal
Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57, 88-93, 119 (1988)
[hereinafter Lee, Entity Classification] (arguing that passthrough treatment should apply whenever "the
owners of the entity have control over the process of earning the entity's income or control the use and
disposition of such earnings"); Master limited Partnerships: Hearings Before the House Ways and
Means Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 340-42, 348 (1987) (statement
of Professor John W. Lee) [hereinafter MLP Hearing] (advocating a dual track approach to integration
of private and public corporations); John Lee, President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals, TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 7, 1993, available in Westlaw at 93 TNT 123-78 [hereinafter Lee, Capital Gains
Proposals] (proposing mandatory passthrough of income or loss as to private C Corporations and markto-market accrual taxation of shareholders of public C Corporations). Some economic thought similarly
believes that limited liability should be afforded only where ownership and management are separated.
See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262,
262-63 (1967) (noting several justifications for limited liability and hypothesizing that "limited liability
is probably an essential aspect of a large corporate system with widespread participation"). See
generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TuLANE L. REV. 1143, 1148
(1989) ("[S]hareholders should only be permitted to acquire the traditional corporate characteristics ...
when ownership and control are separated to a significant degree.").
36. See infra notes 291-343 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 422-38, 445 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 446-56, 458-72, 475-92 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 456 and accompanying text.
40. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of26 U .S.C.). Similarly, President Jimmy Carter's campaign promise to repeal the
individual capital gains preference that was uniting the pressure groups in opposition lead instead to an
increase in the preference by the Revenue Act of 1978. See infra note 432. President Carter also
proposed corporate shareholder integration; however, the Revenue Act of 1978 cut inside corporate tax
rates at all brackets. See infra notes 435-36 and accompanying text.
41. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999); Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R. 2571,

H.R. 3397, and H.R. 4448 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures ofthe House Comm. on
Wnu\" nnd MPnnf: OOth rnno ?7-?R. (1 OR.h\ fhp.n:ain-:~ftp.r Pnf:f'thrnllnh J:ntitiof' Uonrinnf'l fC't'!lltP.mP.nt nf
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either organized as some other entity, such as a business trust or LLC, and
elects under the recent check-the-box regulations to be taxed as a C
Corporation. 42 Form thus controls. A C Corporation is taxed inside as
a separate entity when it earns profits (or distributes appreciated property),
and its shareholders are not taxed directly as to such profits or losses. 43
Rather, the shareholders are taxed "outside" at their individual rates when
and if the C Corporation's profits are (1) distributed (a) in the form of
ordinary income dividends or (b) in redemption of a shareholder's stock or
in liquidation of the corporation, or (2) realized indirectly through a stock
sale to a third party. 44 In a redemption, liquidation, or sale of stock, the
"outside" taxes are usually assessed at the capital gains rate. 45 This is the
classic double taxation scenario. 46 Part III of this Article shows (1) that
the actual inside tax rates for most small and moderate income private C
Corporations are far less than the owner's outside marginal rate would be
on such income if taxed directly, and (2) that the second tax is easily
escaped or long deferred. 47

2. Passthrough Entity Taxation.-A partnership, including an LLC,
is not treated as a separate taxpayer for Federal income tax purposes, and
thus is not taxed on its profits. 48 Rather, the partnership's income is
taxed to the partners. Items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit are
generally allocated to them in accordance with the partnership
agreement. 49 A partner's basis, or cost in her ownership interest in the

J. Roger Mentz, AssistantSecretacy for Tax Policy) (suggesting, in an effort to promote certainty, that
a business entity organized under state Jaw as a corporation should generally be respected as a
corporation for federal income tax purposes, even if the enterprise may more closely resemble another
form of business organization).
42. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 1999). An entity formally formed as a corporation is recognized as a C Corporation so long as it is not a sham without business purpose or activity.
See BORIS I. BITIKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 1 1.05[1)[b] (6th ed. 1998). An S Corporation and its shareholders must properly elect
passthrough status under § 1362. See id. at 1 6.03. Check-the-box allows a taxpayer not formally
organized as a corporation to obtain passthrough treatment under the partnership rules if there is more
than one owner. See generally Hamill, supra note 30, at 1482-83. A publicly traded partnership is
also treated as a C Corporation if it does not carcy on a qualifying passive activity. See I.R.C. § 7704
(1994).

43. See BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 42, at 11 1.02, 2.10.
44. See TREASURY REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS:
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 2 (Januacy 1992) [hereinafter TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE).
45. See BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 42 at 1 1.02.
46. See id. 11 1.02, 1.03.
47. See infra notes 141-62, 172-98 and accompanying text.
48. See I.R.C. § 701 (West Supp. 1999); Robert A. Schnur, Ensuring ILCs Are Taxed as
Partnerships, 67 WIS. LAW. 18, 18 (1994). See generally STAFFOFTHEJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES (JCS-6-97), Apr. 8,
1997 (noting that passthrough taxation applies to LLCs).
49. See I.R.C. § 702, 704 (West Group 1999).
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partnership, is increased by an amount equal to her share of such items. 5°
A partner is not taxed on pro rata distributions from the entity except to the
extent that cash distributions exceed the basis of her ownership interest. 51
Partnership income is thus subject to only one level of Federal income
tax. 52
S corporations, like partnerships, are generally (but not always) treated
as conduits, or passthroughs, for tax purposes. 53 The income of an S
corporation is taxed directly to its shareholders, whose stock basis is
increased by such income and decreased by losses, deductions, and
nondeductible expenses that pass through to the shareholder. 54 In tum,
distributions to a shareholder from an S Corporation are generally taxable
only to the extent that they exceed the shareholder's basis in stock. 55 This

50. See I.R.C. § 705(a)(1) (West Group 1999).
51. See id. § 731(a)(l). Distributions of property are generally tax free, with carry-over basis
adjusonents. See id. § 732. Disproportionate distributions of property or money may trigger recognition to the distributee and other partners. See id. § 751(b).
52. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra note 48, at 10.
53. See I.R.C. § 1363, 1366, 1374, 1375 (1994). See generally Joint Committee on Taxation
Staff, Present Law and Proposals Relating to Subchapter S Corporations Home Office Deductions, TAX
NOTES TODAY, May 25, 1995, available in Westlaw at 95 TNT 102-23 (noting that S corporations pass
corporate items of taxable income and loss through to shareholders). For discussion of the entity and
aggregate aspects of taxation of partnerships and S Corporations see Passthrough Entities Hearings,
supra note 41, at 8 (statement of Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy J. Roger Mentz)
(describing a continuum (based on the work of Eustice, infra) from entities, such as sole proprietorships
and grantor trusts, whose separate existence is for most purposes ignored, to entities such as C
Corporations, which are generally treated as separate persons); Glenn E. Coven & Amy Morris Hess,
The Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal, 50 TENN. L. REV. 569, 622, 622-44 (1983)
(analyzing the treaonent of S Corporations under the Revision Act, whereby "an S corporation is still
subject to a unique pattern of taxation, neither entirely borrowed from corporate entity concepts nor
entirely embracing the partnership conduit approach"); and James S. Eustice, Subchapter S

Corporations and Pannerships: A Search for the Pass Through Paradigm (Some Preliminary
Proposals), 39 TAX L. REv. 345, 353-54, 362-67, 372-78, 381-94, 396-400, 404-10, 433 (1984).
Between the two extremes are entities such as partnerships and S Corporations, "the taxation of which
reflect both aggregate and separate entity principles." see Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 8;
see also Glenn E. Coven, Subchapter S Distributions and Pseudo Distributions: Proposals for Revising
the Defective Blend ofEntity and Conduit Concepts, 42 TAX L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1987) (arguing that
the distribution rules are unsatisfactory and that S Corporations should be taxed like partnerships); Lee,
Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 88-93 (explicating, based on the legislative histories of
Subchapter K and the Passive Activity Loss limitations of section 469, Professor Eustice's continuum
model with a separation of entrepreneurial risk-activities and ownership model).
54. See I.R.C. § 1366, 1367(a)(l) (West Supp. 1999); see also Joint Committee on Taxation Staff,
supra note 53.
55. See id. § 1368(b). If an S Corporation has C Corporation earnings and profits (because it was
formerly a C Corporation or is a survivor of a merger with a C Corporation), the amount of a distribution to shareholders that is income tax free is dependent upon an accumulated adjustments account.
See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note 53, at 8. Due to the inside and outside tax upon
liquidation of a C Corporation under §§ 311, 336, 302, and 331, C Corporation to S Corporation
conversions are usually the only practical alternative for going from a C Corporation to a passthrough
entity. See Symposium, Check-the-Box and Beyond: The Future ofLimited Liability Entities, 52 Bus.
T
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is also a single taxation level regime. 56
Unlike partnerships, including LLCs, an S Corporation must meet
certain requirements as to its capital structure and the identity of its
shareholders. 57 An S Corporation may neither have more than seventyfive shareholders nor more than one class of stock. 58 The one class of
stock limitation, coupled with the requirement that all items of income or
loss be allocated "pro rata" among outstanding shares of stock determined
on a daily basis, 59 preclude for S Corporations the partnership flexibility
of allocating items of income or loss to different investors. In particular,
S Corporations cannot allocate losses disproportionally to, for example, a
capital partner and then follow with a charge back of income. 60 Also,
only individuals (other than nonresident aliens), estates, and limited types
of trusts may be shareholders in an S Corporation. 61 Furthermore, S
Corporation liabilities are not included in a shareholder's basis in her stock
interest, which serves as a ceiling on current deductibility of passthrough
S Corporation losses. 62
In contrast, partners can take deductions
Shareholder loans to an S
supported by partnership liabilities. 63

considerations as a facJor contributing to the survival of S Corporations). For a brief discussion of
traditional tax reasons for such conversions and the extent of such conversions in recent years (25%
to 60% of new S Corporation elections, depending on the year) see infra notes 2I4-26 and
accompanying text.
56. See Karen C. Burke, The Uncenain Future of Limited Liability Companies, I2 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 13, 22 (I995) (noting that S Corporations offer a single level tax); Craig J. Langstraat & K.
Dianne Jackson, Choice ofBusiness Tax Entity After the 1993 Tax Act, II AKRON TAX J. I, 4 (I995).
57. See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note 53, at 11 (differentiating between
partnerships and S Corporations).
58. See I.R.C. § I36I(b)(I)(A) and (D) (West Supp. I999) (amending I.R.C. § I36I (I994))
(outlining the requirements for S Corporation eligibility).
59. See I.R.C. §§ 1366(a)(I), 1377(a)(i) (I994 & West Supp. I999).
60. Comparei.R.C. § 1366(a)(I)(WestSupp.I999)(amendingi.R.C. § I366(I994))(describing
methods of determining shareholder tax liability in an S Corporation); id. § 1377(a)(I) (I994 & West
Supp. I999) (defining a shareholder's "pro rata share" for purposes of tax liability), with Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-I(b)-(c) (explaining how to determine a partner's distributive share and how to account for
contributed property). See also Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note 53 (explaining that S
Corporations do not offer the flexibility of partnerships with respect to allocations of income and losses
to different investors); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 70, 373(2d ed. I995) (observing
that pro-rata distributions of profits and losses to S Corporation shareholders limits the flexibility of
S Corporations, relative to pannerships); William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their
Unprincipled Differences under Federal Tax Law, 49 SMU L. REv. I5, I8-19 (I995) (describing the
flexibility of partnership tax law in terms of the partners' ability to reallocate income and losses to
reduce the tax burden).
61. See I.R.C. § 136l(b)(1)(B) (WestSupp. 1999) (amending I.R.C. § 136I (1994)) (defining the
eligible shareholder for an S Corporation).
62. See I.R.C. § 1366(d)(l) (West Supp. I999) (amending I.R.C. § I366 (1994)) (explaining that
loss deductions taken by shareholders in an S Corporation cannot exceed the shareholders' adjusted
basis in the stock and debt of the S Corporation); id. § 1367 (West Supp. 1999) (amending I.R.C.
§ I367 (I994)) (listing items included in shareholder basis, and omitting liabilities of an S Corporation
from the list).
63. See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note 53.
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Corporation support a loss deduction for that shareholder only, unlike the
partnership rules, where such debt (except nonrecourse debt) is "shared,"
by all partners like any other debt. 64 These differing liability sharing
rules are thought to impact heavily on an entity's choice between
Subchapter S and Subchapter K for holding depreciable real estate. 65
One of the most significant choice of tax entity differences between
Subchapters Sand K (applicable to partnerships including LLCs) is that an
S Corporation can not make inside basis adjustments to its assets upon the
death of a shareholder or a transfer of her interest, as partnerships can. 66
Because the outside basis in the deceased shareholder's stock (a capital
asset) is stepped, usually up, to its date of death fair market value,
carefully timed sales (or distributions to the decedent's successor) of the S
Corporation's capital assets, followed in the same tax year by liquidation
of the S Corporation or redemption of the deceased shareholder's interest,
can yield the same practical tax result as partnership inside basis
adjustments. 67 The decedent's successor can thereby offset her share of
the inside capital gain triggered by the sale or distribution with the
resulting outside capital loss on the stock, since its basis will have been
increased by her share of the inside gain above fair market value and above

64. See I.R.C. §§ 8, 752(a) (1994) (explaining how debt is allocated among partners and treating
a partner's share of an increase as a "constructive" cash contribution); id. § 722 (providing for a basis
increase in the partner's interest for cash contributions); Rands, supra note 60, at 19-20 (explaining the
difference in basis calculations between S Corporations and partnerships). For a description of the
arcane and somewhat counterintuitive rules pertaining to shareholder guarantees of S Corporation debt
and shareholder basis, see generally Susan Kalinka, Shareholder Guarantees and Subchapter S Basis:
Investment in the Corporation, 63 TEMPLE L. REV. 659 (1991).
65. See Patrick J. Mullaney & Richard D. Blau, An Analytic Comparison of Pannerships and S
Corps as Vehicles for Leveraged Investments, 59 J. TAX'N 142, 143-44 (1983) (illustrating that the
differing liability-sharing rules may make the use of a partnership advantageous when the entity
assumes a liability, and discussing means by which S corporations can avoid such disparate results);
Jerald D. August & Mark L. Silow, S Corporation vs. Pannership for Real Estate Ventures, 1 J. OF
TAX'N OF INVESTMENTS 91, 119-20 (1984) (explaining that shareholders in an S Corporation are more
limited in their ability to increase their basis); Eugene Chester & William H. Whitledge, Pannership
or Subchapter S Corporation: Which Provides the Greater Tax Benefits?, 10 TAX'N FOR LAW. 177-79
(1981) (comparing the sharing of liabilities among partners with the rules disallowing the sharing of
liabilities among S Corporation shareholders). Cf. Warren Paul Kean, Comment: After the Facelift,
Is Subchapter S Any More Attractive?, 46 LA. L. REV. 87, 123 (1985) (noting that Congress is
"disinclin[ed] to extend the liberal basis adjustment rules available for partnerships when such
provisions have induced the creation of many perceived abusive tax shelters").
66. See I.R.C. §§ 743, 754 (1994) (allowing the basis of partnership property to be adjusted if the
partnership has formally elected an optional adjustment policy); Manin J. McMahon, Jr., Optional
Pannership Inside Basis Adjustments, 52 TAX LAW. 35, 35 (1998) (explaining that a Subchapter K
entity can make adjustments to inside basis upon the death of a panner if so elected under § 754). See
infra note 239 for a comparison of Subchapters K and S regarding inside basis adjustments.
67. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (West Supp. 1999) (amending I.R.C. § 1014 (1994)) (describing how
to calculate the basis of inherited property); id. § 302, 331 (both stating that the amount received by
a shareholder in a complete or panial liquidation distribution shall be treated as exchanged for the
~tnr.k)
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the proceeds actually distributed. 68 This somewhat Byzantine technique
does not work, however, for inside ordinary income realizations such as
sales of inventory items. In this situation, the gain inside will be ordinary
and the loss outside will be capital and can offset only $3,000 of ordinary
income annually, assuming no capital gains. 69 (Partners too, however,
can not obtain an inside basis adjustment as to an ordinary income asset if
it constitutes "Income in Respect of a Decedent". 70) Conversely, S
Corporations are not subject to the partnership mandatory allocation to the
contributing partner of built-in gain or loss in contributed property. 71
There are other, usually less significant, differences between taxation
of S Corporations and their shareholders and taxation of partners. For
example, there are differences in (1) receipt by service partners of a profits
share; (2) transfers of property to the entity when liabilities exceed the
transferor's basis; (3) varying ownership interest rules; (4) nonpartneremployee capacity transactions with the entity; (5) retirement payments to
former principals; and (6) debt-equity lore ~hen appreciated property is
transferred to lock in the character of gain. 72 It would be nice in the two
or three person owner-entrepreneur venture to be able to elect the
simplified, more rationalized conduit rules proposed by the ALI Reporters
in Taxation of Private Business Enterprises. 73

68. See l.R.C. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1999) (amending I.R.C. § 1367 (1994)) (explaining how
to adjust a shareholder's basis for gains or losses).
69. See l.R.C. § 1211(b) (1994) (explaining that capital losses may only be used to offset $3,000
of ordinazy gains).
70. See generally, SusanKalinka,Death ofaMemberofanlLC, 51 LA. L. REv. 451,456 (1997)
(describing the method of adjusting an LLC member's basis on death and explaining that Income in
Respect of a Decedent reduces the basis amount).
71. See l.R.C. § 704(c) (1999) (requiring that any income, gain, loss, or deduction due to
contributed property be shared among partners in a specific way).
72. See John Lee, Partnership Profits Share for Services: An Aggregate Exegesis of Revenue
Procedure 97-27, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, available in Westlaw at 94 TNT 61-27 (1994) (noting
differences in receipt by service partners of a profits share); James Edward Maule, Repon on the
Comparison ofS Corporations and Partnerships (pt.2), 44 TAX LAW. 813, 858-59 (1991) (describing
the treatment of payments to a retiring partner and observing that "[n]o analogous rules exist in the S
corporation context"); Rands, supra note 60, at 20 n.29; Alan R. Sumutka, Selecting a Form of
Business, CPA JOURNAL, Apr. 1997, at 24, 24 (noting differences in nonpartner-employee capacity
transactions with the entity).
73. YIN & SHAKOW, supra note 35, at 125-30. The Reporters correctly point out that the most
irrational entity features of the current S Corporation derive from the decision to allow tax-free C to
S conversions. See id. at 12; see also Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 91 (stating that the
Subchapter S "pass through separate entity approach" was likely designed to encourage C to S
Corporation conversions). President Clinton's proposals to treat C to S conversions as a liquidation
have gone nowhere. See Jerald David August, Benefits and Burdens of Subchapter Sin a Check-theBox World, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 278, 323 n.166 (1999) (reporting that Clinton's Februazy 1997 budget
proposals recommended that a C to S conversion be treated as a deemed liquidation if the value of the
C Corporation exceeded $5 million, but noting that the proposal was later abandoned).
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Limitation of Liability

Shareholders in C and S Corporations are, in theory, not liable for
contractual or tort obligations of their corporation, 74 except to the extent
of unpaid stock subscriptions. 75 In contrast, general partners are jointly
and severally liable for partnership liabilities. 76 Limited partners in
limited partnerships have much the same shield against the partnership's
liabilities as shareholders in a private C Corporation, but aside from the
difficulty of obtaining a general partner willing to be personally liable, -a
limited partnership is an awkward vehicle where the limited partners want
to play an active management role. 77 The common answer of using a corporate general partner (often an S Corporation sometimes owned by the
limited partners) once raised intense tax questions now largely put to bed
by the check-the-box classification regulations. 78 The other problem,
active limited partners, is partially obviated by the Revised ULPA, but
some difficulty may still remain if the limiteds actually manage the
enterprise. 79 LLCs provide a limited liability shield much like private
corporations while permitting, but not requiring, owners to actively manage
the entity. 80
The advantages of limitation of liability in using the private
corporation or LLC may be more apparent than real. The corporate veil
is pierced in litigation almost as often as not81 (i.e., liability is extended

74. See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note 48 ("A primary reason for incorporating
in many cases has been the fact that corporate form shields the shareholders of the corporation from
liabilities of the business."). For an argument that limitation of liability in private C Corporations, as
well as in LLCs, is a chimera, see infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
75. See 18A AM. JuR. 2d Corporations § 863, at 739 (1985) (noting that "a shareholder is liable
to corporate creditors to the extent his stock has not been paid for").
76. See Uniform Parmership Act§ 15 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 454 (1995) (stating that all partners are
jointly and severally liable for everything chargeable to the partnership and for all its debts and
obligations); Uniform Partnership Act § 306 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 62 (Supp. 1997) (providing that all
partners are jointly and severally liable except for liabilities incurred before a partner joined the
partnership and for liability arising while the partnership was an LLP). See generally Donald J.
Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Pannership Act: The Reponers' Overview, 49 Bus.
LAW. 1 (1993) (providing an overview of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1992) and assessing
its major contributions); Susan Kalinka, The limited Liability Company and Subchapter S:
Classification Issues Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1094 (1992) (stating that at least one member
of a partnership must be liable for its debts).
77. See GEVURTZ, supra note 60 at 254-55.
78. See id. at 80-82.
79. See id. at80-82, 238-39,254-55 ("Section 303(b) ... [of the Revised U.P.A.] provides a safe
harbor of enumerated activities which limited partners may undertake.").
80. See Burke, supra note 56, at 31-32 (describing the typical management of an LLC and
discussing the effects of limited liability on the management of an LLC); Langstraat & Jackson, supra
note 56, at 6; Fallany 0. Stover & Susan Pace Hamill, The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for
Businesses Contemplating the Choice, 50 ALA. L. REV. 813, 817 (1999) (explaining that LLC members
have the option of either formally appointing managers or managing the entity themselves).
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beyond the corporate entity). Such veil piercing is commonly thought to
apply equally to LLCs, and the case law is beginning to agree, creating just
the same unpredictable results as in corporate veil piercing. 82 Additionally, owners of private business entities ·are frequently personally liable
because they usually must endorse entity borrowing or personally commit
torts or supervise those who do commit torts. 83 In short, the nontax
advantages of private C Corporations and LLCs appear dubious at best. 84
C.

Conventional Wisdom-Death ofPrivate C Corporations and Non-UC
Passthroughs
"The report of my death was an exaggeration. " 85 Most recent

commentators on choice of tax entity for small business over-promote

("[M]ost decisions to pierce find their real justification in wrongs conunitted by the defendant in his
or her dealings with the plaintiff or abusive dealings by the defendant with the corporation's assets.");
Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1, 38 (1995)
("Most veil-piercing arguably amounts to either liability for misrepresentations to third parties about
the extent of capitalization or the nature of the entity, or to a kind of fraudulent conveyance liability.");
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036,
1048, 1058 (1991) (finding that piercing occurred more frequently in contracts cases than in tort cases,
and that courts "pierced the veil in about 40% of reported cases"). Self-selection by plaintiffs in
litigation probably contributes to their relatively high success rate.
82. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company:

How Should Couns and Legislatures Aniculate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and
Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 429 (1998) (applying
the current law of veil-piercing to LLCs); Eric Fox, Note, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability
Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1994) (arguing that some aspects of traditional veilpiercing analysis should apply to LLCs). Compare Water, Waste & Land, Inc. v. Lanham, 955 P.2d
997, 1001 (Col. 1998) (holding that an agent for an LLC was personally liable for failure to disclose
that he was acting on behalf of the entity), with Ditty v. Checkrite, 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335 (C.D.D.
Utah 1997) (recognizing that the piercing doctrine probably applies to LLCs, but refusing to apply it
to the defendant LLC in the case); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Latham & Watkins, 909 F. Supp. 923,
930 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); (stating that the corporate veil will not be penetrated unless it is shown that the
corporation was organized for some fraudulent or other improper purpose) and Marina, LLC v.
Walker, No. CA 97-1013, 1998 WL240364, at *6-7 (Ark. Ct. App. May 6, 1998) (affirming the trial
court's refusal to pierce the veil of the defendant LLC).
83. See GEVURTZ, supra note 60, 1998 SUPPLEMENT at 9; Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability
Companies: Profit-Seeking, Individual Liability, and tlze Idea ofthe Firm, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 539, 549
(1995) (arguing that limited liability is a myth); Robert A. Kessler & Gail Levin Richmond, Has
Congress Made the C Corporation Obsolete for Small Business?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 293, 294 (1984)
("The principal nontax advantage of the corporation is the limited personal liability of the business
participants for business debts."); Robert A. Kessler & Edward Yorio, Choosing the Appropriate Form
for the Small Business, 1 CORP. L. REV. 291, 302-04 (1978) (outlining partnership agency rules and
liability for tort damages); Rands, supra note 60, at 26 ("The concept of limited liability also does not
insulate shareholders, members, or anyone else from personal liabilities for any torts that they
themselves conunit while working for the business.").
84. See Dennis J. Carlin, Pannership vs. Corporation: Non-Tax-Shelter Business Enterprise, 34
N.Y.U. !NSf. ON FED. TAX'N 741, 784 (1976) ("The partnership form offers many advantages not
offered by a corporation.").
85. Mark Twain so wrote in a June 1, 1897 note to the London correspondent of the New York
Tnnrnol whirh nnhHohPil it thP nPYt ilov
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LLCs. 86 Conventional wisdom as to choice of small business tax entity
holds that in light of the recent regulatory check-the-box elective tax
classification (allowing taxation as a C Corporation, an S Corporation, or
as a tax passthrough, including an LLC) and the 1986 statutory repeal of
the General Utility shield against inside corporate level tax on gain realized
in a distribution of appreciated capital assets in a liquidation or bulk sale
pursuant to a timely liquidation, 87 the LLC is the wave of the future for
new small business ventures. 88 The theme of "death" of the private C
Corporation and of the traditional passthrough entities, such as limited
partnerships, general partnerships, and S Corporations, runs throughout
recent academic and practitioner tax literature replete with funereal
subtitles. 89

86. See Alan R. Sumutka, supra note 72, at 24 ("Recently touted as a virtual panacea in business
entity planning and selection, the case for the limited liability company (LLC) appears to be
oversimplified and overpromoted. In fact, a C or S corporation is probably the optimum entity for
many small businesses."). For factors commonly used in determining the appropriate tax entity, see
generally James Edward Maule, Repon on the Comparison of S Corporations and Pannerships (pts.
1-2), 44 TAX LAW. 483 (1991); Dudley M. Lang, Comparison ofS Corporations, C Corporations and
Pannerships, 48 N.Y.U. !NSf. ON FED. TAX'N 9-1 (1990).
87. See I.R.C. § 311 and 336 (1994); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-841, vol. II, at 199-204 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4287-92 (containing Conference Repon comments on the
implication of, and intention behind, the repeal of the General Utility doctrine); Denise Roy, Tax Costs
and Opponunities in Exiting a Closely Held Business, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1281, 1346 (1996)
(asserting that in the majority of situations C Corporation tax treatment will be a business's last choice
because of the second tax on exit); Victor E. Fleischer, Note, "If It Looks Like a Duck": Corporate
Resemblance and Check-The-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 529 n.62 (1996)
("The repeal of General Utility by I.R.C. § 311 ... makes the entity-level tax a real burden even to
shareholders of closely-held corporations."). Check-the-box cenainty of pannership status for LLCs
may have some effect on choice of tax entity. See infra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
88. See Richard A. Booth, The Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line
Between Corporations and Pannerships, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79 (1997) (describing the LLC as
the "form of choice for closely held businesses in the United States"); Corey E. Fleming, ILCs Get
Enormous Boost, LAW. WKLY. U.S.A., May 20, 1996, at I (predicting that LLCs will increasingly
displace corporations in the aftermath of check-the-box); Jerold A. Friedland, Tax Considerations in
Selecting a Business Entity: The New E11tity Classification Rules, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 109 (1996)
(noting that LLCs provide the same state law protection against creditors as an S Corporation, but are
generally a more flexible business form); Note, Recent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 553, 556-57
(1996) (describing the advantages of LLC over S Corporation status).
89. See, e.g., Home Office Deduction and Subchapter S Corporation Reform: Hearing on S. 327,
S. 758, and H.R. I2I5 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 104th Cong. 26 (1995) ("(F]uture businesses, I would predict, are going to overwhelmingly
choose the limited liability company, rather than an S corporation." (Statement of Professor Susan
Hamill)). The general pannership has, however, been supplanted by LLCs. See Wayne M. Gazur &
Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. 387, 391 (1991)
(characterizing the LLC as the "survivor of the continuing controversy over the appropriate
classification of entities for federal income tax purposes"); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited
Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 408 (1992) (predicting that
LLCs may ultimately replace limited pannerships, close corporations and even general pannerships "for
most purposes"); Lany E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of

900

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 78:885

Professor Larry Ribstein, a leading proponent of a law and economics
analysis of choice of tax entity, maintains that the traditional corporate
route to limited liability bears the costs of (a) "the extra tax burden
associated with 'two-tier' taxation of corporate income," and (b) rules such
as centralized management, extensive fiduciary duties of directors to
shareholders, and nondiscrimination within classes of stock. 90 Thus, in
his view, the two-tier corporate tax penalizes limited liability. 91 Professor
Ribstein asserts that the LLC alternative "provides an opportunity to test
firms' preference for limited liability in the absence of regulatory and tax
constraints. " 92 He predicts that "[t]he move toward LLCs will come at
the expense of other, more costly, limited liability business forms for
closely held firms, including limited partnerships, statutory close
corporations, and Subchapter S Corporations. " 93 However, Part III shows
that in fact, for most small businesses conducted in entity form with small
positive income after payment of compensation to principals and a need for
retention of capital (e.g., for expansion), the tax constraints currently run
in favor of the C Corporation and against the passthrough form. 94 This
may be even more true for many capital intensive, moderate income private
C Corporations. 95
Professor Susan Pace Hamill fabricates an interesting law and economics construct as to LLCs. She posits that the intolerable inequities of
imposing the corporate tax on small asset private C Corporations will cause
many private small businesses to choose the LLC form over the private C
Corporation form without examining the LLC's business benefits or
detriments: 96 "[l]t is impossible to tell whether or not the LLC offers
material business advantages over the close corporation. " 97 Professor
Hamill therefore calls for corporate shareholder integration for private
corporations (presumably mandatory passthrough) because

Pannership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417 (1992) ("After a transitional period, partnership will survive,
if at all, as a residual form for firms that have no customized agreement."); Walter D. Schwidelzky,
Is It Time to Give the S Corporation a Proper Burial?, 15 VA. TAX REv. 591, 637-38 (1996)
(proposing repeal of subchapter S because of the superiority of the LLC and arguing that the availability
of LLC starus makes the "demise of the S corporation inevitable"); infra note 293 and accompanying
text.
90. Ribstein, supra note 89, at 419·20. This Article does not address the latter "burden." Clearly
the LLC is more flexible than the C Corporation in this respect.
91. See id. at 457 (noting that "despite the availability of single-tier taxation for limited-liability
firms, the two-tier tax continues to penalize limited liability").
92. Id. at 426.
93. Id. at 474.
94. See infra subpart III(A).
95. See infra subpart III(A).
96. See Hamill, supra note 1, at 399, 432-33.
97. /d. at 399.
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[o]nly after lawmakers integrate close corporations, thus removing
the tax advantage LLCs currently enjoy, can new businesses choose
between the LLC and the closely held corporation without regard to
tax consequences; and only then will it be possible to determine if
the LLC's business provisions truly offer a superior combination of
the corporate and partnership forms. 98
Assuming that sophisticated small asset private C Corporations avoid
double taxation by paying out profits as deductible compensation to
shareholder-employees, Professor Hamill argues that only unsophisticated
small asset private C Corporations are taxed more than once. 99 She
claims that "[f]ocusing on the corporate tax paid by the smallest corporations, the revenue cost for integrating the small-asset corporations would
likely be between $2 billion and $3 billion." 100 Therefore, "by bringing
the inequities between the incorporated and unincorporated forms out of the
closet, the rise of the LLC form should compel lawmakers to integrate
small closely held businesses as soon as possible. " 101 Part V rebuts
Professor Hamill's argument by recounting that in fact small business pressure groups view the separate taxation of small income private C Corporations as a $3 to $5 billion a year boon worth fighting for, not a $3 billion
a year burden to be repealed. 102 The historical record sketched there
shows that Congress supports the small business pressure groups in their
battle with corporate tax reformers over inside graduated corporate
rates. 103
Professors Don Llewellyn and Anne O'Connell Umbrecht argue that
passthrough treatment is economically preferable to taxation as a private C
Corporation in most cases, so that for any new entity, other than one
formed as or likely to become publicly traded, an LLC taxed as a passthrough should be the tax entity of choice. 104 They perform present
value calculations of a hypothetical corporation generating income taxed at
thirty-four percent and then selling its assets after five years and
liquidating, with the net to the shareholders being taxed at twenty percent
as a long-term capital gain. 105 They then contrast this with a hypothetical
passthrough whose owners are taxed at a flat 39.6% "[t]o give the C

98. ld. at 433.
99. ld. at 415-18, 430.
100. !d. at 432 n.l87.
101. See id. at 432.
102. See infra notes 457-59 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 458-68.
104. See Llewellyn & Umbrecht, supra note I, at 2.
105. See id. at 6-7.
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corporation option a fighting chance. " 106 With these assumptions they
demonstrate that on a present value basis a passthrough entity is economically preferable. 107 Part III reveals that they have, in effect, tied both
hands behind the back of the small income C Corporation in the choice of
tax entity fight. In reality, ninety-eight percent of C Corporations are
taxed at lower than thirty-four percent, and the second tax is often avoided
or long deferred. 108 They are, however, correct that most owners of
private C Corporations would be taxed at marginal rates of 39.6% or
higher on additional income. 109
In short, most (but not all) commentators predict that LLCs will soon
render obsolete both the private C Corporation and the traditional passthrough entities (partnerships, limited partnerships, and S Corporations) as
tax entities for new private business ventures. 11 For the reasons stated
in Parts IV and V below, in an ideal (or even a moderately rational,
apolitical) tax world most, if not all, of this would come to pass, although
probably not for conventional wisdom's reasons. Of course, in an ideal

°

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

ld.

See id. at 7.
See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
See-infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
In addition to the authorities already cited in notes 86-89, and 101 see William E. Elwood,

The Limited Liability Company in Seven Easy Lessons: A Tax Executive's PriliJer, 46 TAX EXECUTIVE
388 (Sept. 1994) (describing LLCs as the "hottest new business structure in decades"); Hamill, supra
note 1, at 405 (arguing that the explosive rate of increase in formation of LLCs compared with the
small percentage increase in the formation of corporations and decrease in pannerships, indicates that
the LLC "may in fact become the entity of choice in the future"); G.A. Shareef, New Form of
Organizing Aids Business, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. I, 1996, at E-3, available in
1996 WL 6360434 ("The LLC has become the business entity of choice for smaller, privately held
companies. . . . For many businesses, the LLC alternative is not only a smart choice, it is the only
choice available to obtain personal protection from business debts, tax simplicity and financial
flexibility."); Vasilios T. Nacopoulos, Note, Whither (Wither) Subchapter C? The Effect ofthe DoubleTax System's Progeny (the ILC, Check-the-Box and Subchapter S), 17 J. L. & COMM. 159, 173
(1997) (suggesting that the C Corporation may survive, but only due to "corporate inertia" and the
ignorance of practitioners who give advice to new business clients). Here too, as shown in the
Appendix, the facts on the ground are not so convincing. See infra notes 273-309 and accompanying
text. Contrary voices include Burke, supra note 56, at 20-22 (providing an interesting public choice
analysis of origins of state LLC legislation) and Rands, supra note 60, at 32-33 ("No matter what the
merits of the limited liability company (and in my opinion they are modest), its emergence is an
example of badly formulated tax law."). q. Susan Saab Fonney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of
Unintended Consequences: The Traps ofLimited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717,
762 (1997) (warning that "the current limited liability rules can negatively impact [law] firm insiders
and persons who deal with the firms"). For a list of constituencies supporting the LLC movement see
Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, Uncenain Role,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 179-81 (1995) (detailing the roles of business lobbies, tax and
business lawyers, accountants and the IRS in pushing for LLC legislation); Hamill, supra note 30, at
1463-66, 1517-18 (including independent oil explorers, real estate developers, and business ventures
expecting to consistently recognize taxable income as groups with an interest in supporting the LLC
movement).
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world the current multiplicity, confusion, and misunderstanding as to
choice of small business tax entity-all grossly violating the tax principle
of simplicity 111-could never have arisen. 112
III. Reality of Inside Shelter for Small Income Private C Corporations and
Perceived Residual Advantages of S Corporations

A.

Inside Shelter of Small Income Private C Corporation

1. Statistics of Income Data.-The 1993 113 corporate income tax
distribution manifests a long-standing pattern of income concentration in
large asset, mostly publicly traded corporations. 114 The approximately

Ill. Simplicity is a fundamental tax policy criterion. See Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of
Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REv. 567, 572-73 (1965) (providing a seminal definition of
"practicality" as a tax policy criterion). It is thought to be a keystone to a tax system that relies on
taxpayer self-assessment. See Edward Yorio, The Presidem's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right
Direction, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1985) (noting that a system that relies on self-assessment
must be simple, "[o]therwise ... taxpayers may find it difficult or impossible to compute their tax
liability correctly"); Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Issues in Simplification of the Income Tax
Laws, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) [hereinafter Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Simplification
1] (stating that simplification is required in order for individuals to be able to complete their own tax
returns). But see Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Overview of Present Law and Issues Relating to
Individual Income Taxes, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 14, 1999, available in Westlaw at 1999 TNT 73-24
(citing the Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Report JCX-18-99, Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter JCT,
Simplificationll] ("On the other hand, simplicity in a tax system may involve sacrifices of equity and
efficiency."). The practical keystone for individual taxation is withholding and the standard deduction.
See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Simplification I, supra; Amy Hamilton, Rossotti Heeds Advice,
Doesn't Fix What Isn't Broken, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 29, 1999, available in Westlaw at 1996 TNT
82-4 ("(I]nformation reporting and employment tax administration are the cornerstones of the voluntal)'
tax compliance system."). Only 39% of the returns filed in 1999 claimed itemized deductions. Of
these itemizers, roughly 68% had family income greater than $50,000. See JCT, Simplification II,
supra at tb1.4. For 1999, this was 39 million taxpayers. See id. The itemized returns, however,
account for over 50% of reported individual income. See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, Selected

Materials Relating to the Federal Tax System under Present Law and Various Alternative Tax Systems,
TAX NOTES TODAY, March 15, 1996, available in Westlaw 1996 TNT 53-8 [hereinafter Joint Comm.
on Taxation Staff, Federal Tax System].
112. CJ. Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat . .. n: The Mess We Have Made of
Pannership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 487, 488 (1997) (discussing "our collective failure with
respect to partnership law").
113. Although 1996 corporate statistics of income are now available (1995 SOI data as to such
statistics was the latest available when this article was submitted), this article relies primarily on 1993
corporate statistics of income because only for that year is additional data available (from the Joint
Committee on Taxation Staff) as to the number of profitable C Corporations below and above certain
critical tax rate breakpoints and the percentage of corporate income that such groups of corporations
report. See infra notes 128, 130. Without that Rosetta Stone I was only able to estimate based upon
corporate statistics of income that the large public corporations ($100 million+ in adjusted basis assets)
reported 80% of corporate sector income; S Corporations, 10%; and private C Corporations, 10%.
See Lee, Capital Gains Proposals, supra note 35. I would now estimate as of 1993 the income share
of the large public C Corporations roughly at 74%; S Corporations, 11 %; small income private C
Corporations, 5%; and moderate income or middle market private C Corporations, 10%. See infra note
201.
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four thousand profitable corporations with assets (adjusted basis) from $100
million to $250 million paid 6.2% of all corporate income taxes; the
approximately two thousand profitable corporations with assets from $250
million to $500 million 5.3%; and the approximately two thousand profitable corporations with more than $500 million 71.2% .us Thus, the
largest eight thousand profitable corporations (out of almost four million
C and S Corporations) paid 83.7% of corporate income taxes. These large
corporations were nearly all C Corporations, since the largest C
Corporations (.01 %, or roughly the two thousand profitable C
Corporations with assets of more than $500 million) subject to the flat 35%
rate reported 79% of taxable C Corporation earnings for 1993,n6 and
there were only 295 S Corporation returns with more than $100 million in
assets, with just 226 reporting a profit. 117 Roughly two million S
Corporations reported 11.1 % of net income of all corporations in
1993. us Thus 79% of C Corporation earnings is about the same as 68%
of all corporate earnings.
At the same time, the overwhelming numbers of C Corporations (and
even more so with S Corporations) are small asset taxpayers. (This article
assumes that small- asset C Corporations are small income and private C
Corporations and vice versa although "there is not an ironclad correspondence between the size of the business and the form of organization." n9)

assumed that because the number of public corporations roughly corresponded with the number of C
Corporations with $IOO,ooo;ooo or more in assets, they were the same. Professor Hamill cleverly
shows that they are not. See Hamill, supra note I, at417 n.122, 4I5 n.110. I agree with her surmise
that the lack of an exact correlation at the large asset level probably reflects large private corporations
with high levels of debt (thus indicating to me a leveraged buyout of a formerly public firm) and
suspect that she is correct as well that the small asset public corporations may reflect postbankruptcy
shell corporations. See Hamill, supra note 1, at 420 n.131, 415 n.II 0, respectively. In any event, the
overlap between asset size and public and private C Corporations is sufficient to treat them as tending
to be the same for purposes of this Article.
115. See JointComm. on Taxation Staff, Federal Tax System, supra note Ill, attbl. C-22. These
figures include S Corporations (total returns were 3,965,000), although very few of them have assets
in this range. See infra notes 117-I8 and accompanying text. The figures as to percentages of taxes
paid by different classes of corporations by size of assets probably do not vary that much from figures
as to portion of taxable income, since around 75% ofC Corporation income is subject to the 35% rate
and over IO% is subject to the 34% rate. See supra note 113. Effective tax rates may show greater
variation.
116. See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, Impact on Small Business of Replacing the Federal
Income Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 24, 1996, available in Westlaw at 96 TNT 8I-16; see also infra
note 201.
117. See 1993 CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK, supra note I4, at 481, 497.
1I8. See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, supra note 53, at 2 ("S corporations tend to engage in
non-capital intensive businesses and in I993 held only 4 percent of all corporate assets. In addition, S
corporations reported 16.5 percent of all business receipts .... " (using I993 statistics of income data)).
119. Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, supra note 116, at 51.
When businesses are classified by asset size, one can see that there are a significant
number of C corporations of small size. Almost 8I6,000 have assets under $50,000,
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Nearly a third of partnerships report assets less than or equal to zero,
which is much higher than for either C Corporations or S
Corporations. 120
The pattern of concentration of corporate income in a handful of
public corporations is long-standing, 121 even existing in microcosm in the
mid-1930s heyday of tax populism. Then there were 450,000 corporations
(fifty-five percent reporting a profit) and 1.5 million sole proprietorships
and partnerships; the gross sales of corporations was $142 billion; the
gross sales of individuals and partnerships was $30 billion. 122 About
214,000 of the corporations had net income under $10,000; 43,000
corporations had net income above $10,000. 123 Out of this universe, five
hundred to six hundred corporations with $1 million or more net income
reported about half of the total corporate net income. 124 Multiplying all
of these numbers by ten gives a rough picture of the pattern today-fifteen
million sole-proprietors and 1.5 million partnerships, four million small
and middle income corporations and six thousand big corporations that
report over half of the corporate earnings. 125

one-half have assets under $50,000. The concentration of assets differs among the three
forms. C corporations have the largest disparity in asset holding-firms with over $100
million in assets, which represent two-thirds of one percent of C corporations, hold over
90 percent of the assets in C corporations. By comparison, a similar share of partnership
returns (those with assets over $50 million) holds just under one-half of the assets in
partnerships and a similar share of S corporation returns (those with assets over $10
million) hold about one-third of S corporation assets.
Id; see also David L. Brumbaugh, Federal Taxation of Small Business: A Brief Summary, Apr. 14,
1994, at 2, available in 1994 WL 637320 ("[W]hile the connection between income and size is not
perfect-large corporations can have small profits and small firms can earn large incomes-there is
nonetheless a relationship. Relatively small firms tend to earn smaller profits than large ones.").
120. See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, supra note 116 at tbls. 4-6 (comparing the 31.59% of
partnerships with assets Jess than or equal to zero to the 6.7% of S Corporations and 5.42% of C
Corporations with assets less than or equal to zero).
121. In 1963, the Treasury estimated that there were 467,500 corporations with income of less
than $25,000 (90% of all corporations); 54,000 with income from $25,000 to $50,000; 25,000 with
income from $50,000 to $100,000; 25,500 with income from $100,000 to $1,000,000; and 4,000 with
income of$1,000,000 and over. President's 1963 Tax Message: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways & Means (Part 1), 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 70 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 House Hearings]. In 1984,
the 3,663 corporations with more than $250 million in assets reported 60% of corporate sector income.
See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 100-01 n.169.
122. See Hearings on H.R. 12395, Revenue Act, 1936, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 890 (1936) [hereinafter 1936 Senate Hearings] (statement ofTreasury General Counsel
Herman Oliphant).
123. See id. at 12 (statements of Commissioner Guy T. Helvering and A.S. McLeod, Treasury
Statistician); id. at 30 (statement of George C. Haas, Treasury Director of Research and Statistics).
124. See [Confidential] Hearings on H.R. 12395 (Revenue Act, 1936) Before the Senate Finance
Comm. (Part 4), 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1936) (Executive Session) [hereinafter 1936 Confidential
Senate Hearings] (statement of Deputy Commissioner Charles T. Russell). According to Senator
Robert La Follette, Jr., R-Wis., "the figures show that 67 corporations in 1933 had about one-third of
the total corporate income of the country." 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 32.
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Most commentators on corporate and shareholder integration have
focused on the large income corporate taxpayers, 126 where the bulk of the
income is, 127 but in initial choice of tax entity the context almost invariably is small income private business, where the bulk of the taxpayers are.
The Joint Committee Staff's invaluable factual study, Impact on Small
Business of Replacing the Federal Income Tax, using Internal Revenue Service data from 1993 on C Corporations, concluded that sixty-one percent
of all C Corporations reported no income 128 and thirty-seven percent 129
(or 763,356 C Corporations 130), accounting for 5.3% of C Corporation
income, reported less than the $335,000 ceiling on the phase-out of lower
graduated rates on retained corporate income. 131 I calculate the average
taxable income of such small income private C Corporations as $39,708,
which for the average such corporation would be taxed at the fifteen
percent rate applicable to the first $50,000 of C Corporation earnings. 132

126. See TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE, supra note 44, and commentators cited therein.
127. See supra note ll5.
128. Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, supra note ll6, at 5 n.8. My initial premise, based upon
the literature, see authorities collected in Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 91 n.l30, and
my anecdotal experience in practice, was that this very large number of no income C Corporations
mostly reflected a practice of paying out net profits as deductible items on the assumption that firms
with initial operating losses were organized as S Corporations to pass the losses through to owners.
This, too, is the picture Professor Hamill paints of sophisticated small asset (private) C Corporations
avoiding double taxation by paying all of the profits out as deductible compensation. See Hamill, supra
note I, at 430. The substantial deficits (equal to 24% of total net income), particularly at the smaller
asset corporations levels, suggest that operating losses are a prime cause as well. See CORPORATE
SOURCE BooK, supra note 14, at 9. For 1993, at the zero asset level the aggregate deficits exceeded
the aggregate net income; at the under $100,000 of assets level, deficits equal about 72% of net
income; and at the between $100,000 and $250,000 range, deficits equal approximately 60% of net
income. See id.
129. Data from the Internal Revenue Service from 1993 on C Corporations, by taxable income
category, indicated that 61% of C Corporations reported no taxable income, and another 37% reported
taxable income less than $355,000 [sic, $335,000]. See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note
ll6, at 5 n.8. Those C Corporations reported only 5.3% of the total taxable income of C
Corporations, so that the remaining 94.7% of taxable C Corporation income came from 2% of C
Corporations (and 79% of taxable income came from the 0.1% of C Corporations subject to tax at a
flat rate of 35% ). See id. The reference to $355,000 is surely a typo-the amount should be $335,000.
For a C Corporation with taxable income between $75,000 to $100,000 the rate is 34%, and $100,000
to $335,000 the rate is 39%. See I.R.C. § ll(b) (1994); infra note 168.
130. The 1993 CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 1, 481, reveals that for 1993 there
were 3,964,629 active corporations, including I ,901,505 S Corporations. Thus, there were 2,063,124
active C Corporations. 2,063,124 x .37 = 763,356.
131. See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note ll6, at 5 n.8.
Corporations are taxed as separate entities, at rates ranging from 15 percent (for taxable
income up to $50,000) to 35 percent (for taxable income over $10,000,000). The
intermediate rates are 25 percent and 34 percent. The benefit of graduated rates below 34
percent is phased out for corporations with taxable income between $100,000 and
$335,000. Thus, a corporation with taxable income between $335,000 and $10,000,000
is effectively subject to a flat rate of 34 percent.
/d. at 4. I.R.C. § ll(b) (1994).
132. See I.R.C. § 1l(b)(l)(A) (1994). 1993 CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 245
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Other particular circumstances of shareholders may militate towards
selection of a small income private C Corporation over a passthrough
entity. Early commentators pointed out that LLCs offered a tax advantage
over S Corporations, 133 which prohibit stock ownership by a nonresident
alien. 134 While this is true, a private C Corporation may offer even
greater advantages. A nonresident alien may hold stock in a domestic
corporation accumulating income used in United States business expansion
and sell that stock at a capital gain without incurring the thirty percent at
the source tax on income connected with a United States business. 135 In
contrast, a nonresident alien member of an LLC conducting a United States
business is subject to a United States income tax on her distributive share
of such income. 136
A private C Corporation paying out all of its business income either
as compensation or deductible fringe benefits may be utilized to obtain
deductions for certain fringe benefits, including premiums paid for health
and accident insurance and group-term life insurance, which are paid on
behalf of its shareholder-employees, received tax free by such
shareholder-employees, and then deducted by the corporation. 137
Currently, lesser amounts of health and accident insurance premiums paid

$571,922,088,000 ($658,666,005,000-$86,743,917,000). (Recall that the 61% of C Corporations
reponing no income or a deficit were already accounted for so net income C Corporations is the
relevant universe.). Since 5.3% of income for all active C Corporations reponing net income is
$30,311,870,000 (5.3% x $571,922,088,000), the average net income of these 763,356 C Corporations
is $39,708 per corporation ($30,311,870,000 + 763,356 = $39,708). For some indications of the
dispersion of the aggregate income among this group of small income C Corporations, which affects
the inside rate, see infra text following note 168.
133. See, e.g., Andrew Wecker, O.R.C. Chapter 1705-0hio's New Statute on Limited Liability
Companies, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 951, 955 (1995) (noting that the LLCs may have foreign members).
134. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C) (1994).
135. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (1994). Since such a corporation is a United States person, it is not
subject to the flat 30% withholding at the source under § 1441, but is instead subject to United States
income taxation. See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, Description and Analysis of Present-law Rules
Relating to International Taxation, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 29, 1999, available in Westlaw at 1999
TNT 124-8 ("The United States imposes tax on nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations
(collectively, foreign persons) only on income that has a sufficient nexus to the United States. In
contrast, the United States imposes tax on U.S. persons on all income, whether derived in the United
States or in a foreign country."). I am grateful to R. Braxton Hill, III, Esq., one of my Co-Editors
of the Virginia Tax Conference, and Professor William J. Turnier, both members of the Virginia Tax
Study Group, for bringing this niche to my attention. Brax funher explained to me that the inside
corporate income tax often was avoided since these ventures were often stan ups with § 174 research
and development expenditures offsetting income, directly or through net operating losses carried forward under § 172, until sufficient market share was obtained to sell the stock profitably.
136. See I.R.C. § 871(b)(1) (1994).
137. See id. § 79, 106, 162(a); see also Susan Kalinka, Limited Liability Companies: Assignment
of an Interest in a Limited Liability Company and the Assignment ofIncome, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 443,
470-71 n.157 (1996) (emphasizing that one advantage of forming a corporation is that fringe benefits
given by the corporation to its employees can be deducted by the corporation while being received by
the shareholder-emolovee tax free).
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either by an LLC on behalf of a member-employee, or by an S Corporation
on behalf of a two percent or more shareholder-employee, are
deductible. 138 These tax rules may explain in part the very large percentage of active C Corporations breaking even-reporting neither income nor
loss. The phase-in from 1997 through 2007 (or sooner) of the deduction
for health insurance costs of self-employed individuals, 139 ending the
horizontally preferential treatment of private C Corporation employeeshareholders, may be expected to reduce the attractiveness of private C
Corporations, particularly when they are used to pay out all profits as
(deductible) compensation and fringe benefits. Such a result would be
consistent with the SOl projections for an annual decline between 1999 and
2005 in the number of smallest income (mostly private) corporation
returns, Form 1120-A. 140

2. Business Entity Ownership by High Income Individuals.-The
literature shows that the active owners of small corporations are, on the
average, high income individuals 141 (e.g., those taxed at marginal (and
usually effective) rates of 31% and mostly above, up to the 39.6%

I38. See I.R.C. § I62(l)(I) (I994) (providing that 60% is deductible for I999); Booth, supra note
83, at 547 (noting that the possibility of deducting health insurance payments made on the firm level
is one of the attractions of the corporate form).
I39. Section I62(l) currently is phased-in between I997 and 2007. See I.R.C. § I62(J) (I994 &
Supp. m I997).
I40. See Zaffino, supra note I3, at I79 fig. A.
I41. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 58-59 n.7 (noting that stock ownership in
closely held corporations has been concentrated among high-income taxpayers for some time); John W.
Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REv. 1, 41 n.I48
(1995) (citing data indicating that the top I% of families own 49% of publicly held stock and 62% of
business assets). The top 1% of families by income number 700,000 with "family economic income"
beginning at$350,000. ld. at41-42; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PERSPECTIVES ON THE
OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF CAPITAL GAINS 7 tbl. 1, 9 tbl. 2 (1997)
(66.3% of the top 1.2% of families with adjusted gross income over $200,000 owned business property
and 60.7% owned stock). Note that these studies use somewhat different definitions and sources.
Based on analogy to the S Corporation and parmership data, most private C Corporations probably have
no more than I to 4 shareholders (who, based on anecdotal experience, may often be members of the
same family). See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, supra note 53 ("S corporations continue to be
predominately held by three or fewer shareholders. In 1993, half of all S corporations [had] one
shareholder; these firms [held] 3I percent of all S corporation assets. Fewer than one-sixth of S
corporations [had] more than three shareholders. Over 90% of S corporation assets are in firms with
10 or fewer shareholders."). This same pattern continued for I995 and 1996. See Susan M. Wittman,
S Corporation Returns, 1995, I7 SOl BULLETIN (No.4) 43, 45 (1998) (showing that in 1995, 52% of
S Corporations had 1 shareholder; 30%, 2 shareholders; 7.6%, 3 spareholders; and 7.6%, 4 to 10
shareholders); Wittman & Grant, supra note 19, at 43 (showing that in I996, 53.3% of S Corporations
had 1 shareholder; 29.9%, 2 shareholders; 7.7%, 3 shareholders; and 8.3%, 4 to 10 shareholders); see
also Symposium, supra note 55, at 623 (recording Professor George Yin's observation that partnerships
follow a similar pattern with 50% having only 2 partners; 75%, 4 or fewer parmers; and 90%, 10
partners or fewer). George tells me this is based upon unpublished SOl data, some prepared personally
for him by very helpful Service staff.
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marginal rate (or even 45% in some cases)). 142 In contrast, the first
$50,000 of taxable corporate earnings is taxed at only 15% Gust like the
working poor) and the next $25,000 at 25% roughly comparable to the
middle income class 28%; from $75,000 to $100,000 a 34% rate applies
and then from $100,000 to $335,000 a 39% rate applies to "phase out" the
tax benefit of the lower rates on the first $75,000 of C corporation net
income. 143
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) assumes that the benefits
of this inside rate preference are concentrated at higher individual income
levels:
The graduated rates encourage the use of the corporate structure
and allow some small corporate businesses that might otherwise
operate as sole proprietorships or partnerships to provide fringe
benefits. They also encourage the splitting of operations between
sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. Most businesses
are not incorporated; only a small fraction of firms are affected by
this provision.
This provision is likely to benefit higher-income individuals who
are the primary owners of capital . . . .
Most analyses of capital income taxation suggest that such taxes
are likely to be borne by capital given reasonable behavioral
assumptions.
Capital income is heavily concentrated in the
upper-income levels. For example, the Congressional Budget Office
reports that 36.2 percent of capital income is received by the top one
percent of the population, 53.7 percent is received by the top 5
percent, and 62.3 percent is received by the top 10 percent. The
distribution across the first nine deciles is: 0.3, 0.8, 1.7, 2.8, 3.8,
4.8, 6.2, 7.1, and 9.8. Corporate tax expenditures would, therefore,
tend to benefit higher-income individuals. 144
CRS expressly recognizes that the amount of this graduated inside rate
preference thus depends upon the shareholder's outside ordinary marginal
tax rate. 145 CRS elsewhere estimates that
142. See I.R.C. § I (1994). Taking account of the various phase-outs results in a top marginal
rate of 41.5% or so, depending on the taxpayer's dependency exemptions and personal deductions.
See Langstraat & Jackson, supra note 56, at 26-27. The uncapped portion of the FICA taxes can add
another 2.9% to nonpassive income. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. So the top outside
federal rate can reach around 45%, or 30 points above the lowest inside graduated corporate rate.
143. See I.R.C. § ll(b) (1994).
144. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND
MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS, 254 & 5-6 (Senate Budget CommitteeS. Print 103-101 Dec.
1994 103rd Cong., 2d Sess.) (prepared using Joint Committee on Taxation data) (citations omitted)
[hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURES COMPENDIUM).
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[f]amilies that owned small businesses were found to have eighty
percent more income and over five times the wealth of the average
family. Their wealth is similar to that of stockholders in large
corporations. In general, the top 10 percent of households by wealth
own about 80 percent of both types of businesses. The incomes of
small business owners tend to be somewhat below that of owners of
corporate stock-the top 2 percent of households with highest
incomes own 70 percent of large firms and 45 percent of small
firms. 146

3.
Splitting Income Between Private C Corporation and
Entrepreneur.-The above data suggests that a high income owner or
operator of a business venture may tend to use the private C Corporation
as a separate tax entity to "split income" 147 from the venture between
compensation to such owner and retained earnings that are taxed at lower
rates (down to 15%) than if taxed directly to the high income bracket
owner (taxed at up to 39.6% or even 45%). As Jane Gravelle put it in a
CRS Report, given the passthrough S Corporation (and LLC) alternative,
the main reason for choosing the private C Corporation is "tax
avoidance," 148 employing this inside C shelter to split income from the
146. Jane G. Gravelle, Small Business Tax Subsidy Proposals, TAX NOTES TODAY, March 15,
1993, available in Westlaw at 93 TNT 61-12. Yin and Shakow, supra note 35, at 141-42, concludes,
on the basis ofiRS statistics for 1994, that individual participants in partnerships and S Corporations
were, on the average, in higher income tax brackets than individual filers in general, with almost twothirds in the 28% bracket or higher, but with a surprising one-third in the lower bracket or zero income
due, most likely, to pass through of tax losses from the entity.
147. See Lee, supra note 141, at 83-84 (stating that, due to income-splitting between compensation
to the entrepreneur and retained earnings by the corporation, there is often less income tax of corporate
earnings than would be imposed if the entrepreneur were taxed directly for that amount); John W. Lee,
Capital Gains Exception to the House's General Utilities Repeal: Funher Indigestions From Overly
Processed Com Products, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 31, 1986, available in Westlaw at 86 TNT 63-96
(explaining the method by which use of the low graduated corporate rates and reinvestment of corporate
profits can be advantageous to the high-income entrepreneur); Leonard Sloane, Your Money; S
Corporations: A New Luster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1986, § 1, at 38, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File (noting that the first $50,000 of a corporation's earnings will be taxed at 15%, as
opposed to the 28% marginal rate for individuals); cf. William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business
Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 1001, 1015 n.40 {1995) (observing the incentive that exists for taxpayers to split their activities
into smaller entities to take advantage of the low tax rates available to the first $50,000 of corporate
earnings).
148. Gravelle, supra note 146. Cf. Glenn E. Coven, Corporate Tax Policy for the 1\venty-First
Century: Integration and Redeeming Social Value, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 495, 496-98 (1993)
(providing a historical overview of selected tax reforms and their implications); Alvin Warren, The
Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717, 723
{1981) (describing options available to the individual business owner and detailing their tax
ramifications). Comparison between the top marginal individual shareholder rate and the bottom
graduated corporate rate is more relevant for choice of entity than the comparison of top individual and
corporate effective rates that Professor Hamill makes. See Hamill. suora note 30. at 1509-12. The
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business venture. The Joint Committee Staff's conclusion as to choice of
tax entity in Impact on Small Business of Replacing the Federal Income Tax
supports this story in its traditionally careful and impartial manner.
In some instances, if a C corporation anticipates deductions that
may result in a relatively low tax at the corporate level for a
significant period, the fact that corporate rates are lower than the top
individual rates might encourage use of a C corporation rather than
a pass-through entity, particularly if investors anticipate the ability to
reduce shareholder level tax on earnings by realizing the value of
retained earnings in the form of capital gains on sale of the
shares. . . . The top marginal rate applicable to individuals under
present law (39.6 percent) is higher than the top marginal rate
applicable to corporations (35 percent) [and substantially higher than
the graduated inside rates of 15 percent and 25 percent on smaller
amounts of corporate income]. However, the graduation of the
corporate and individual rate schedules and the division of corporate
income among shareholders may mean that the average and marginal
tax rates for the individual shareholders under present law may be
lower than the rates applicable to corporations. The relative tax rates

applicable to corporations and individuals (and the extent to which
business earnings are reinvested in the enterprise) are important
considerations in determining whether or not subchapter C status is
desirable. 149
Popular tax journalism expresses this thought concretely. Comparing
the applicable rates for a small income private C Corporation with those
of an individual filing a joint income tax return and claiming two
dependents, one trade journal concluded: "If a business did generate net
income of $154,790, the optimum tax result would be achieved by splitting
the income between the individual and the corporation-$75,000 to the
corporation and the excess to the individual." 150

corporate effective rate mostly turns on the effective rate of large mostly public C Corporations, since
they repon over 80% of the C Corporation income, which is largely dependent on the capital recovery
rnles, whereas the effective rate of private C Corporations turns more on the graduated tax rates. See
supra notes 114-16; infra note 446 and accompanying text. Choice of new entity usually involves
smaller asset and income entities.
149. Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, Small Business, supra note 116, at 8 & n.ll (combined in
text) (emphasis supplied); Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, supra note 53, at 6 n.6; see also Klein &
Zolt, supra note 147, at 1002-03 (noting that the corporate tax regime can produce savings over
pannership taxation, depending on the relative individual, corporate, and capital gains tax rates); Eric
M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State ofDisequilibrium, 66 N.C. L.
REV. 839, 840, 851-52 (1988) (analyzing the pre-1986 "retained earnings strategy" in which a
corporation avoids higher individual tax rates by not paying out dividends).
150. Mark E. Battersby, Which Structure is Best?, GRAPHIC ARTS MONTHLY, Apr. 1988, at 58,
60; accord, Allen Fishman, Fit the Form of Your Business to Your Special Circumstances, ST. LOUIS
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Unless there is a printer who has not exhausted the 15% tax bracket
with his or her other income, it will always be advantageous for the
graphic arts business to operate as a regular [C] corporation,
accumulate the first $75,000 of taxable income and pay out the
balance in the form of owner salaries. 151
Prior to the advent of the LLC literature extolling the virtues of
avoiding double taxation while obtaining the purported benefits of limitation of liability, the tax advantages of the "inside" corporate tax shelter (of
low graduated rates) were widely extolled in the practitioner tax
literature. 152 Tax writing committee members were informed of this tax
sheltering technique. In many Congressional tax writing committee
hearings, including House Ways & Means Chair Wilbur Mill's famous tax
revision hearings in the 1950s and the House and Senate hearings on
President Jimmy Carter's 1978 tax proposals, including corporateshareholder integration, witnesses testified to the use of small income
private C Corporations by high income shareholders as inside tax
shelters. 153 While capital formation (i.e., encouraging equity over debt

detennining the best legal fonn is that a private C Corporation is taxed as a separate entity paying 15%
on the first $50,000 of net income and 25% on the next $25,000. See id.; see also I.R.C. § ll(b)(1)
(1994) (providing the graduated corporate income tax scale). "Thus, for businesses with earnings
below $75,000, the C-corporation offers reduced tax rates, providing more after-tax income that can
be used for such things as expansion or retiring debt. The higher the individual's tax bracket, the
greater tax advantages to a C-corporation for a business doing under $75,000 a year in profit."
Fishman, supra, at 22 (quoting a panner in a local CPA finn). Such a business is usually "doing" at
least $75,000 to $100,000 a year more in profit before payment of compensation to the principal.
151. Battersby, supra note 150, at 60.
152. See generally Jerald A. Fink, Is There Still Life For Professional Corporations?, 9 REv. OF
TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 123, 128 (1985) (noting the advantages of lower corporate tax rates for high
income individuals); Frank E. Watkins, Jr. & Fred A. Jacobs, Closely Held Businesses: Tax Planning
after ERTA, 13 TAX ADVISER 516 (1982) (developing a taxation decision model that acknowledges the
potential benefits of the "inside" corporate tax shelter); Robert W. Wood, Incorporation of
Professionals Still Offers Benefits, 64 TAXES 38, 41-42 (1986) (exploring the potential tax savings from
splitting income between an individual and a corporate entity).
153. See Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability: Hearings Pursuant to Sec. 5(a)

of Public Law 304, 79th Congress, Before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the Joint Comm. on the
Economic Repon, 84th Cong. 526, 551, 586 (1956) (statements of Rep. Curtis; Chair Mills,
questioning Dr. James K. Hall; and statement of Dr. Hall, respectively) (all asserting that the pre-1978
tax code discriminated in favor of high-income corporate shareholders); Income Tax Revision: Panel
Discussion Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th Cong. 844-46, 863-64 (1960) (statement
of Dr. Carl S. Shoup and colloquy with Rep. Byrnes) (discussing the undertaxation of high-income
stockholders who invest in growth corporations that pay out very few cash dividends); id. at 854-55,
860-61 (statement of Paul Ziffren) (proposing that all corporations be taxed as pannerships to solve the
problem of double taxation and to introduce progressivity); id. at 866-69 (statement of Rep. Alger)
(referring to the limited credit against individual income tax for dividends received by individuals and
to the exclusion of $50 of such dividends under§§ 34 and 116 of the 1954 Tax Code, Pub. L. No. 83591, 68A STAT. 13, 37); The President's I978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong. (Part 6) 3516-33 (1978) (statement of Professor
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financing) did drive the various Congressional corporate-shareholder
integration debates: 154
[t]he desirability of close C corporation graduated rates, meant to
encourage or subsidize capital formation in small businesses (even if
only via increased retained earnings) was discussed in each
integration debate. The graduated rates generated the economic
inefficiencies of horizontal disparity as to businesses conducted in
partnership form and vertical disparity as to wage earners in general
. . . . Under the close C corporation graduated rates, the
corporate-shareholder structure yielded less revenue on earnings than
direct taxation would have, leaving the double tax system vulnerable
to a "briar patch" argument used by defenders of the status quo.
The real issue is not whether a "double" tax is collected, but whether
Treasury will collect the equivalent of even a single tax. 155
Double taxation as to private C Corporations has sadly continued to be a
"Briar Patch" argument that ensnares most recent commentators.
In my Small Business Planning course, I present a hypothetical of a
firm earning $250,000 before paying compensation to Alice, the sole and
active owner. Assume that Alice files a joint return and that her spouse
earns an amount just equal to all deductions, exemptions, etc. Ignore
phase-outs and wage taxes. Thus, were Alice to report the entire $250,000
as taxable income on a joint return, her federal income taxes would be
$77,485 and her marginal rate from, for example, $150,000 to $250,000,
would be thirty-six percent. 156 Now assume that the firm is a C
Corporation and pays Alice compensation of only $150,000, while
retaining $100,000 in earnings. The inside federal corporate income tax
on $100,000 of taxable income, is $22,250. 157 This contrasts with the
$36,000 in individual federal income taxes Alice would have had to pay on
this $100,000, had it been passed through to her. 158 Due to the inside

Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong. 155-56, 190 (1978) (statement of Treasury Secretary W.
Michael Blumenthal) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Hearings] (discussing the existence and use of various
tax shelters). I repeated this message in 1987 hearings before the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee. See MLP Hearings, supra note 35. I had no expectation that it would have any
immediate impact since it was tangential to the topic of the hearings but had hoped that it and the
resulting article, Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, might be taken into account in any
subsequent integration or classification debate. Fundamental errors by most in the LLC literature,
particularly accepting the "Briar Patch" argument of double taxation, might have been avoided had that
more frequently been the case. Happily the exemplary Taxation of Private Business Enterprises did
consider this article. See YIN & SHAKOW, supra note 35.
154. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 66-67 and authorities collected therein.
155. ld. at 67-69 (footnotes omitted).
156. See I.R.C. § 1(a)(1) (West 1999).
157. $50,000 x 15% = $7,500; $25,000 x 25% = $6,250; and $25,000 x 34% = $8,500. See
I.R.C. § ll(b) (1994). $7,500 + $6,250 + $8,500 = $22,250.
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graduated federal corporate income tax rates (fifteen percent on the first
$50,000 of taxable corporate income; twenty-five percent on the next
$25,000; and thirty-four percent on the next $25,000159), the spread
between the inside rate and the outside rate increases at lower amounts of
retained or taxable corporate earnings. If the small corporation retained
$75,000, the inside tax would be $13,750 versus $27,000; if passed
through, and on retainings of $50,000, the inside tax would be $7,500, as
compared to $18,000 if passed through. 160 The spread also would be
increased if the hypothetical is changed to $250,000 paid as compensation
with $100,000 retained. The outside passthrough marginal rate would
increase to 39.6%. 161 This hypothetical probably does not exaggerate the
potential tax savings of close to half of the profitable private C
Corporations, since the top two percent of families by income (who are at
the 39.6% marginal rate before phase-outs of exemptions, and reduction of
itemized deductions, and imposition of wage taxes) hold forty-five percent
of small private businesses. 162
4. Inside Private C Shelter as Tax Expenditure.-The widespread use
of a private C Corporation with small income as an inside tax shelter can
also be deduced from the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation's
calculations of federal tax expenditures. The Joint Committee Staff
annually prepares lists of "tax expenditures" or "reductions in individual
and corporate income tax liabilities that result from special tax provisions
or regulations that provide tax benefits to particular taxpayers." 163 These

159. See I.R.C. § ll(b)(l) (1994).
160. The inside corporate graduated income tax on $75,000 is $13,750, computed as follows:
$50,000 x 15% = $7,500; $25,000 x 25% = $6,250; $7,500 + $6,250 = $13,750. See I.R.C.
§ 11(b)(1)(A) and (B) (1994). The individual joint return income tax on taxable income from $175,000
to $250,000 is $27,000, computed as follows: $50,000 x 36% = $27,000. See id. § I(a). The inside
corporate graduated income tax on $50,000 is $7,500, computed as follows: $50,000 x 15% = $7,500.
See I.R.C. § 11(b)(l)(A) (1994). The individual joint return income tax on taxable income from
$200,000 to $250,000 is $18,000, computed as follows: $50,000 x 36% = $18,000. See id. § 1(a).
161. The 39.6% bracket commences at $250,001 of taxable income for married individuals filing
a joint individual income tax return. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (1994).
162. See supra notes 141-43 and infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
163. Joint Committee on Taxation, JCT Estimates Federal Tax Expenditures for 1999-2003, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Dec. 15, 1998, available in Westlaw at 98 TNT 240-4 [hereinafter JCT Estimates
Federal Tax Expenditures for 1999-2003] (citing the Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1999-2003, JCS-7-98, Dec. 15, 1998, which predicts the future
effect of current tax policy).
Special income tax provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they may be
considered to be analogous to direct outlay programs, and the two can be considered as
alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives. Tax expenditures
are most similar to those direct spending programs that have no spending limits, and that
are available as entitlements to those who meet the statutory criteria established for the
programs.
ld. For an enlil!:htening samoling of the literature see P. CARON ET AL.. FEDERAL INCOME TAX
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special tax provisions can take the form of exclusions, credits, deductions,
preferential tax rates, or deferrals of tax liability. 164
The Joint
Committee Staff calculates the tax expenditure attributable to the inside
shelter of the inside graduated small income corporate rates as $3 billion
a year; and the one-point spread from thirty-four percent to thirty-five
percent as a $1 billion a year tax expenditure. 165
The Joint Committee measures the tax expenditure attributable to the
inside graduated corporate rates by comparing them with the top inside
corporate rate of thirty-five percent (prior to 1993, thirty-four percent). 166
The true comparison should be between the inside graduated corporate
rates and the outside individual income rates that would apply if the small
private C Corporation income were taxed directly to the (active) owners.
The amount of the tax expenditure or subsidy would probably be at least
as large as the Joint Committee estimates if the lower inside graduated
corporate rates were measured against the applicable outside federal
ordinary income tax rates of the individual shareholders. Eighty percent
of small income private C Corporation stock is held by the top ten percent
of individual taxpayer families by income; the top two percent hold fortyfive percent. 167 The top one and two percent of families are subject to
the 39.6% rate on additional income; the top five percent at least to the
thirty-six percent rate on additional income; and the top ten percent at least

ANTHOLOGY 296-312 (1997) (offering articles by Stanley S. Surrey explaining "tax expenditure
analysis" and iiS role in legislative processes).
164. See Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 163.
165. The Joint Committee Staff explains:
The income of corporations (other than S corporations) generally is subject to the
corporate income tax. The corporate income tax includes a graduated tax rate schedule.
The lower tax rates in the schedule are classified by the Joint Committee staff as a tax
expenditure (as opposed to normal income tax law) because they are intended to provide
tax benefiiS to small business and, unlike the graduated individual income tax rates, are
unrelated to concerns about ability of individuals to pay taxes.
!d. Technically the Joint Committee does not split the tax expenditure as to the inside graduated rates
between 34% and 35% as I do in the text, but the historical record supports my conclusion. Reduced
rates on the first $10,000,000 of corporate taxable income are estimated for 1999-2002 at $4.4 billion,
and for 2003 at$ 4.5 billion. See id. The tax expenditure for 1993 as to the first $75,000 of corporate
taxable income (prior to enactment of the 35% bracket which commences at $10 million) was estimated
at $3.1 billion. See Joint Comrn. on Taxation, Estimates ofFederal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
1993-1997, TAX NOTES TODAY, April 24, 1992, available in Westlaw at 92 TNT 89-30.
166. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 163 (implying that the correct measure of the tax
expenditure for the inside graduated corporate rates is the difference between the highest rates and the
lower rates).
167. See CHARLES BROWN Ef AL., EMPLOYERS LARGE AND SMALL 17 (1990); see also
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 141. Similarly, the top 2% of families received over
60% of S Corporation income. See DavidS. Hilzenrath, Income Tax Hike Stirs a Debate On Jobs
Impact: Administration Rejects Claims Small Business Would Be Hurt, WASH. Posr, June 24, 1993,
at B-9, available in 1993 WL 2185133 (stating that "[t]axpayers with incomes of $200,000 or more
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to the thirty-one percent rate on additional income. 168 Accordingly, I
assume that for the most part the spread is between 15% inside and 36%
to 39.6% outside (before taking account of phase-outs and wage taxes).
Comparison of (1) the $3 billion a year tax expenditure (as calculated
by the Joint Committee on Taxation Staff) attributable to the fifteen percent
inside rate on the first $50,000 of small C Corporation income and the
twenty-five percent rate on the next $25,000 169 with (2) the $30 billion
in taxable income I estimate is attributable to the profitable small income
C Corporations as a class for 1993 170 suggests that the tax expenditure
or preference is about ten percent of the corporate income for this class.
The fact that the spread between these graduated rates and the top inside
corporate income tax rate of thirty-five percent is twenty percentage points
on the first $50,000 and ten percentage points on the next $25,000 (the
basis for the Joint Committee's calculations) suggests that a substantial
number of the more than 750,000 small income C Corporations report
income from $75,000 to $100,000, where the preference is only one percentage point, as calculated by the Joint Committee Staff, or from
$100,000 to $335,000, where there is no preference so calculated. The
remaining profitable small income C Corporations perforce have lower
incomes, on the average, than the almost $40,000 average 171 for the
group. Nevertheless, I expect that there is still sufficient inside shelter
overall for a large number of private C Corporations to drive the choice of
tax entity where earnings in excess of compensation to principals can or
need be left in the business.

5. Avoidance of Second Level of Shareholder Taxation.-Important,
but not essential, to this private C Corporation as an inside shelter scenario
is the assumption that the dreaded second level shareholder taxation on
distribution of private C corporate retained income is mostly avoided
through well-known tax techniques. 172 First, private C Corporations

168. I am assuming that the top 1% and 2% of American families have "income" of at least
$250,000; the top 5%, at least $140,000; and the top 10%, at least $110,000. See Lee, supra note
141, at 42 {providing 1995 Treasury estimates of family "economic income," which already include
imputed private C Corporate income). The rates in the text are based upon the breakpoints for married
individuals filing joint returns. See I.R.C. § !(a) (1994).
169. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 126-30 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
172. See Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra note 41, at 22 (prepared statement of J. Roger
Mentz, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy) (stating that, especially as to private C Corporations, "the
double tax is, in practice, to some extent mitigated"); Booth, supra note 88, at 80 (contending that
Treasury was willing to allow LLCs to be taxed as partnerships because double taxation of corporate
income rarely occurs in practice). This literature is referring to techniques which pay out profits in
deductible form to principals. I am referring to retaining small amounts of earnings inside to be taxed
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rarely distribute earnings (in excess of payment of compensation to
principals) formally as dividends, 173 but instead usually retain them for
expansion. 174 Transaction costs of this technique may be high for audited
private C Corporations. Many of the complexities in corporate taxation,
such as the accumulated earnings tax, personal holding company tax, and
the collapsible corporation provisions, were developed in an attempt to
curtail use of a private C Corporation as a tax shelter. 175 Successfully

173. When there are passive and active owners in private C Corporations, conflicts of interest as
to payment of dividends arise with some frequency in state court litigation. See GEVURTZ, supra note
60, at 365. Most small C Corporations probably have no more than one or two owners. See supra
note 141.
174. See, e.g., Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra note 41, at 22 (prepared statement of J.
Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy) (discussing how "double taxation encourages
corporations to retain rather than distribute income, so as to defer the second level of tax"); Lee,
Capital Gains Proposals, supra note 35. If the accumulations are not used for expansion or other
business purposes, then accumulated earnings problems generally arise once the minimum credit for
the accumulation of earnings is exceeded. See generally I.R.C. § 531 (1994) (imposiug an additional
39.6% tax on the "accumulated taxable income" of a corporation where a tainted purpose for such
accumulations is met); id. § 535(c)(2) (providing a minimum credit of $250,000 to most C
Corporations). The accumulated earnings tax is generally imposed on corporations that are "formed
or availed for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders ... by permitting
earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." /d. § 532(a). Accumulated
taxable income is taxable income with adjustments, the determinative one usually being the
"accumulated earnings credit" equal to the reasonable needs of the business, or, if greater, a "minimum
credit" of $250,000. /d. § 535(a),(c). Accumulated taxable income is also reduced by federal iucome
taxes paid by the corporation. /d. § 535(b)(1). The federal corporate income tax on a hypothetical C
Corporation with $50,000 in taxable income is $7,500 ($50,000 x 15%). /d. § ll(b)(1)(A). Thus,
accumulated taxable income for such a C Corporation with $50,000 in taxable income would increase
$42,500 ($50,000- $7,500) annually. Accordingly, assuming no business needs for accumulations,
such a C Corporation's minimum accumulated earnings credit of $250,000 would be reached after six
years (6 x $42,500 == $255,000). Since the business needs defense includes "reasonably anticipated
needs," Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1, and the tainted purpose of avoidance of shareholder level taxation is
not met to the extent accumulated earnings are tied up in bricks-and-mortar, inventory, etc., see Smoot
Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960),
the accumulated earnings tax is not now, nor has it ever been, effective. See JOINT COMM. ON
INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 69TH CONG., REPORT ON EVASION OF SURTAXES BY INCORPORATION
§ 220, at 48-56 (Comm. Print 1927) (noting that the accumulated earnings provision has not been
applied by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to large, private corporations investing enormous surpluses
in expansion or purchase of related industries; as of 1927 no taxes had as yet collected under the almost
decade old accumulated earnings tax); /936 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 124 at 69
(statement of Acting Chief Counsel Arthur H. Kent) ("[l]t is very hard to convince the Board of Tax
Appeals [predecessor to the Tax Court] that there are not some legitimate business reasons for retaining
a substantial portion of the earnings and surpluses." The Government had considerable success,
however, where large accumulations were "loaned" to dominant, large shareholders); JEROLD L.
WALTMAN, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX 108 (1985) (only incompetent advisers fail
to enable corporations to escape this tax since justifications such as future expansion are difficult to
challenge); Jeffrey L. Kwall, Subchapter G of the Internal Revenue Code: Crusade Without a Cause?,
5 VA. TAX REV. 223, 235-37 & n.69, 260-61 (1985) (tracing from 1918 through the end of the 1954
Code, inefficiencies of the accumulated earnings tax in deterring private corporations from accumulating
income to obtain benefits of inside and outside rate differentials).
175. See Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra note 41, at 22 (prepared statement of J. Roger
Mentz. Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy) (stating that "current Jaw attempts to restrict avoidance or
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avoiding these pitfalls requires attention, effort, and when the accountants
and tax lawyers are finally called in, money. Also, a shareholder must
delay realizing the proceeds of her investment, especially if she wants to
maximize the advantages of deferring the outside tax. Wealthy shareholders are in the best position to do so. Less wealthy owners of private
C Corporations, however, may be forced to obtain funds to live on. They
might attempt to do so by drawing a higher salary from the corporation
(taxed as ordinary income and possibly beyond the scope of the
corporation's deduction for salaries, which is limited to "reasonable ...
compensation for personal services actually rendered" 176), by selling
property to the corporation (which might be characterized as a contribution
to the capital of the corporation, particularly if sold for a note, so that the
payments received are taxed as ordinary income dividends) or by borrowing money from the corporation (giving rise to imputed interest or
recharacterization as disguised dividends). 177
Assume a small business making $350,000 leaves $100,000 in the
corporation to be taxed at lower inside rates (fifteen percent on the first
$50,000, twenty percent on the next $25,000, and thirty-four percent on
the next $25,000 178) and pays out $250,000 as compensation to the
principal. If the Service can recharacterize $50,000 of that $250,000 as a
"constructive" dividend it will still be taxed outside at thirty-six percent,
but inside that $50,000 will not be deductible and will therefore be taxed
at thirty-nine percent, because from $100,000 to $335,000 an inside
corporate rate of thirty-nine percent applies before falling back to a flat
thirty-four percent. 179 The leading Code Section in audit of all business
taxpayers is section 162 and the related provisions of sections 263 or
274. 180 Not surprisingly, given the above tax stakes, the leading section
162 audit issue for small and moderate income C Corporations is
postponement of the double tax on corporate income"); Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at
107 (arguing that the inside tax shelter for small C Corporations is "subject to substantial transactional
costs, which create most of the complexity in tax practice as to small business"); Revenue Act, 1936:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong. 658-59 (1936) [hereinafter 1936
House Hearings] (statement of Herman Oliphant, Treasucy Counsel) (discussing the histocy of
provisions designed to prevent evasion of surtaxes through the use of corporations, and the resulting
1934 "straight tax on personal holding companies"). My first article dealt with an aspect of the
shareholder loans versus constructive dividend controversy. See John W. Lee, Shareholder
Withdrawal-Loan or Dividend: Repayments, Estoppel, and Other Anomalies, 12 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 512 {1971).
176. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
177. See MLP Hearings, supra note 39, at 348 (statement of Lee).
178. See I.R.C. § ll(b} (West Supp. 1999).
179. See I.R.C. § ll(b}(1) (West Supp. 1999).
180. See General Accounting Office, Tax Administration, Recurring Issues in Tax Disputes Over
Business Expense Deductions, (GAO/GDD-95-232 1995) Sept. 26, 1995, at 10 (identifying the most
common issues raised in disputes between the IRS and small and large businesses over the business
expense deduction).
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deductibility of "reasonable" compensation. 181 This has been the case for
over two decades. 182 The fact that taxpayers win most of the litigated
reasonable cases, which Professor Hamill documents, 183 overlooks the
substantial transaction costs in audits, since litigation is only the tip of the
audit iceberg. 184 Even when a taxpayer wins in audit or a lawsuit, she
loses due to the transaction costs.
The second, more serious risk of double income taxation is thought to
be triggered by the entrepreneur's exit from her private corporation. 185
This seems to be (1) avoided at least half the time 186 by holding the
private corporation stock until death (thereby obtaining a stepped up basis
in her estate's hands 187) or merging it tax-free into a public
corporation 188 and then holding its stock until her death, or (2) largely

181. See id. (noting that the most common issue for small and medium sized C Corporations is
reasonable compensation).
182. See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, Simplification I, supra note 111, at 32-33 (listing
"compensation" as one of the eight most significant issues at the IRS appellate level for the past 20
years).
183. See Hamill, supra note 1, at 415-16 (finding that since the 1970s, the IRS success rate has
been about 30-45% ). A pattern of auditors raising tax issues which are senled at the appeals level or
often lost in litigation is to be expected when auditors are evaluated only on the amounts of increased
taxes proposed and not on the ultimate outcome. See General Accounting Office, Tax Administration:
Compliance Measures and Audits ofLarge Corporations Need Improvement, (GAO/GGD-94-70 1994)
Sept. 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10576 (reporting that a key measure of the Service's audit
function is the amount of additional taxes recommended per audit hour, while the appeals function is
measured by the number of cases senled without litigation, and also recommending consideration of
the amount of dollars collected in each audit as well).
184. Roughly 1,000,000 audits a year yielded only 30,000 litigated cases a year prior to the
reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service. Compare General Accounting Office, Financial Audit:
Examination of IRS' Fiscal Year I993 Financial Statements, OvervieiV of the Financial Statements,
(GAO/AIMD-94-120 1994) June 15, 1994, at 55 (stating that in 1993 only .9% of individual taxpayers
and 3.1% of corporations were audited), with Ann Reilly Dowd, Win More at the New IRS; Congress
Is Finally Getting Serious about Fixing the IRS, MONEY 82 (Jan. 1998) (stating that only 31,000
individual taxpayers "choose to take the IRS to any federal court").
185. See supra note 87.
186. See Lee, supra note 141, at 15 (citing a collection of literature that concludes that 50% of
stock owned by individuals is held until death). That literature considers public stock. The political
rhetoric set forth by William Blatt must rest on the assumption that a large percentage of private stock
is held until death. See William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular
Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287, 340-44 & n.319 (1996) (recounting historical
arguments against inheritance-based taxes, which he claims hurt small businesses).
187. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1994). The revenue loss from such a step up was expected (before the
most recent stock market run up) to increase from $14 billion to $20 billion a year from 1995-99. See
TAX EXPENDITURES COMPENDIUM, supra note 144, at 243.
188. In the past few years, American mergers have primarily been stock acquisitions in which the
parties used a pooling of interests accounting method. This method allowed the acquiring company to
avoid the "goodwill" costs associated with mergers (where companies pay, in stock, a value that
exceeds the target's tangible assets) by simply adding together the accounting ledgers of the two
companies. Under a new merger accounting method recently implemented by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, the acquiring company must record goodwill costs on its balance sheet and then
gradually write them off against profits, which could "[penalize] a company's earnings growth for
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diluted by deferring sales of such stock for a number of years, with
ultimate realization at preferential capital gains rates. 189 When the inside
tax rate is 15% and the outside tax rate is 20% (the maximum individual
capital gains rate190), the after tax income is greater than it would be after
direct taxation at 39.6%. 191 If, as is usually the case, realization of the
outside capital gain is deferred, its present value is decreased so that the
spread between the private C Corporation and direct taxation is increased.
And, of course, for many, the direct taxation marginal rate is more like
45% than 39.6%. 192
Section 1202 allows individuals a fifty percent exclusion of capital
gains from certain small business C Corporation stock sold after a five-year
holding period. This stock otherwise is subject to a twenty-eight percent
rate and hence, theoretically, a fourteen percent rate. 193 This provision
is unlikely to constitute a major factor in choice of tax entity due to the
interplay of this preference with the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT),
which results, in most cases, in a twenty percent rate still being
applicable. 194

several years." See Daniel Bigler, Little Goodwill forM erger Rule Reform Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES
(LONDON), Apr. 23, 1999, at 6, available in, available in LEXlS, News Library, London Times File;
Accounting Shift Could Accelerate Mergers, BosroN GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1999, at D2, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Bglobe File; Accounting Board Votes to End Pooling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at
C22, available in LEXlS, News Library, New York News Source File (explaining that under "purchase
accounting" the premium above tangible assets must gradually be written off). The Financial
Accounting Standards Board has voted to repeal pooling of interests accounting effective January I,
2001, which many think may accelerate mergers short term but reduce merger activities after that date
iu market segments where pooling is now typically used, like in financial institutions and technology
industries. See id. But see Robin Sidel, Accounting Rules to Change on Mergers, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2865709 (notiug that most merger experts do not expect a slowdown in
merger activity). I thank Bob Eveleigh, Esq., a former student, for bringing this development to my
attention.
189. See David S. Hulse & Thomas R. Pope, The Effect of Income Taxes on the Preference of
Organizational Forms for Small Businesses in the United States, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., 24-25 (1996)
(explaining that small business owners doing business in the corporate form can receive a return on
their investment by selling their stock rather than declaring a dividend, and by so doing defer the
"second tier" of corporate double taxation and also reduce the amount of that "second tier" tax by
qualifying for capital gains treatment). Indirect support for much longer average holding periods for
private C Corporations can be found in the fact that the holding periods for partnerships and S
Corporations are, on the average, much longer than for corporate stock (the realizations of which I
believe are overwhelmingly public stock). See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 141, at
11, tbl. A-15; Lee, supra note 141, at 11, 16, 25-6 n.IOI.
190. See I.R.C. § l(h)(l)(c) (West Supp. 1999).
191. Assume $100 taxed at 15% = $85 x 80% [100%- 20%] = $68 after inside and outside tax;
$100 x 61.4% [100% -39.6%]= $61.40 after a single level of tax.
192. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
193. See I.R.C. § 1202(a) (West Supp. 1999).
194. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(3)(D) (West 1999). I thank Professor Tumier for showing me that I
needed to include a discussion of§ 1202. But for the AMT aspect, § 1202 would tend towards selection of the private C Corporation over an S Corporation or an LLC.
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In conclusion, "double taxation" is either an unwitting or "briar
patch" argument 195 in most cases. In any event, some believe that the
tax cost of exiting is not taken into account by clients at the time of choice
of tax entity 196 (leading to surprises 197 and perhaps recriminations upon
exiting). A few significant contexts, such as business reasons, idiosyncratic investor preferences, 198 or a near-term goal of going public, 199
may induce selection of a C Corporation, even when initial losses are
anticipated, foregoing the income tax savings of a passthrough entity.
B.

Inside Shelter for Moderate Income Private C Corporations

Moderate income private C Corporations (income from $335,000 to
less than $10,000,000) subject to the flat 34% inside corporate tax rate also
provide inside shelter (34% versus 39.6% before phase-outs and wage
taxes) on considerable amounts of income, to the extent that their very high
income shareholders avoid the second level of individual income tax by
holding stock in that or a successor public corporation until death. 200 I
assume that this entire group was around 33,490 C Corporations in
1993. 201 This group reported for 1993 around 11.7% of C Corporation

195. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 69 (analogizing corporate shareholders to
"rabbits" in the 1954 Code "briar-patch" being caught in double-tax "thorns"). I am indebted for this
simile to my colleague Professor Charles Koch, as acknowledged therein. He has been my chief
sounding board for over a dozen years. This anicle, as well as many others, and scholarship and
governance in general at our Jaw school owe a Jot to him.
196. Compare Hearing Before the Senate Finance Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1985) (statement of Professor Sam Thompson) (arguing that most businesses
would choose not to incorporate due to the proposed bill's effects on taxation at exit) accord id. at 246·
47 (statement of Professor Edwin Cohen) (arguing that the "double tax" proposal would negatively
affect incorporated entities, especially smaller corporations that own appreciated property and whose
only way of avoiding higher taxes would be to sell their assets to another, larger corporation); id. at
326·27 (statement of Professor Edward J. Roche) (contending that many more businesses would elect
to form partnerships in order to avoid the unfavorable tax consequences of C Corporations), with id.
at 262·63, 273·81, 327-28 (statements of Peter Faber, Esq.) (arguing that small companies choosing
a business form generally choose whether to incorporate or not based on immediate concerns, such as
limited liability or initial taxes, rather than exit costs).
197. See Laura Saunders, S, Cor Me? FORBES, Dec. 5, 1994, at 168 (commenting that when the
seller of a private C Corporation "hears about the double tax, he is shocked" (quoting John Evans, an
accountant for Anhur Anderson)).
198. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737,
1766 (1994) (making the point that investors may have nonmonetacy benefits as investment goals).
199. See Llewellyn & Umbrecht, supra note I, at 9 (stating that if interests in a business wilJ be
"publically traded," C Corporation status "is probably mandatocy"). Even here, it might be more tax
advantageous to use an S Corporation to pass through losses and then terminate the election when the
going-public stage of relatively high annual earnings is attained. See id. at 22 (favoring an S
Corporation when an eventual exchange for corporate stock is anticipated).
200. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
201. The entire group of profitable C Corporations with taxable income above $335,000 is 2%
of all C Corporations, according to the Joint Committee. See supra notes 129-30 and text
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income with an average income of $1,998,056. 202 Assuming that moderate income correlates (sufficiently) with moderate assets, perhaps ninety
percent of these moderate income C Corporations are private according to
Professor Hamill's helpful studies. 203
While the tax expenditure as to moderate income private C
Corporations is only one percentage point under the Joint Committee's
calculations (thirty-four versus thirty-five percent), the true subsidy for
these "moderate income" private C Corporations where the outside tax can
be avoided is up to eleven percent of their substantial income (forty-five
percent maximum outside rate less thirty-four percent inside rate). 204 I
suspect that the aggregate subsidy to 33,490 moderate income private C
Corporations may equal or exceed the aggregate subsidy to twenty times
as many small income private C Corporations. A populist perspective
would anticipate just that result. 205
C.

Factors Outweighing Inside Shelter of Private C Corporations

I. Factors Militating in Favor of UC as Choice of Entity.-The
above discussion has shown the inside tax shelter reason that the small
income private C Corporations (and some moderate income private C
Corporations) still remain a practical entity of choice where the entity
generates small (and sometimes even moderate) amounts of net profits after
payment of compensation to principals, which are retained in the entity for
expansion. There are, however, two significant market segments in which
the inside shelter of private C Corporations is less useful or not available
at all to significant percentages of the SOl industrial groups. Not
surprisingly, it turns out that these two segments account for over seventy

profitable large asset (and income) C Corporations leaves 33,490 moderate asset profitable C
Corporations (the loss C Corporations-large, moderate, and small asset-are included in the 61% no
income or loss corporations). See Joint Comm. on Taxation Staff, Federal Tax System, supra note Ill,
at 60; 1993 CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 497, line 1.
202. For 1993, C Corporations with assets of$100 million and above reported $474,691,920,000.
See 1993 CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 245 Oine 661ess line 69). All C Corporation
income amounted to $571,922,088,000, see supra note 14. Therefore, such large asset C Corporations
reported 83% of C Corporation income for 1993 ($474,691,920,000 ..;. $571,922,088,000 == 83%).
Small asset C Corporations reported 5.3% of C Corporation income. See supra note 131. Therefore,
moderate income and moderate asset C Corporations reported 11.7% of C Corporation income. [I 00%
- 83% - 5.3% == 11.7%] All C Corporation income amounted to $571,922,088,000. 11.7% x
$571,922,088,000 = $66,914,884,300. $66,914,884,300 ..,. 33,490 = $1,998,056.
203. See Hamill, supra note I, at 422 n.I45 (calculating that approximately 10% of medium asset
corporations are publically traded, thereby implying that the other 90% are privately held). While our
definitions of "moderate" might not exactly correspond because Hamill is using asset size and I am
estimating from income shares, I expect the results would not vary much. See supra note 119.
204. See supra text accompanying note 143.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 327-43.
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percent of the growth in LLCs. These two segments are (1) insurance,
financial, and real estate industries and (2) services industries. 206
If initial losses are expected in a beginning real estate venture, then a
passthrough entity is usually recommended. 207 Even if the real estate is
not generating current deductions in excess of rental income, a systemic
pattern of selling real estate investment after a relatively short period (less
than ten years) and distributing the proceeds would trigger a double
tax. 208 Moreover, improved real estate has historically appreciated, or
at least had its basis reduced (by depreciation) 209 below the sales price,
which would generate an inside tax on sale or distribution in kind to the
shareholders with no inside capital gains advantage. 210
As to service businesses, the inside shelter of graduated rates on small
income is not available to certain personal service corporations. 211
Moreover, in service businesses not subject to the loss of such graduated
inside corporate income tax rates, there is also less likely a need to
accumulate earnings than in other market segments, since most service
businesses are less capital intensive. 212 If the principals intend to
withdraw most of the profits from the venture, then a passthrough tax
entity is also indicated. These professional services and real estate
premises are confirmed by the statistics of income for partnerships, S

206. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
207. See Melvin N. Greenberg, Forms of Organization for Holding and Developing Real Estate,
29 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX'N 1129, 1134, 1148 (1971) (listing the fact that losses are passed
through to each partner as a reason to organize real estate ventures as partnerships); see also supra note
65 and accompanying text. Such losses may not be currently taken by the owners except to the extent
of passive activity income or material participation in non-real estate businesses or real estate rental
businesses hy real property business operators. See I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1999).
208. See infra note 210. Exceptions to this pattern would be large real estate firms and real estate
investment trusts seeking public financing and small income real estate firms with taxable income of
less than $100,000 after compensation to principals. See J. Donald Dial, Jr., When to Put Real Estate
in a Corporation-Tax Considerations, 32 S.C. L. REV. 319, 328-29 (1980) (discussing how
corporations holding real estate can avoid double taxation).
209. See I.R.C. §§ 168 (West Supp. 1999), 1016 (Supp. 1997); Christian C. Day, Corporate

Investment in Real Estate Ventures-Special Considerations for Special Allocations Under Section 704:
'The Price is Right," 10 J. CORP. L. 313, 315 (1985).
210. See I.R.C. §§ 311, 336 (1994). A sale of appreciated real estate (not held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinal)' course of business) by an S Corporation or LLC would be taxed at a
preferential capital gains rate to an individual shareholder or member under§§ 1221, 1231 and 1(h),
whereas a C Corporation would not obtain any rate advantage upon a similar sale under § 1201. See
id. §§ 1221, 1231, 1(h), 1201 (1994).
211. See I.R.C. § 11(b)(2) (1994) (excluding qualified personal service corporations from
graduated rate eligibility). The definition of qualified personal service corporation includes "health,
law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, [and) consulting." I.R.C.
§ 448(d)(2)(A) (1994). See generally Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 82-83 (stating that
"[t]he new PSC inside tax rate is starkly simple: PSCs are not eligible for section 11(b)(1) graduated
inside corporate rates").
212. Cf. Wittman, supra note 141, at 50 (showing that the services industl)' ranked fourth in total
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Corporations, and C Corporations discussed below, and validate law and
economics theory, which assumes that more or less rational tax strategies
drive choice of tax entity. 213

2. Factors Militating in Favor of S Corporations and C to S
Corporation Conversions.-Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax
literature and hearings presented a paradigm tax life cycle of a private
corporation, beginning with an S election during the initial loss first stage.
Once the profitable second stage was reached, the S election was then
terminated and the organization operated as a C Corporation (S to C
conversion) to accumulate earnings that would be taxed at lower graduated
inside corporate rates. 214 Historically, the third and last stage, C to S
conversion, occurred when a private C Corporation approached unreasonable compensation or accumulated earnings problems, or perhaps unexpectedly began to incur losses, which would benefit the owner-entrepreneur if
passed through. 215 Consistent with the first stage of initial passthrough
of operating losses, newly formed S Corporations reported an average loss
of $5,921 for 1987, while established S Corporations reported average
income of $20,262, and newly converted S Corporations reported average
income of $71,986. 216 In contrast, and consistent with the third stage,
68.1% of C to S conversions for 1987 reported positive income (almost
two-thirds of the remaining C to S conversions reporting a loss in 1986
also reported a loss in 1987). 217 This indicates that perhaps a third of C
to S conversions are made in order to pass through operating losses otherwise trapped in a C Corporation. This is likely a problem of substantial
magnitude since sixty-one percent of C Corporations for 1993 reported no
income or incurred losses. 218

213. "Economic analysis of law traditionally posits a world in which decisions are based on
rationality, not on emotion." Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Layalty, and the Corporate Campaign,
73 B.U. L. REV. 291, 359 n.339 (1993) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
3-10 (2d ed. 1997)). As indicated at infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text, the Service estimates
that from 1999-2005, the rate of increase in C Corporation returns will decline. To the extent that this
does occur, and is based on the conventional but erroneous wisdom of double taxation of private C
Corporations, perceptions rather than reality will be driving some choices of tax entity. The
widespread prediction that LLCs will supplant C Corporations thus may become a self-fulfilling
prophecy rather than an explanation of rational factors leading to that result. The prediction that they
will also supplant S Corporations shows no signs of occurring in the near-term future.
214. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 150 ("The most common forms of business are sole
proprietorships, partnerships (limited or general), regular C-corporations, and S-corporations. These
forms may be used in combination or a different form may be used at various stages of a business.");
Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 91 n.130.
215. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 91 n.130.
216. See Susan M. Wittman & Amy Gill, S Corporation Elections After the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 17 SOI BULL., No.4, at 82, 83 (1998).
217. See id.
?.1 R_
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C to S conversions make up a substantial number of new S elections
each year. This is the second choice of tax entity story. Of the over
268,000 returns filed by new S Corporations for 1996, 71.6% were filed
by newly incorporated businesses and 28.4% were filed by C to S
conversions; 219 of nearly 270,000 returns filed by new S Corporations for
1995, 70.7% were filed by newly incorporated businesses, the rest by C
to S conversions; 220 of 250,000 returns filed by new S Corporations for
1994, forty-one percent were filed by newly incorporated businesses, the
rest by C to S conversions; 221 of 255,600 returns by new S Corporations
for 1993, seventy-five percent were filed by newly incorporated businesses,
the rest by C to S conversions; 222 and of 241,600 returns by new S
Corporations for 1992, two-thirds were filed by newly incorporated
businesses, the rest by C to S conversions. 223 In the last four of these
years, the number of new S elections each year exceeded, by 125,000 to
150,000, the total annual increase in S Corporation returns, 224 probably
reflecting the substantial failure rate in small businesses225 and perhaps
some second stage S to C conversions. Third stage C to S conversions do
raise the complexity level of S Corporation taxation considerably. In
addition, built-in gain tax on preconversion appreciation in assets held by

219. See Wittman & Grant, supra note 19, at 40.
220. See Wittman, supra note 141, at 43.
221. See Susan M. Wittman, S Corporation Returns. 1994, 16 SOl BULL., No. 4, at 38, 38
(1997).
222. See Amy M. Gill & Susan M. Wittman, S Corporation Returns, 1993, 15 SOl BULL., No.
4, 27, 28 (1996).
223. See Amy M. Gill, S Corporation Returns, 1992, 14 SOl BULL., No. 4, 73, 74 (1995). The
highest rate of C to S conversion during these years was in 1994 after the outside rates had been
retroactively raised at the highest individual brackets for 1993, and thus the pain of a return reflecting
such increases arose on about April 15, 1994. See I.R.C. § 6072 (1994) (setting the due date for
calendar year individual income return at the 15th day of April following the close of the calendar
year).
224. For 1993, the increase from the prior year of total S Corporation returns was 116,134; for
1994, the increase was 122,249; for 1995, the increase was 129,365; and for 1996, the increase was
151,297. See Gill & Wittman, supra note 222, at29; Wittman, supra note 221, at 39; Wittman, supra
note 141, at 44; Wittman & Grant, supra note 19, at 41.
225. The literature indicates a 50% to 75% failure rate during the first five years. See, e.g., Ellen
P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1357 (1993) ("Small businesses ...
have high rates of failure."); Gary D. Burton, Incubators as a Small Business Support in Russia:

Contrast of University-Related U.S. Incubators with the Zelenograd Scientific and Technology Park,
J. OF SMALL Bus. MGMT., Jan. 1998, at 92 (citing the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of
Advocacy (1992) for the proposition that "the failure rate for a small business is typically between 55
and 65 percent during the first four to six years of existence"); Phillip F. Zeidennan, Franchising: Who
Needs It? The Role of Small and Medium-Sized Companies, J. FIN. COMMITTEE ON FRANCHISING,
Winter 1984, at 11 (noting that over half of all small business startups fail within five years). Many
of these businesses start up again under the same ownership. See G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical
Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1198, 1238 (1988) ("Statistics show that many small businesses emerge from Chapter 11 under
the same ownershin a~ before hankruntcv _")_
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the C Corporation and subsequently realized by the S Corporation is significant in the literature, but perhaps less so on the ground. 226 Most C to
S conversions, new S Corporations, and existing S Corporations were in
the services industrial group, and, to a lesser extent, the retail trade
group. 227 Such C to S conversions also reduce the number of C
Corporations and thus require more newly formed private C Corporations
to maintain the same net number of C Corporations.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, with its (1) dramatic lowering of outside individual rates below the top inside corporate tax rate, its (2)
elimination of the capital gains preference, and also its (3) repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine, had a sea-change effect on electing S
Corporations. The number of S Corporations surged from 826,214 in
1986 to 1,127,905 in 1987, a 36.5% increase. 228 Forty-three percent of
the increase is attributable to C to S conversions, 229 continuing a pattern
of growth commencing with the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982.230
From 1987 through 1992, the numbers of S Corporations and C
Corporations converged, as S Corporation numbers increased while C
Notwithstanding the Revenue
Corporation numbers decreased. 231
226. Compare Eustice, supra note 53, at 389-90 ("Conversions between C and S status ... have
no significant entity level tax consequenees. ") (written prior to the built-in gain tax), with Kalinka,
supra note 76, at 1168-69 (noting the problems of conversions from C to S due to built-in gain). In
1995, the built-in gains taxes paid by S Corporations were $141,218,000, as compared with
$99,128,672,000 in net income (about 78% from trade or business, 19% from portfolio income, and
2.3% from rental real estate). See Wittman, supra note 141. at 48-49. Of course, such built-in gain
occurs only in converted S Corporations and S Corporation successors (by merger) to a C Corporation,
which are a fraction of all S Corporations, albeit probably a significant fraction by now since such
conversions have been running at 75,000 or so a year, and these converted companies are older and
less likely to fail after election than a newly formed S Corporation.
227. See Wittman & Gill, supra note 216, at 83-85.
228. See Paula Karvonis & Nina Shumofsky, Corporation Income Tax Returns, /989, 12 SOl
BULL., 41 Fig. C (1992).
229. See Gill, S Corporation Returns, /992, supra note 223, at 73, 74.
230. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 965, 1016 n.l52 (1989) (noting a 61% increase inS Corporations from 1981-1984,
in contrast to a 12% increase in all corporate returns for the same period).
231. See Tom Peska, Taxes and Organizational Choice: An Analysis of Trends, 1985-92, 15 SOI
BULL., 86, 90 (1996). SOI data suggest that due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the relative
importance of Subchapter S Corporations increased. "In the 15 years from 1978 to 1993, the number
of S corporation returns filed nearly tripled, with three-quarters of the increase coming after 1986 ..
. [with the] most rapid increase in ... [1987-1990]." Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Subchapter ·
S, supra note 53, at 3. "Since then, the annual growth rate in the number of S corporations returned
to rates comparable to those of the early 1980's." ld. While the number of S corporation returns
increased after 1986, the number of C Corporation and partnership returns decreased, resulting inS
Corporations representing 48.4% of all corporations by 1993. See id. at 31.
By contrast, in 1986, S corporations were only 24.1 percent of all corporations. In 1990,
the number of S corporations surpassed the number of partnerships for the first time.
While there has been a relative shift between partnerships, C corporations, and S
corporations, the predominant form of organization [in numbers] throughout the period
has remained the sole proprietorship.

2000]

Business Tax Entities

927

Reconciliation Act of 1993's increase in the top outside individual rate
above the top inside corporate rate, such increase "has apparently not
slowed the rate of growth in the number of S Corporation returns
filed. " 232 This might indicate that the C to S conversions after 1993
were more for the traditional unreasonable compensation and accumulated
earnings problems rather than simply a desire to withdraw profits with a
single level of taxation.

D.

S Corporations

~rsus

Other Passthrough Entities

1. Conventional Wisdom.-Commentators typically point to the S
Corporation restrictions on capital structure (for example, one class of
stock and strict pro rata allocations of income and loss) and identity of
shareholders (preclusion of nonresident aliens, and corporate investors, or
prior to 1996, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)233) as nonlevel
playing field barriers to raising capital not present in LLCs or other
partnerships. 234 The stock ownership patterns in S Corporations suggest
that these restrictions have scant impact at the time of formation, although
were the S Corporation ever to acquire many more shareholders (which
seldom happens) the restrictions might have more of an impact. Over fifty
percent of S Corporations have only one shareholder. 235 Another thirty
percent have only two shareholders. 236 In light of this ownership pattern,
some state entity statutes might in fact impose greater restrictions on
availability of LLCs than federal law imposes on S Corporations. A
handful of jurisdictions still require that an LLC have two or more
members, 237 although with check-the-box most now permit single
member LLCs. 238 Initially I surmised that lower LLC-to-corporation

232. Wittman, supra note 141, at 43.
233. Under the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 1316, 110 Stat.
1758, 1785, a qualified retirement plan trust is able to holdS Corporation stock under§ 1361 (b)(l)(B)
and (b)(6). I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(l)(B) & (c)(6). Passthrough income was treated as unrelated business
income under § 512(e) as enacted, but the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 retroactively amended this to
exclude ESOPs. See I.R.C. § 512(e)(3) (1997); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 744-45 (1997),
reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1129, 1556-57. As a practical matter, due to the limitation on
holdings of investments in employer securities under ERISA§ 407, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. 880
(1974), and its exception for ESOPs, only ESOPs may hold substantial amounts of S Corporation stock
of the sponsoring employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (1994).
234. See HamiJI, supra note 1, at 408 ("Commentators asserted that without reformS corporations
would be unable to compete for capital with LLCs." (citing Robert J. WeJls, S Corp. Simplification Bill
To Be Introduced Soon, Senate Aides Say, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 160-62, May 10, 1993, available
in Westlaw at 93 TNT 100-2)).
235. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-1313 (Michie 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17050 (West
Supp. 1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1301(16) (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C § 2(5)
(West Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-106 (Michie 1999).
238. See. e.f! .. ALASKA STAT. ~ 10.50.155(b) (Michie 1997): COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-203
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formations ratios might exist in the holdover jurisdictions since the majority
of small businesses have just one owner,239 but Professor Glenn Coven
pointed out to me that this limitation is probably largely offset by the ease
of bringing in a minority owner such as a family member.
The most significant distinction between Subchapters K and S entities
is the inability to step up the basis of inside S Corporation assets upon the
death of a shareholder or redemption of her stock interest, as can be done
to the inside basis of partnership or LLC assets upon the death of a partner
· or liquidation of her partnership interest under a Section 754 election. 240
This problem may often be overlooked in the initial choice of an entity
since it usually would not surface until years in the future. Some suggest
that the partnership aggregate approaches of inside step up provisions and
mandatory allocations of built-in gain are far too complicated for many
small business practitioners and taxpayers. 241 This may well be true for
the smallest business entities, particularly if more tax sophisticated
practitioners are unavailable due to cost or location. I find convincing

CODE ANN. § 14-11-101(12) (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-202 (1999); 805 ILL COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/5-l(b)(l999); IOWA CODE§ 490A.l02 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7605 (1998 revised);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.015(8) (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.1301(10) (1999);
MINN. STAT. § 322B.11 (West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-103(h) (1998); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 304-C:l.V. (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42.2B-2 (West 1999); N.D. CENTURY CODE§ 10-3206 (revised 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. § 2001.11 (1998); ORE. REV. STAT. § 63.001(13) (1997); R.I.
GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-2(m) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 33-44-202(a) (Law. Co-op. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS§ 47-34A-202.l(a) (Michie 1999); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Art. 1528n. art. 4.0l.A (1999); 11
VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3022(a) (1997); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-1.002 (Michie 1998); W.VA.
CODE§ 31B-2-202 (1999).
239. See Symposium, supra note 55, at 623 (uin 1993, about seventy-five percent of the roughly
twenty-one million businesses in this country were organized as sole proprietorships ... [A]bout fifty
percent of all S corporations in 1993 had only a single shareholder .•.. In 1994, about fifty percent
of all partnerships had only two partners.").
240. See Burke, supra note 56, at 28 (contrasting the rules governing corporations' and
partnerships' recognition of gain upon the distribution of appreciated property); Eustice, supra note 53,
at 354, 387 (discussing generally the discontinuities between Subchapters Sand K); John H. Matheson
& Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16
(1996) (identifying uthe inability to adjust inside basis" as one of the utax disadvantages" of the S
Corporation); Francis J. Mellen, Jr. et al., Limited Liability Companies and Registered Limited Liability
Pannerships in Kentucky: A Practical Analysis, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 229, 297 (1995) (recommending
that companies be organized as LLCs rather than as S Corporations because the former permit a § 754
election); Rands, supra note 60, at 20 n.29 (stating that, unlike an S Corporation shareholder, u[a]
partner can make a § 754 election which allows a basis adjustment in his or her share of the partnership
property in order to reflect the outside basis in his or her partnership interest"); Schwidetzky, supra
note 89, at 598 (uAnother substantial advantage of the partnership over the S corporation is the
availability of the 'section 754 election.'").
241. See Martin D. Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter Sin an Integrated Tax World, 47 TAX L.
REV. 665, 669-70, 678 (1992) (describing the Subchapter S rules as a surrender of a degree of
precision and flexibility in exchange for uabsolut[ion] from having to master" the uawesomely
complex" partnership tax rules); Yin, supra note 35, at 136 n.51 (proposing a simplified tax system
for simple private business firms that would avoid inside basis adjustments and special allocation
requirements for built-in gain or loss).
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Professor Yin's example in Taxation of Private Business Enterprises of the
two person, very small business partnership needing simplicity. 242

2. Familiarity Breeds Predilection.-Conventional wisdom holds that
practitioners are more familiar with S Corporations than LLCs or partnerships in general. 243 My anecdotal experience is that nontax expert, small
business practitioners (and sometimes their clients244) think that they
understand Subchapter S but know that they don't understand Subchapter
K, much less LLCs. Furthermore, drafting S Corporation documents often
involves off-the-shelf documents, while partnership and, in particular, LLC
documents require more tailoring and more time educating the client and
are hence more expensive. 245 This component constitutes a market
failure-lack of information-which time and experience may correct. 246

242. YIN & SHAKOW, supra note 35, at 104-16, 128-31, 162-69, 183-234 and 245-72.
243. See generally, Symposium, supra note 55, at 624-25, 629-30 (relating the comments of
Professor Carol R. Goforth; Ira Meislik, Esq.; Professor Larry Ribstein; Jude Lemke, corporate
counsel; Dale G. Schedler, Esq.; and Irving Schloss, Esq.); accord, GEVURTZ, supra note 60, 1998
SUPP. 19-20. Professor Coven similarly believes that practitioners accustomed to the private C
Corporation form may prefer S Corporations to LLCs for passthrough treatment of private businesses
for at least the near future. See Symposium, supra note 55, at 630 (noting an observation by Jude
Lemke of Chiquita Brands International, Inc., that subchapter Sis more easily understood by nontax
specialists and clients than subchapter K); accord, Douglas E. Starcher, Limited Liability Company May
Be Good Incorporation Alternative, ORLANDO SENTINEL, March 24, 1997, at 32, available in 1997 WL
2764197 ("S corporations, as corporate entities, enjoy the benefits of familiarity."). The SOl data
supports this insight. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
244. See Symposium, supra note 55, at 624-25 (detailing a discussion between Professor Carol
R. Goforth and Ira Meislik, Esq., about inertia among lawyers and clients as a barrier to acceptance
of new business forms like LLCs); Jan Norman, No Stampede-Yet-for Limited Liability,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 29, 1995, at E1, available in WL, SCRMTO-BEE Database ("Although the
art consultant's attorney and accountant recommended the LLC form, 'We felt insecure; we didn't
know enough. We formed an S corporation instead, because we were familiar with it.'").
245. See Symposium, supra note 55, at 630-31 (presenting the discussion of Jude Lemke, Ira
Meislik, Esq., and Dale Schedler, Esq., regarding the additional costs of new forms and "tailor-made"
language for LLCs). See generally Phillip J. Baptiste & Tracy J. Monroe, Negative Aspects to Using
ILCs for Operating Companies, 27 TAX ADVISER 472 (1996) Oisting familiarity, drafting, and return
preparation expense factors as reasons to avoid LLCs); Cheryl A. Cruz & John E. Karayan, Should
Your Firm Operate as a ILC?, 21 Bus. F. 16 (1996) (discussing learning curve problems such as the
hesitation of accountants and lawyers to set up LLCs until others have done so and the ms has made
rulings). This factor may work for an LLC, at least by attorneys drafting the documents who may be
able to charge far more for an LLC than for an S or C Corporation. This was the general sentiment
expressed by participants at the Ernst & Young LLP Professional Educators Conference held on March
18-19, 1999 at Tysons Comer, Virginia. Accord, Symposium, supra note 55, at 626-27 (William R.
Asbell, Esq.; Michael Bamberger, Esq.) (observing that the expense ofLLCs makes them less desirable
to clients). CPAs, on the other hand, who are getting no fee for drafting may be more likely to
recommend an S Corporation (perhaps due to familiarity) according to the participants at the Ernst &
Young LLP Professional Educators Conference. That has been my anecdotal experience gleaned from
talking to local practitioners and participants in regional tax conferences.
246. See Branscomb, supra note 2I3 (noting that law and economics holds that market failures
tend to self-correct). q: Symposium, supra note 55, at 624-25 (expressing the opinion that lawyer
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3. Wzge and Self-Employment Tax Avoidance.-An apparent reason
for the continued popularity of S Corporations as choice of entity,
particularly for service businesses, is the perceived advantage of S
Corporations in wage or self-employment taxes. The taxes imposed on
employers and employees under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA)247 and on partners and proprietors under the Self-Employment
Contributions Act (SECA)248 are sufficiently substantial these days to
drive choice of tax entity. One frequently advised, and hence presumably
widely used, technique is to split profits in an S Corporation between (1)
compensation to the principal or shareholder-employee subject to the FICA
12.4% (employer and employee) old-age, survivor and disability insurance
(OASDI) and 2.9% (employer and employee) medicare hospital insurance
(MHI), and (2) "dividends" (actually withdrawals of pro rata share of
income after payment of compensation to principals) equal to the balance
of the profits which it is hoped are not so subject to FICA. 249 In
contrast, as a sole proprietor or partner, an identical 12.4% OASDI and
2.9% MHI tax is imposed under SECA on the principal's "net earnings
from self-employment. " 250 A partner's or proprietor's net earnings from
self-employment is generally her distributive share from any trade or
business, less certain passive income (rents, interests, dividends). 251 A
shareholder in an S Corporation is not required to include for SECA
purposes her pro rata share of the S Corporation's income as net earnings
from self-employment, "[r]athenhareholders who perform services for the

Ribstein's. See id. SOl estimates that S Corporations will continue to be more popular than LLCs for
some time. See infra notes 285, 289 and accompanying text.
247. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b) (1999) (imposing a wage tax on employees), 31ll(a) and (b) (1994)
(imposing a wage tax on employers).
248. I.R.C. §§ 1401-02 (1994).
249. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, New Incentive for Avoiding SE and FICA Tax,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 10, 1998, available in Westlaw at 98 TNT 237-58 [hereinafter Raby &
Raby, Avoiding SE and FICA Tax] (describing scheming to avoid payroll taxes through S Corporation
dividends); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Shareholder Compensation: How Low Can You
Go?, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 13, 1996, available in Westlaw at 96 TNT 116-62 [hereinafter Raby
& Raby, S Shareholder Compensation] (examining cases where shareholders received low
compensation). See generally Baptiste & Monroe, supra note 245, at 242-73 (contrasting the treatment
in LLCs and S Corporations of 401(k) plans, self-employment tax and payroll withholding); Kirsten
Harrington, Employment Taxes: What Can the Small Businessman Do?, 10 AKRON TAX J. 61, 70-75
(1993) (outlining the benefits of distributing someS Corporation profits as compensation); Michael P.
Watters & Daryl Burckel, Establishing Reasonableness of Compensation Difficult in IRS Attacks, 8
AKRON TAX J. 147, 150 (1991) (calculating that taxpayers have won only 20% of inadequate
compensation cases, in contrast to 50% of excessive compensation cases). Again, this is what local
practitioners and professor-consultants at the 1999 Ernst & Young Conference told me.
250. I.R.C. § 1401(a)-(b) (1994).
251. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1994) (defining "net earnings from self-employment"); Joint
Committee on Taxation Staff, Description and Analysis of Proposals Relating to Worker Classification
and the Tax Treatment of Cenain S Corporation Shareholders and Panners, TAX NOTES TODAY, May
3, 1994, at 19, available in Westlaw at 94 TNT at 85-6 [hereinafter JCT, Worker Classification].
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S corporation are subject to FICA taxes on the wages paid to them. " 252
(A field service advice holding that a Subchapter S Corporation
shareholder's pro rata share may constitute earnings from self-employment
unfortunately is erroneous. 253) Therefore, an S Corporation is thought
to have a clear wage tax advantage over a partnership or proprietorship in
many instances.
Commentators maintain that as long as the compensation paid is in the
reasonable range the Service can not treat the pro rata share as compensation for FICA purposes. 254 The case law (prior to the 1982 revision
of Subchapter S) drew more subtle distinctions. The old Subchapter S
treated a shareholder's share of undistributed S Corporation taxable income
as "an amount distributed as a dividend on the last day of the taxable year
of the corporation. " 255 The Service often attempted, without success, to
treat such deemed dividends as wages for FICA where there was no actual
distribution (which was income tax free to the extent of previously taxed
undistributed income). 256 Where the shareholder performed services,

252. JCT, Worker Classification supra note 251, at 19-20.
253. See IRS Field Service Advice 1999-526, 13 Chief Counsel Advice Serv. (Tax Analysts) No.
3, at 457 (Feb. 1, 1999). The Service concluded that S Corporation distributive shares can be
self-employment income (and subject to self-employment tax) if the shareholder's services are a material
income-producing factor, but because the shareholder's services were nota material income-producing
factor, the distributive shares were not self-employment income. "Sections 1.1402(a)-2(f) and (g) of
the Income Tax Regulations provide that for purposes of determining net earnings from
self-employment, the term 'partnership' includes a subchapter S corporation as defined in section 1361
of the Code." /d. The regulation actually refers to a partnership electing to be treated as a domestic
corporation under long-repealed Subchapter R, i.e., section 1361 of a very early version of the 1954
Code. See I.R.C. § 1361 (1954), 68A Stat. 3, repealed by Act of April14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-389,
§ 4(b)(l), 80 Stat. lll, 116. Treatment of an S Shareholder as self-employed for wage purposes is
sound tax policy, see infra note 262 and accompanying text, but contrary to the current statute. See
Ding v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that, based on the plain meaning of
§ 1402 and the fundamental principle of corporate and tax law (that corporation and shareholders are
separate persons), "S corporation pass through items are not properly included in determining selfemployment tax liability").
254. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 30, 249, at 71 (discussing what constitutes "reasonable
compensation" and noting that recently, "much larger salaries [are] being considered reasonable");
Raby & Raby, S Shareholder Compensation, supra note 30, 249 (listing methods for preventing
compensation from being considered for FICA calculations).
255. I.R.C. § 1373(b) (1954). Now, following the partnership model, a shareholder's pro rata
share of partnership income or loss is simply included in her income for her tax year in which the S
Corporation's tax year ends. See I.R.C. § 1373(b) (1958) (eliminated through revision in 1982).
256. See, e.g., Gardner v. Hall, 366 F.2d 132, 135 (lOth Cir. 1966) (holding that the Secretary
of HEW has no authority to allocate the profit and income of a corporation not distributed in fact); Letz
v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 598, 602 (D. Col. 1975) (ruling that the Secretary of HEW cannot
allocate corporate profits to an applicant for Social Security benefits as long as such funds remain
undistributed and unavailable for individual use); Somers v. Gardner, 254 F. Supp. 35, 38 (E.D. Va.
1966) (holding that funds from a self-run corporation cannot be used to reduce old age insurance
benefits so long as the applicant for such benefits did not receive income from the corporation in any
form). For prior law see I.R.C. § 1375(b), (d) (1958) (eliminated through revision in 1982). See
f!enerallv David F_
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took no compensation as such, and actual distributions were made in the
form of dividends or loans, however, the courts, under a "substance over
form" analysis, allowed agency reclassification of such "dividends" as
"wages" for FICA. 257 There have been no reported cases where some
compensation was paid and the rest of the shareholder's pro rata share was
distributed. Moreover, IRS staff has questioned whether the authorities
decided under the old Subchapter S still apply. 258
Section 482 cases dealing with sole proprietor service businesses
which incorporate (as a C Corporation) suggest that the Service can determine under section 482 that the arm's length compensation charged by the
S Corporation shareholder for her services (where capital is not a material
income producing factor) is essentially equivalent to what she would have
received absent incorporation because that is what an uncontrolled taxpayer
could demand and obtain.259 In such circumstances, under the majority

Full-Step Back, 4 VA. TAX REv. 49, 50-52 (1984) (describing the effect of the Subchapter S Revision
Act of 1982 on constructive, unallocated dividends).
257. See, e.g., Spicer Accounting, Inc., v. United States, 918 F.2d 90, 93 (9th Cir. 1990)
("[R]egardless of how an employer chooses to characterize payments made to its employees, the true
analysis is whether the payments are for remuneration for services rendered." (citing Radtke v. United
States, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990))); Fred R. Esser P.C. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 421, 423
(D. Ariz. 1990) (holding that the form of payments constituting wages is immaterial); Ludeking v.
Finch, 421 F.2d 499, 503 (8th Cir. 1970) (distinguishing cases where profits were actually distributed);
Joseph Radke v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (holding that dividends paid to a
corporation employee amount to wages for the purpose of calculating FICA and FUTA taxes, especially
if the employee is the sole shareholder in the corporation and receives no other monetacy compensation
from the corporation), aff'd 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990); Gale W. Greenlee, Inc. v. United States,
661 F. Supp. 642, 643 (D. Col. 1985) (declaring that loans made from a corporation to its sole
shareholder constituted payment of wages for the purpose of calculating FICA and FUTA taxes).
258. See JCT, Worker Classification, supra note 251, at20 n.22 (noting that recent rulings make
older rulings unclear); House Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Ways and Means, Repon on H.R.
3600, W.M.C.P. No. 103-25, at 302 n.34 (1994) [hereinafter Subcomm. Repon on Health Security]
("The present-law validity of this 1974 ruling [Rev. Rul. 74-44] following the substantial revision of
the rules that apply to S corporations and their shareholders in 1982 is unclear.").
259. See Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1025-26 (1981), aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (lOth Cir.
1983). The court there commented that:
Assuming that Keller, Inc.'s share of partnership profits from MAL and its fees from
MAL, Inc. continued to be on a par with those payments in the pre-incorporation years,
one would expect petitioner, in an arm's-length transaction with an unrelated party, to
have bargained for a total compensation package which would approximate the amounts
he previously received as a sole proprietor. One would similarly expect that petitioner's
total compensation would also reflect any increase in MAL and MAL, Inc.'s earnings
over and above the pre-incorporation years. To the extent of any meaningful disparity
between these amounts, it is our view that the Commissioner is correspondingly justified
in making an adjustment in petitioner's income to properly reflect the true taxable income
he earned in his capacity as Keller, Inc.'s employee.
The Commissioner lost in Keller because the professional services corporation paid all of its earnings
out as compensation or contributions to a qualified retirement plan. !d. at 1028-29. Congress'
unhappiness with the "result" in Keller lead to Section 269A. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-760, at
634 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1190 (stating that Congress intended these provisions
would "overturn the results reached in cases like Keller v. Commissioner. 77 T.C. 1014 (1982). where
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approach the Service can reallocate income from the S Corporation to the
shareholder as an arm's length charge (compensation) for her services. 260
Such reallocation would impact FICA wage taxes. 261 Section 482 might
not apply to under-compensation for wage tax purposes under the rationales
that it is (I) limited to clearly reflecting income for income tax purposes or
is (2) predicated on the shareholder-employee not working exclusively for
the services corporation. If so, the theory that the Section 482-deemed
arm's length charge for services is the substantial equivalent to what the
shareholder-employee would have received as a sole proprietor (including
subsequent increases in profits), should be extendible to fix what is
reasonable compensation for wage tax purposes. 262 The sensible answer,

the corporation served no meaningful business purpose other than to secure tax benefits which would
not otherwise be available"). That provision is limited to reallocations between a personal service
corporation and shareholder-employee where the corporation performs substantially all of its services
for one other entity. See Mary LaFrance, The Separate Tax Status of Loan-Out Corporations, 48
VAND. L. REV. 879, 904, 919 (1995) (describing the government strategy to oppose service induslry
tax avoidance). Keller supports the practice of C Corporations (panicularly professional corporations)
paying out all profits as compensation and fringe benefits (especially health insurance). See supra notes
137-38 and accompanying text.
260. Cases conflict as to whether the shareholder and the corporation are two commonly controlled
businesses for purposes of§ 482 under which the Service may reallocate income between two or more
businesses owned or controlled by the same interests if necessary to clearly reflect income. See
Fogelsong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[Section 482] ... should not apply,
however, to one who does work exclusively for his corporation") (emphasis omitted), rev'd, 77 T.C.
1102 (1981) (explaining that§ 482 is applicable because the threshold requirement that there be at least
two organizations, trades or businesses was met because there was an employee and a corporation).
The Service properly refuses to follow this holding. See Rev. Rul. 88-38, 1988-1 C.B. 246 (asserting
that in determining whether § 482 applies, the term "organizations, trades or businesses" should be
broadly construed "to include a kind of equity or enterprise that had independent tax significance");
Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing ConfUsion Over the Assignment of Income
Doctrine and Personal Service Income, 1 FLA. TAX REv. 623, 667-68 (1993) (describing how§ 482
is unimpaired by Fogelsong because the common law assignment of income doctrine can achieve the
same result). See generally Elliott Manning, The Service Corporation-Who Is Taxable on Its Income:
Reconciling Assignment ofIncome Principles, Section 482, and Section 351, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 657,
678-79 (1983) (harmonizing § 482 with Fogelsong and illustrating the failures in the coun's reasoning);
Kerry M. Lavelle, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 482 Tax Implications for Closely-Held
Domestic Business Associations, 9 VA. TAX REV. 199, 209 (1989) (suggesting that Keller is a
reasonable solution). The Fogelsong coun overlooked that being an employee of a corporation itself
constirutes a trade or business. See Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 378 (1970) ("[l]t is
possible for an employee to retain, at least temporarily, his starus of carrying out his own trade or
business, independent of receiving any compensation from a panicular employer."). I thank Professor
Gene Seago for calling Rev. Rul. 88-38 to my attention.
261. See Foster v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 234, 236 n.I46 (1983) (noting that characterization
affects liability for FICA taxes).
262. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (b) ("A controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard
if the results of the transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if
uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances .... "),with
id. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (defining reasonable compensation as "such amount as would ordinarily be paid for
like services by like enterprises under like cireumstances"). The "arm's-length" standard under the
§ 482 regulations is "equally applicable in ascenaining the 'ordinary and necessary' character of a
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of course, is contained in President Clinton's still-born health bill: treat two
percent or more S Corporation shareholders as partners for SECA
purposes. 263
There is a further choice of entity wrinkle in this context. Under a
1977 statutory amendment, the distributive share of a limited partner is
excluded from net earnings from self-employment, except to the extent of
a "guaranteed payment" under section 707(c) for services to or on behalf
of the partnership. 264 In 1997, the Service proposed conceptually sound
regulations reminiscent of the passive activity loss regulations that would
have barred this exception to any limited partner performing services in
professional partnerships or participating in the partnership business for
more than five hundred hours during the year. 265 After a firestorm of
pressure group complaints alleging a stealth tax increase266 by the

T.C. 836, 849 (1973). The Tax Court in Bianchi v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 324, 332 (1976), ruled
that "it is proper to make reference to prior self-employment earnings to decide whether current
corporate compensation of an employee is reasonable." The newS Corporation made a "deferred
compensation paymeut" coveriug a 7-day period far out of line with prior self-employment earnings
to support a qualified plan contribution and create a passthrough Joss, both of which the court
disallowed as attributable to unreasonably high compensation. See id. at 333.
263. See House Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Ways and Means, Repon on H.R. 3600,
W.M.C.P. No. 103-25, at 302-03 (explaining the provision "(I) amend[ing] the definition of NESE
to include the pro rata share of certainS corporation income of certain shareholders and (2) modify[ing]
the rules applicable to limited partners in a partnership, for SECA tax and health insurance premium
purposes"); NYSBA Advocates Uniform Self-Employment Tax Treatment for Owners of Interests in
Passthrough Entities, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 15, 1994, available in Westlaw at 94 TNT 245-43
(citing New York State Bar Association, Memorandum, Uniform Self-Employment Tax Treatment of
Owners of Interests in Pass-Through Entities, Dec. 9, 1994, which advocates elimination of the
distinctions between types of partnerships for SECA calculations); see also Thomas E. Fritz,
F/owthrough Entities And The Self-employment Tax: Is it Time For a Uniform Standard?, 17 VA. TAX
REV. 811, 856 (1998) (asserting that "the most noteworthy aspect of the various proposals introduced
in the I 03rd Congress is the fact that each measure would have extended application of the selfemployment tax to two-percent shareholders of an S corporation").
264. See Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 313(b), 91 STAT. 1509, 1536; I.R.C. § 1402(a)(l3) (1994).
Congress intended to prevent passive limited partners from creating social security earnings from selfemployment (especially when the earniugs arose from securities income) in order to obtain social
security benefits. See H.R. REP. No. 95-702, pt. 1, at40-41 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4155, 4197 ("Under the bill, the distributive share of income or Joss received by a limited partner from
a trade or business of a limited partnership would be excluded from social security coverage.
However, the exclusion from coverage would not exteud to guaranteed payments (as described in
section 707(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.)").
265. See Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.1402(a)-2(h), 62 FED. REG. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997); cf. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(l) (1997). The conceptual soundness is limited, of course, to income from
services.
266. See 143 CONG. REC. S8,472 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Bond) (noting that
millions of limited partners in limited partnerships and LLCs will be pleased by the proposed bill's
"moratorium" on the IRS's proposed stealth tax); id. at H3,253 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) (remarks of
Rep. Pappas) (referring to the 2.9% proposed tax on limited partnerships to pay for medicare as a
"stealth tax"); Raby & Raby, Avoiding SE and FICA Tax, supra note 249 (describing reaction to the
proposal as "intense"); see also 145 CONG. REc. S 2602-03 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
'Rnnr1' r~roninO'
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Service, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 postponed for one year issuance
of any final regulation. 267 Treasury, taking the hint, still had not
promulgated such final regulations at the time of this writing.
What about LLCs? Limited partner usually means limited as to
liability and since members of LLCs are so limited, aggressive practitioners
have argued that active members in LLCs are not to be subject to these
wage taxes, 268 at least where a manager is appointed. Commentators
have pointed out that since there is no definition establishing whether a
member of an LLC is a limited or general partner, assuming that even a
nonmanager member of an LLC with a management agreement is a limited
partner for SECA purposes is risky and against the policy of SECA, which
was aimed at passive investors attempting to obtain coverage, for social
security purposes, from passive investments. 269 Moreover, no active
member of an LLP should be considered a limited partner for this
purpose. 270 I agree. Here, too, the sensible resolution is statutory. 271

CONG. REc. S928 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Bond) (including sections of the Stealth
Tax Prevention Act to provide a 60 day notice period to review any IRS raises in revenue). See
generally David L. Green, Bill Eases Small Business Burdens, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, June 6, 1997, at
19C, available in Wesdaw, SLPD database (describing the "stealth Tax Prevention Act").
267. See Pub. L. No. 105-34, Sec. 935, 111 STAT. 788, 882 (placing a moratorium upon final
regulations until July 1, 1998); Raby & Raby, Avoiding SE and FICA Tax, supra note 249. For a
discussion of "limitation riders," which include such a moratorium, whereby Congress micro-manages
tax policy, see John W. Lee et al., Capitalizing and Depreciating Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs:
More-Troub/e-Than-It's-Wonh?, I7 VA. TAX REV. 161, 169 & n.26 (1997).
268. See Stephen Lukinovich,Limitedliability Companies, Pannerships Differ, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), July 26, 1998, at 3E, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File (noting that
one of the advantages of an LLC is that "some members may be able to avoid self-employment tax"
in a nonprofessional service business).
269. See, e.g., Carol Mayo Cochran, Key UC Issues and Answers, THE TAX ADVISOR, July 1,
1996, available in 1996 WL 9338497 (asserting that guidance is needed for the application of the
definition of "limited panner" in the context of LLCs); Carol R. Gofonh, Continuing Obstacles to
Freedom of Choice for Management Structure in UCs, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 165, 197
(1997) (exploring the relationship between passive loss limitations, the choice of management structure
in LLCs, and the definition of "limited panner"); Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers:
General Panners Need Not Apply, Bus. LAW., Nov. 1995 (discussing the implications of the selfemployment tax for lawyers practicing in member-managed LLCs); Walter B. Moore et al., Shaping
Your Practice: Planning a Foundation to Give Your Business Structure and Form, NAT'L PUB. Ace.,
Dec. 1995, at 18 (noting that under the current regulations problems arise in the context of passive
investmenJs "because all LLC members are literally limited panners"); see also supra note 264 and
accompanying text.
270. See Raby & Raby, Avoiding SE & FICA Tax, supra note 249 (noting that the IRS considers
the treatment of active members as limited panners "a perversion of the statutory scheme").
271. See Fritz, supra note 263, at 814 (noting that in recent years focus by Congress and the
Clinton administration on the self-employment tax has rendered the unsettled and controversial area
subject to substantial scrutiny, as well as to the real possibility of modification). At the 1999 Ernst &
Young Conference, a participant stated that he recommended splitting services and investment activities
into separate LLCs, with an S Corporation as a manager of each, to which the LLCs would pay a
management fee. If all of the entities are owned by essentially the same interest(s), this seems to exalt
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As between using a single member LLC and a sole shareholder S
Corporation to attempt to avoid self-employment wage taxes, the LLC
appears much weaker. 272 This, I suspect, explains some of the growth
in S Corporations. In any event, for wage or self-employment taxes to be
driving the choice of tax entity, particularly with a single principal where
capital is not a material income producing factor, constitutes, in my eyes,
a market failure.

E.

Facts on the Ground as to Choice of Tax Entity

1. Statistics of Income Data.-The facts on the ground show that the
number of active C Corporations increased by more than ten percent, from
2,063,124 in 1993273 to 2,321,048 in 1995.274 The bulk of that
increase occurred, however, in 1994, with a net increase of only 2,434 C
corporations in 1995. 275
Nevertheless, the number of new C
Corporations formed in 1995 was far greater than such net increase. For
instance, 92,150 C Corporations elected S Corporation status for 1995.276
Accordingly, at least that many new C Corporations had to have been
formed in 1993 in order for the 92,150 shrinkage in the 1994 base number
of C Corporation returns to be offset. Undoubtedly, a number of other
new C Corporations were also formed, which were offset by liquidations
of and cessations of active business status by private C Corporations.

historically been risky in the wage tax arena. I find sound the advice that David N. Pope, CPA, one
of the Conference directors who practices in Houston, Texas, gives clients, which is to follow the
proposed regulations where they materially participate as to services income, etc.
272. A single member LLC is regarded under the classification regulations as a "tax nothing,"
i.e., a sole proprietorship in this context. See DavidS. Miller, The Tax Nothing, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Feb. 3, 1997, available in Westlaw at 97 TNT 22-69 ("[T]he tax nothing will most often be a singlemember limited liability company that has not elected to be treated as an association for federal income
tax purposes."). Dressing this up as a manager-directed LLC is quite aggressive. See Bernie Phillips,
Self-Employment Tax Treatment ofUC Members, NAT'L PUB. Ace., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 6 (stating that,
according to an ms person who was responsible for the check-the-box regulations, "the single member
LLC must be treated as a sole proprietor").
273. See supra note 130.
274. See STAT. OF INCOME DIVISION 1995, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, 9, 481 (revised
1998). Internal Revenue Serv., Stat. oflncome: Corp. Income Tax Returns 9, 481 (Pub. 1053 revised
March 1998) [hereinafter 1995 STAT. OF INCOME DIVISION] (revealing that there were 4,474,167 active
corporations, 2,153,119 S Corporations, and thus 2,321,048 C Corporations).
275. 2,321,048 C Corporations in 1995 - 2,318,614 C Corporations in 1994 (4,342,368 active
Corporations in 1994 minus 2,023,754 S Corporations) = 2,434. See 1994 STAT. OF INCOME
DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STAT. OF INCOME: CORP.. INCOME TAX RETURNS 9, 481 (Pub.
1053 revised March 1997). The large growth in C Corporations for 1994 might reflect the increase
in top individual rates in 1993. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13201(a), 13202, 107 STAT. 312,457-58,
461.
276. See supra text accompanying note 223 (reporting that 29.3% of 270,000 new S Corporation
elections for 1995 consisted ofC to S conversions). For 1996, 28.4% of268,000 newS Corporation
elections were by C corporations, i.e., 77,112 C to S conversions. See supra text accompanying note
223.
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There were probably some S to C conversions in 1995, which would
reduce the estimate of new C Corporation formations. I expect that private
C Corporations fail more often than Subchapter S Corporations and surely
LLCs, concentrated as they are in professional services and developed real
estate as contrasted, for example, with restaurants. zn In any event, net
C Corporation filings picked back up by 1997, as 2,699,000 C Corporation
returns were filed in 1997, for a two-year increase of 16.28% from
1995. 278 The drop in increase in net C Corporation returns for 1995279
might, as Professor Hamill and others predicted, reflect the new certainty
as to partnership tax status for LLCs arising first from Revenue Procedure
95-10,280 which grants relatively easy classification of an LLC as a
partnership, and then from Notice 95-14, 281 which announces that
Treasury and the Service were considering discarding the entire entity
classification regime and adopting a "check-the-box" elective classification
as a partnership or association taxed as a corporation, which was widely
publicized in the practitioner literature and tax conferences. 282 If so, the

277. There is no data for 1995 available as to the number of C Corporations liquidating or as to
the number of S Corporations terminating their S elections and filing C Corporation returns.
278. See Zaffino, supra note 13, at 184 tbl. 1. 2,699,000 C Corporations in 1997 (5,149,000 total
returns for corporations- 2,450,000 returns for S corporations)- 2,321,048 C Corporations in 1995,
see supra note 274, = 377,952; 377,952 + 2,321,048 = 16.28%. As of November I, 1999, no SOl
data was available as to C Corporation formations for 1996.
279. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
280. See 1995-1 C.B. 501; see also Hamill, supra note I, at 406-07 (describing how Revenue
Procedure 95-10 has provided the tax world with certainty concerning the way in which LLC managers
will be taxed); supra note 87 and accompanying text.
281. See 1995-1 C.B. 297. Check-the-box entity classification regulations were proposed in mid1995, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1, 61 FED. REG. 21989 (1996), and then finalized later the
same year. See 61 FED. REG. 66584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.581, 301.7701,
602.101 (1999)). All persons filing under an LLC statute automatically receive parmership taxation.
See Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-3 (1999); Hamill, supra note 30, at 1483 (discussing the impact of Notice
95-14).
282. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Top Ten Reasonsfor Professionals to Consider Using ILCs, 73 TAXES
515, 519 (1975) (noting that Revenue Procedure 95-10 clarifies the tax consequences of converting to
an LLC); Donald J. Hess eta!., Limited Liability Companies and Real Estate: A California Perspective,
47 U. S. CAL. ANN. !NSf. ON FED. TAX'N. § 1705 (1995) (implying that California could have
minimized the risks of uncertain tax characterization for LLCs by passing measures similar to Revenue
Procedure 95-10); Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Hechtman, The Internal Revenue Service's
Perspective on ILCs: An Update, 22 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 356, 358 (1995) (detailing the requirements
that must be satisfied to be taxed as a partnership pursuant to Revenue Procedure 95-10); John G.
Schmalz & Samuel P. Starr, IRS Provides Welcome Cenainty in the Classification of ILCs as
Pannerships, 82 J. TAX'N 260,265 (1995) ("Rev. Proc. 95-10 provides welcome guidance that offers
taxpayers and practitioners a high degree of certainty in their attempts to classify LLCs as
partnerships."); W. Joey Styron, Securing Pannership Tax Status for Limited Liability Companies, 12
J. TAX'N INVEsr. 306, 307 (1995) (stating that Revenue Procedure 95-10 is a general document that
applies to all LLCs and sets out the requirements that must be met before the Service will rule on the
corporate verse partnership tax status of an LLC); Patricia Pace Hamill, A Case for Eliminating the
Pannership Classification Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 20, 1995, available in Westlaw at
1995 TNT 141-65 (concludin!! that "fblecause limited oartnershios and limited liabilitv comoanies can
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resurgence in net C Corporation returns by 1997 may reflect that the
novelty of check-the-box is wearing off. In any event, through 1997 the
number of new C Corporations and newS Corporations formed annually
each appears to have equaled or exceeded the number of new LLCs formed
that year.
SOl projects, for 1999-2005, smaller increases in the number of C
Corporation filings as compared with the projected increases in S
Corporation or in partnership filings. 283 With complete parity of tax
treatment or health and life insurance fringe benefits as between c
Corporations, passthrough entities, and self-employed taxpayers over the
next few years, the projected decrease in smallest asset and income C
Corporation filings might reflect a decrease in the use of small asset and
little or no taxable income C Corporations to provide preferentially taxed
health and life insurance fringe benefits of private C Corporations as
contrasted with passthroughs. 284 To the extent this is so, new C
Corporations may still be formed to obtain an inside tax shelter from
graduated inside corporate rates for small income C Corporations.
SOl projects annual increases in somewhat larger asset or income C
Corporations for 1999-2005,285 so that the use of the inside shelter from
the lower fiat thirty-four percent rate in the case of moderate income
private C Corporations will probably continue to grow. In any event, to
the extent that the widespread myth of double taxation of private C
Corporations does have the effect of retarding their use as an inside tax
shelter post-1997, we may have a rare instance in Taxland of two wrongs

currently comply with the regulations while substantively resembling corporations . . . , eliminating
the classification regulations will save enormous transaction costs without adversely affecting the
revenue base or increasing the types of businesses that can use these forms."); Daniel Shefter, Check
The Box Pannership Classification: A Legitimate Exercise in Tax Simplification, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Apr. 13, 1995, available in Westlaw at 1995 TNT 72-44 {supporting the IRS's proposed simplification
of tax procedure because of its potential to reduce costs to the IRS and the taxpayer and remove some
complexity from the entity taxation system); Sheryl Stratton, IRS Proposes 'Check The Box' Pannership
Classification Procedure, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 30, 1995, available in Westlaw at 1995 TNT 62-3
(summarizing the mechanics of the proposed "check-the-box" classification structure); Seth M. Zachary
& Andrew M. Short, Attorneys Say Check-the-Box Proposal Should Include Single Owner
Organizations, Unincorporated Foreign Entities, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 19, 1995, available in
Westlaw at 1995 TNT 140-57 (supporting the proposed "check-the-box" classification structure and
arguing for the extension of the benefits conferred by this structure to such groups as single-owner
unincorporated organizations and foreign unincorporated business organizations). See generally Barbara
C. Spudis, ILCs and UPs: Take the "L" Train, 53 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX 9 (1995) (comparing
the advantages and disadvantages of LLCs, LLPs, and S Corporations).
283. SOl projects a 1.38, 4.6, and 4.04 average annual percentage increase for 1999-2005 for
Form 1120 C Corporations (greater than $500,000 in income or assets), S Corporations (Form 1120S),
and partnerships (Form 1065), respectively. See Zaffino, supra note 13, at 179. It also projects for
this period an average annual percentage decrease in Form 1120-A small income (less than $500,000
in income and assets) C Corporation returns. See id.
284. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
285. See Zaffino, supra note 13, at 179.
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((1) inside graduated and flat thirty-four percent rates for small and
moderate income private C Corporations and (2) the myth of their double
taxation) making a right (requiring passthrough or conduit entity taxation
where management and ownership are not separated, i.e., private and
public corporation differentiation).
The number of S Corporations also increased around ten percent, from
1,901,505 in 1993 to 2,153,119 in 1995 and 2,304,416 in 1996.286 For
1997, there were 2,450,000 S Corporation returns. 287 SOl projects S
Corporation returns to increase an average of 4.16% annually from 19992005.288 SOl estimates that S Corporation filings will first exceed C
Corporation filings in 2000. 289
The number of partnerships of all types also increased around six
percent, from 1,493,963 in 1993 to 1,580,900 in 1995. 290 The number
of partnerships further increased to 1,654,256 for 1996 and to 1,755,000
for 1997, with SOl projecting an average 4.04% annual increase for 19992005.291 The increases in the number of partnerships commencing in
1994 reversed a pattern of declining numbers since 1989, which
corresponded with the collapse of the commercial real estate market. 292
This recent pattern of growth in numbers of partnerships is largely
attributable to LLCs, which grew from 17,335 in 1993 to 47,816 in 1994,
and then from 118,559 in 1995 to 221,498 in 1996.293 Indeed, in 1996,
in contrast to the just over 100,000 increase in LLCs, there was a 50,000
decline in the number of general partnerships and only a 16,000 increase

286. See 1995 STAT. OF CORPORATE INCOME, supra note 274; 1993 CORPORATE SERVICE BOOK,
supra note 14, at 481; Witnnan & Grant, supra note 19, at 41. See supra note 218 for the argument
that greater numbers of newS elections in 1994, 1995, and 1996 than net growth probably indicates
a large number of liquidations of S Corporations and possibly a large number of terminations of S
elections each year.
287. See Zaffino, supra note 13, at 184 tbl.l.
288. See id. at 179 fig.A.
289. See id.
290. See Timothy D. Wheeler, Pannership Returns, 1995, 17 SOl BULLETIN 43 (1997).
291. See Zaffino, supra note 13, at 184 tbl.l, 179 fig. A; Alan Zempel, Pannership Returns,
1996, 18 SOl BULLETIN 45 (1998).
292. See Zaffino, supra note 13, at 184 tbl.1; James Bates, California May Avoid Bnmt of a Real
Estate Market Slump, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 3, 1989, available in 1989 WL 2214017 {describing the
problems created for lenders and financial institutions as a result of the real estate crisis); Peter Cary
& Stephen J. Hedges, Can't Anybody Here Sell Some Propeny?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec.
10, 1990, at 56 (discussing the Resolution Trust Corporation's problems in recovering for the S&L
crisis, namely, the crash of the commercial real estate market); Ellen Freilich, Shopping Center Values
Face Decline, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1990, available in 1990 WL 2899078 (describing the collapse of
the retail real estate market in 1990); Kenneth R. Sheets & Robert F. Black, A Roof Bllf No Shelter,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 6, 1989, at 45; Steve Waldman et al., The Big Bust, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 1, 1990, at48 (exploring the reasons for the omnipresent 1989 decline of the real estate market).
293. See Timothy D. Wheeler, Pannership Refilms, 1994, 16 SOl BULLETIN (Number 2) 76, 82
(1996); Wheeler, supra note 290, at 52; Zempel, supra note 291, at 56.
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in the number of limited partnerships. 294 SOl projects that partnership
returns in general will increase 4.04% annually for 1999-2005.295 The
rate of growth of LLCs may be expected to be greater than this because the
annual decrease in the number of general partnerships offsets some of the
annual formation of LLCs.
Significantly, in 1996, over seventy percent of the LLCs were concentrated in "finance, insurance, and real estate" and services. 296 Real estate
businesses constituted almost 80% of the "finance, insurance, and real
estate" SOl category and the industry group as a whole made up over
53.9% of all partnerships in 1996.297 Note that eighty percent of the
income of services partnerships was attributable to the professions of law,
health, and accounting. 298 Such real estate and services market segments
dominate all partnerships in roughly the same percentages as in LLCs. 299
In short, the growth in LLCs as to market segments as of 1995-96 followed
exactly the same pattern as all partnerships generally. Thus, the growth
was probably tending to take more from other forms of partnerships, or
what would have been other partnerships, rather than from C or S
Corporations. 300

294. See Zempel, supra note 291, at 50 fig. F (noting that the number of LLCs grew from
118,559 to 221,498, the number of general partnerships declined from 1,167,036 to 1,116,054, and
the number of limited partnerships increased from 295,304 to 311 ,563).
295. See Zaffino, supra note 13, at 179 fig. A.
296. See Wheeler, supra note 290, at 45 (noting that in 1995, 2/3 ofLLCs were found in these
areas). A June 1999 study of registration records for 1,252 LLCs in 43 states found a large portion
were professional service firms. In the sample, 26% consisted of engineering and management support
companies; 19%, real estate businesses; 12%, construction; and 9%, investment companies. See
Zempel, supra note 291, at 48 ("Over 70 percent of all limited liability companies were classified in
the finance, insurance, and real estate and services industrial divisions."). See Conrad S. Ciccotello
& C. Terry Grant, ILCs and ILPs: Organizing to Deliver Professional Services, Bus. HORIZONS, Mar.
I, 1999, available in 1999 WL 14051370. In a similar sample of 680 limited liability partnerships,
29.7% consisted of law firms; 28.5%, medical firms; 12.1 %, accounting firms; and 9.7%, real estate
services. See id.
297. See Zempel, supra note 291, at 50, fig. F (allowing the reader to calculate this figure by
dividing the total number of businesses in these three categories by the number of those businesses
which were real estate businesses). Using 1990 SOl data, the General Accounting Office reported that
real estate accounts for 44% of "partnerships"; financial and insurance, 7%; services, 18%; retail
trade, 10%; and agriculture, 8%. See General Accounting Office, Tax Administration: IRS's
Pannership Compliance Activities Could Be Improved, tbl. 1.2 (GAO/GGD-95-151 June 16, 1995),
reprinted in 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 118-21, June 19, 1995, available in Westlaw at 95 TNT 118-21.
298. See Zempel, supra note 291, at 46 fig. B.
299. See Wheeler, supra note 293, at 76, 78 fig. D (reporting that for 1993, finance, insurance,
and real estate accounted for 54.2% of all partnerships, while services accounted for 17.5%, and together they accounted for almost 75% of both net income and deficits of all partnerships). Eighty-four
percent of the income of services partnerships was attributable to the professions of law, health, and
accounting. See id.; Wheeler, supra note 290, at 44 fig. B (reporting essentially the same pattern for
1994); Zempel, supra note 291, at 46 fig. B (reporting essentially the same pattern for 1995).
300. See Spudis, supra note 282, § 9.03 at 9-11 (suggesting that when a state adopts an LLC
statute the number of corporate organizations is not significantly reduced).
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The above tendencies as to choice of tax entity are not absolute rules
(except as to most tax sensible professional businesses, and even there a
fair number may go the C Corporation route and then pay out all profits
as compensation or fully deductible fringe benefits, which probably works,
so long as capital is not an income producing factm301 ). SOl data shows
that for 1995, 10.8% of S Corporation net income consisted of "finance,
insurance, and real estate" industrial groups, 302 which reported 61.9% of
the net rental net income of S Corporations. 303 Finance, insurance, and
real estate returns made up 10.5% of all S Corporation returns. 304 The
significantly greater percentage of partnerships than of S Corporations in
this industrial group is consistent with the bias in the S Corporation tax
rules against including entity level debt in a shareholder's basis, which is
a key element of partnership passthrough of real estate losses. 305
It is not possible to determine from the published data what percentage
of real estate businesses constitute C Corporations. The entire finance,
insurance, and real estate industrial group for 1995 accounted for 15% of
all active C and S Corporation returns 306 and for 15.45% of all active C
Corporation returns. 307 Real estate businesses made up seventy percent
of the returns for the entire finance, insurance, and real estate industrial
groups for all corporations. 308 Since the S Corporation SOl data do not
break the finance, insurance, and real estate industrial group down into its
components, it is not possible to determine how many real estate businesses
file C Corporation as contrasted with S Corporation returns or the percentage real estate business returns constituting C Corporation and S
Corporation returns. Nevertheless, given the fact that many of the

301. See Booth, supra note 83, at 563 (stating that small firms can easily avoid corporate tax by
paying bonuses and fringe benefits). The Appendix combines professional and nonprofessional
corporations as does IACA Annual Report of the Jurisdictions 1997, 1998, and 1999. See 1997 IACA
ANN. REP. OF TilE JURISDicrJON: UPDATE; 1998 IACA ANN. REP. OF THE JURISDICTION: UPDATE;
1999 IACA ANN. REP. OF THE JURISDICfiON: UPDATE.
302. See Wittman, supra note 141, at 49 fig. E.
303. See id. at 47.
304. See id. at 44 fig. A (reporting that finance, insurance, and real estate made up 326,149 out
of2,153,119 S Corporation returns in 1995).
305. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text; infra note 342 and accompanying text.
306. See 1995 STAT. OF INCOME DIVISION, supra note 274, at 9, 482 (consisting of 683,211 out
of 4,474,167 returns).
307. See id. at 9, 182, 481, 491. From the number of finance, insurance, and real estate returns
for all corporations, subtract the number of S Corporation finance, insurance, and real estate returns.
683,211 (returns for all corporations)- 326,149 (returns for S Corporations) = 357,062 (returns for
C Corporations in the aforementioned businesses). The total of all C Corporation returns for 1995 was
equal to 4,474,167 (total of corporate returns) -2,153,119 (total ofS corporation returns) = 2,321,048.
The proportion ofC Corporations in the finance, insurance, and real estate industries was thus 15.38%
of the 2,321,048 total.
308. See id. at 182,202 (calculating as follows: 481,450 C and S Corporation real estate returns
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subgroups in this industrial group listed for all corporations are conducted
only in C Corporation form (e.g., banks, insurance companies, condominium and co-operative associations, regulated investment companies
(mutual funds), real estate investment trusts (REITs)), most of which are
not even eligible to elect under Subchapter S, 309 I expect that the S
Corporation's percentage of this entire industrial group that consists of real
estate businesses is substantially greater than seventy percent. The countervailing tendencies toward selection of C Corporation status by real estate
businesses is explained by large firms seeking public financing and in small
income profitable firms with not more than $100,000 a year income after
compensation to principals. In any event, it is clear that real estate
businesses make up a far smaller percentage of all corporations (about ten
percent) than their percentage of all partnerships and of LLCs (forty
percent or more). 310

2. International Association of Corporation Administrators Annual
Report of the Jurisdictions Data.-The conclusion drawn from the SOl data
as to partnerships and statistics of corporate income data-that the increase
in LLCs are by-and-large not coming from a decrease in formation of
corporations-is corroborated by the trends in the information contained in
the 1997-1999 Annual Update Reports of the Jurisdictions of the
International Association of Corporation Administrators (IACA), containing
information for the years 1995-1998, which can be found in the
Appendix. 311
While the number of new reportings by LLCs has indeed increased
greatly in most jurisdictions, the number of new reportings by corporations
for 1997 stayed constant or increased slightly in most jurisdictions and
declined, usually by less than one hundred, in thirty percent of the
jurisdictions. 312 For 1998, ten percent of the jurisdictions, including
California and Texas, continued to show a slight increase in the number of
new corporate filings, but most jurisdictions reported small percentage
declines. 313 Nevertheless, for 1995 to 1998 in all jurisdictions except
Connecticut (which phenomenon may be explained below), the number of
new corporations reporting has exceeded the number of new LLCs

309. See I.R.C. § I36I(b)(2) (1994).
310. See 1995 STAT. OF INCOME DIVISION, supra note 274, at 9, 202. Real estate businesses
account for 10.76% of all corporations (calculating as follows: 481,450 C and S Corporation real estate
returns divided by 4,474,167 total C and S Corporation returns).
311. The numbers of new corporate reportings in. this data are far greater than the increase in
corporations in corresponding SOl data, probably because the former but not the latter data include
corporate subsidiaries and inactive corporations, and the latter data reflect net increases after corporate
liquidations and terminations and C to S conversions.
312. See infra Appendix.
313. See infra Aooendix.
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reporting. 314 Indeed, for 1997, the ratio of new corporation to new LLC
reports in two jurisdictions was as high as 20:1 and 50: 1; in two more
jurisdictions the ratio of corporate to LLC formations was 8: 1. The ratio
was 5:1 in twenty percent of the jurisdictions; 3:1 in thirty percent; 2:1 in
twenty percent; and in three jurisdictions, the ratio of LLC to corporate
formations was approaching 1: 1. 315
For 1998, the percentage of the jurisdictions in the 4:1 range, which
included Texas and New York, declined to ten percent of the jurisdictions;
the percentage of 3: 1 range jurisdictions declined to twenty percent; and
over fifteen percent were between 2:1 and 2.5:1, including California and
New Jersey. 316 For 1998, in most jurisdictions with large numbers of
new corporate filings (more than 30,000), the corporate to LLC new filings
ratio was greater than 4:1 (Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas), or
between 2:1 and 3:1 (California, New Jersey and Georgia); the exception
to this pattern is Michigan, with a 1.5:1 ratio. 317
In some instances, the varying ratios may reflect different legal
cultures, different choices among different market segments, or different
local tax treatment. This especially appears to be the case where LLCs are
subject to franchise taxes but (limited) partnerships are not, as in Texas and
California318 and, until recently, in Florida and Pennsylvania. 319 This
franchise tax treatment resulted in a 50:1 and a 5:1 corporation to LLC
filing ratio in Florida and Texas, respectively, for 1997. 32 For 1998

°

3I4. See infra Appendix. In Connecticut there was roughly a three-to-two ratio of LLC to
corporate fonnations for I997; the ratio was more than two-to-one for I998. See infra Appendix.
3I5. See infra Appendix. Ratios are probably more important than Professor Hamill's focus on
the rate of increase because there is such a low base. See Hamill, supra note I, at 405-06.
3I6. See infra Appendix.
3I7. See infra Appendix.
3I8. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23I5I(a) (West I998) (imposing a franchise tax on
corporations doing business in the state); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § I71.00I(a) (West I992) (imposing
franchise taxes on corporations and LLCs doing business in Texas).
3I9. See infra note 320.
320. See infra Appendix. For instance, California's LLC regime originally contained two biases
against full use, which reportedly caused the statute to be a "dud" at first: (I) professionals and anyone
licensed by the state (67 categories) could not fonn an LLC (due to pressure from the California Trial
Lawyers Association), see Jane Applegate, Thanks to Exclusions, Liability Shield Plan Languishes,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 26, I994, available in Westlaw, SCRMTO-BEE Database; Nonnan, supra
note 244; and (2) in addition to an annual fee based on gross receipts, LLCs had to pay the minimum
$800 corporate franchise tax. See id. Subsequently, special taxes on limited partnerships, LLCs, and
limited liability companies were repealed, but the franchise tax is still imposed on LLCs. See CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE§§ 2308I, 2309I-23096.5, 23097-23099.5, 23038(c) (West I992 & Supp. I999).
Not surprisingly, in I995, the ratio of California corporate filings to LLC filings was 6:I, but has
dropped to 4:1 for 1996, 3:I for 1997 and 2.5:I for 1998. See infra Appendix. California now
pennits "professionals," but not other licensed services businesses, to organize limited liability
partnerships. See CAL. CORP. CODE§ 16951 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (recognizing only registered
limited liability partnerships and foreign limited liability partnerships). Texas and Florida applied a
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Florida's adverse LLC franchise tax rule was repealed for half the year and
the ratio of new corporate to new LLC filings dropped to 27:1 for the
whole year, while Pennsylvania, with the repeal of its adverse LLC franchise tax rule for the whole year, dropped from a 16:1 ratio to a 6:1. 321
In Texas, the adverse LLC franchise tax remained in place, and the 5:1
ratio remained the same as well. 322 Conversely, in Connecticut, where
LLC to corporation formations were running 3:2 for 1997 and a little over
2:1 for 1998,323 the state taxation rules greatly favor members of LLCs
over shareholders in S Corporations, since Connecticut imposes no individual income taxation (except on certain passive income of partnerships)
while subjecting S Corporations, but not LLCs, to a franchise tax based on
income. 324 Thus, the extremes at both ends of the spectrum of corporate
to LLC formation ratios for 1997, 3:2 LLCs to corporations (Connecticut)
and 20:1 (Pennsylvania) and 50: 1 (Florida) corporations to LLCs, appear
to reflect peculiar state taxation of one form or another of these business
tax entities.
I suspect that in many of the other jurisdictions, the varying ratios of
filings may reflect the relative importance of the various market segments
in the jurisdiction and perhaps the varying degrees of inertia among the
small business practitioners and possibly clients. It may be that high
corporation to LLC formation ratios correlate with the importance of

no income tax that would apply to partnerships. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 17I.OOi(a)-(b) (West
1992); FLA. SfAT. ANN. §§ 608.47I, 220.02 (West I989 & I993, respectively). Florida has repealed
its franchise tax as to LLCs, effective July I, I998. See FLA. SfAT. ANN. § 608.47 (I999 Supp.).
Prior to the amendment, Florida's corporate filings compared to LLC filings were 50:I for I997
(115,835 to 2,357). See id. Comparison of I997 filings to 1999 filings will be very interesting. For
I998, the Florida ratio fell to 27:I (114,796 to 5,I24). See id. Similarly, Pennsylvania originally
taxed LLCs generally like corporations, except for LLCs by professionals, which were taxed like
limited partnerships. See 15 PA. CONS. SfAT.§§ 8925, 8997 (I995) (treating LLCs like corporations
for tax purposes and taxing professional LLCs as limited partnerships), repealed insofar as inconsistent
with§ 35.I(b) of Act of May 7, I997, P.L. 85, No.7 (effective Jan. 1, I998). Section 8925 was
repealed effective January I, I998. See Act of May 7, I997, P.L. 85, No.7,§ 35.I(b) (amending the
Act of March 4, I97I (P.L. 6, No.2)). For I998, new corporate filings dropped, and new LLC filings
increased, by roughly the same number; the ratio of new corporate to LLC filings dropped from 20: I
to 7:1. See infra Appendix.
321. See supra note 320.
322. See infra Appendix.
323. See infra Appendix.
324. See CONN. GEN. SfAT. §§ I2-2I4, 2I7(c)(I) (West Supp. 1999) (providing that an S
Corporation also must bring back compensation paid to principals into pro rata shares subject to
income-based franchise tax); John T. Del Negro, Connecticut Taxation ofBusiness Entities, 64 CONN.
BAR J. (Special Issue) SI-Il3, SI-115 (I990) (providing an overview of the business taxation system
in Connecticut and explaining that S Corporations are subject to the corporate franchise tax while
partnerships and other pass through entities are not); William Hathaway, Profit Protection: Limited
Liability Entities Emerge as Popular Tax and Liability Shield, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 28, I997,
available in I997 WL 2997655 (asserting that the cost of setting up an LLC can be urecouped quickly
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manufacturing, which is more likely to be conducted in corporate form, as
in New York (5:1), New Jersey (3.6:1) and Ohio (3:1) for 1997. 325
Delaware's ratio of 2.5:1 corporations to LLCs for 1997 and 1.6 to 1 for
1998326 is less important than the high numbers of formations in both
categories, which probably reflects that it is the jurisdiction of choice both
as to corporations and LLCs for many out of state businesses. m
IV. Populist Perspective

A.

Overview of Populism

Populism means many things to many people. It is too often
categorized, even by admirers, as champion of the underdog against the big
interests. Writers in legal periodicals often use the term as a caricatureshorthand for prejudice against big business in general, and in particular
against big corporations, 328 banks, 329 insurance companies330 (and,

325. See infra Appendix.
326. See infra Appendix.
327. I am grateful to Peter Mahoney, CPA, Conference Co-Director for the 1999 Ernst& Young
Conference, for telling me that he chose Delaware as the jurisdiction for the many LLCs (in effect joint
ventures) formed between large income C Corporations, as to which he was consulted in his National
Office practice.
328. "Among others, populists of the 1880s and 1890s and demagogues through the ages (Huey
Long, for example) have rallied citizens to their cause by demonizing large corporations." Douglas M.
Branson, Book Review, 48 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 459, 466 (1998); see also Michael H. Orbison,
Note, Vertical Restraints in the Brewing Industry: Is the Malt Beverage Interbrand Competition Act the
Answer?, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 143, 186-87 (1983) (speculating that brewers have not chosen to support
the use of exclusive territories as a sound business practice because legislators are sensitive to a populist
pressure against business interests). A contrary positive view of populism is that the people know best
"and, as long as representatives are faithful to popular preferences, social welfare will be maximized."
David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995).
Be that as it may, I find refreshing the following critique of too-ready criticism of populism as simply
prejudice by political and academic elites. "Identifying the tradition of populism with passion and
intolerance often implies a contrasting identification of elite discourse with reason and lack of prejudice,
an identification that may be more imagined than deserved." J .M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism
as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1951 n.42 (1995) (book review). Elitism versus
populism in this context means "disagreement about the competence of people to handle their affairs"
and transcends traditional debates between liberalism and conservatism. JEFFREY BELL, POPULISM
AND ELmSM: POLITICS IN THE AGE OF EQUALITY 3, 5 (1992).
329. See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 47, 104 (1999) (suggesting that the desire of populists to limit the economic power of banks
contributed to the placement of restrictions on banks); John B. McCoy, The Future of U.S. Banking:
A Modest Legislative Agenda to Encourage Competitiveness, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1191 (1989)
(noting the presence of a "lingering populist distrust of banks that dates back to Revolutionary War
times"); Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics ofDerivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALEJ. ON
REG. 279, 311 n.106 (1997) (describing bigoted populist agitation by farmers against Jews and
Catholics due to antibanker sentiments).
330. See Barty E. Adler, Politics and Virtual Owners of the Corporation, 82 VA. L. REV. 1347
(1996) (book review) (noting that "the insurance industry [was] a favorite target of populist outrage
over concentrated wealth"); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act
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At
historically, railway companies331), lawyers, 332 and the rich. 333
the worst it connotes the demagogue and the mob, 334 usually with a
Southern hill-country flavor. 335 Populism's philosophical and even ethnic
origins are, indeed, the egalitarian democracy of President Andrew
Jackson 336 who was of Scotch-Irish origin337 and who was a

(I 993) Oinking populism to the beginning of rate regulation of insurance companies by slates); Mark
J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification ofthe Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 639, 656 (I 993) (identifying insurance companies as among the largest economic organizations
to which populists were opposed).
331. See FRANK R. KEMERER, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSfiCE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 28 (1991)
(noting that populist sentiment induced farmers to protest the exploilative practices of railroad
companies).
332. See Gerald Caplan, Criminal Justice in the Lower Couns: A Study in Continuity, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1694, 1703 (1991) (recognizing that populists are "highly suspicious of lawyers"); Carrie
Menkei-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics,
Diversification and Organization ofLawyering, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 621, 625 (1994) (analyzing
the strong antilawyer sentiment which was a part of Jacksonian populism in the 1800s).
333. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J.
283, 287 (1994) (mentioning "soak the rich" populism).
334. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REv. 1, 29 (1988)
(advancing the point that lawyers often portray the Jaw to their clients in a cynical fashion as "the
legislation of populist demagogues"). "Until the appearance of Frederick Jackson Turner's essay on
frontier democracy in 1893, the dominant historical interprelation of Jacksonian Democracy was 'as
a destructive, degrading expression of the mob spirit in politics.'" Morton J. HorwilZ, Foreword: The
Constitllfion ofChange: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 59-60
(I 983) (quoting ALFRED A. CAVE, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE HISTORIANS 27 (1964)). It was
Turner's essay, with its celebration of western democracy, that helped exemplify the populist era's positive attitude toward democracy. See id.
335. See Calvin Woodard, Listening to the Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L. REv. 563, 574 n.13 (1994)
(describing Hugo Black as "a resolute hiJI country populist, stoutly refusing to join a big firm or to
represent large corporations. He became a highly successful plaintiff's lawyer who delighted in laking
on the 'Big Mules' of industrial Alabama.").
336. See Justice Robert L. Brown, From Whence Cometh Our State Appellate Judges: Popular
Election Versus the Missouri Plan, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 313, 314 (1998) (describing the
radical movement toward the election of judges sparked by populism during Jackson's presidency);
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Pan One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 382 n.I89 (1998) ("Although Andrew Jackson often is seen as
the figurehead for the aggressive form of populism that he championed, history suggests Jackson was
as much a recipient of the democratic movement as he was its creator."); Matthew J. O'Hara, Note,
Restriction of Judicial Election Candidates' Free Speech Rights after Buckley: A Compelling
Constitutional Limitation?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197, 207 (1994) ("In the 1830s President Andrew
Jackson Jed a populist movement that promoted popular control over an elements of a democratic
society.").
337. See DAVID H. FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRmSH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 642-44
(1989) (reporting that Jackson came from an elite American Scotch-Irish family). See generally JAMES
G. LAYBURN, THE SCOTCH IRISH: A SOCIAL HiSTORY 185 (1962) (noting that Ulster Scots settled in
the back country of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Piedmont Carolinas). The Scotch-Irish and their
restless descendants moved on after their initial arrival, settling the next frontier (Tennessee and
Kentucky) and then the next. BiJI Gilbert, Pioneers Made a Lasting Impression on Their Way West,
SMITHSONIAN, May 1994, at 40 (documenting the westward movement of Scotch-Irish settlers in 19th
Century America); BiJly Kennedy, An Irishman's Diary, THE IRISH DMES, Sept. 7, 1998, at 17
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frontiersman in hill-country Tennessee and a general of hill-country armies.
Populism's more modem manifestation arose over a century ago as an
agrarian movement338 among Texas hill-country farmers and ranchers
who were also of Tennessee-Scotch-Irish (and some German) ancestry. 339
While populism has, at times, displayed such demagoguery and prejudices,
it also was the first American political party to propose a graduated income
tax and direct election of Senators. 340 I believe that its core message is
good tax policy: equality of opportunity (horizontal equity) and distrust of
aggregations of economic power-34 1 because of their political ability to
obtain special privileges (violating vertical equity). 342 Taxation of private
C Corporations has long been a populist concern, as is documented in Part
IV below.

B.

Horizontal and Vertical Equity and Private C Inside Shelter

For decades, national tax policy has encouraged profitable small businesses to select C Corporations as the tax entity of choice, due to the inside

338. The populist movement began in 1877 in Texas with the establishment of the Southern
Fanners Alliance and culminated two years later when it endorsed the new People's Party. See
KEMERER, supra note 331, at 27. The movement "died out as a political force ••. around the tum
of the century when the Democratic Party co-opted their platfonn." See id.; see also T.R.
FEHRENBACK, LoNE STAR: A HISfORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 618-31 (1968). I find particularly
apropos for this article the following observation: "The great public universities in this country must
of necessity pursue multiple and partially conflicting missions. The University of Texas at Austin, as
an elite public institution in a populist state, is as clear an example as can be imagined." Samuel
Issacharoff, Bakke in the Admissions Office and the Courts: Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 684 (1998).
339. See FEHRENBACH, supra note 338, at 286, 597 (noting that Texas north of Austin was settled
predominantly from the upper South, i.e., Tennessee, by "Anglo Celtic" frontier folk from mountains
and forests); see also ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON
60 (I 982) (hinting at the Gennan heritage prevalent in central Texas).
340. See Lynn A. Baker, Theoretical and Constitutional Issues: Comment: "They the People": A
Commellf on U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 859, 859 n.4 (1996) (describing
the implementation by Progressives of causes first advocated by the Populists); Michael Kent Curtis,

Textualism and the Civil War Amendment: Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffery
Rosen's Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1269, 1282 (1998) (arguing for inclusion of the Populists and
Progressives in the pantheon of creators of the Constitution); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Changes: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 91 HARV. L. REV. 386, 428 (1983)
(recounting the role of the Populist Movement and others in the first three periods of Constitutional
amendments).
341. See JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS, AND THE STATE,
1945-1975, at 172 (1998) (indicating that populism "combined a belief in local participatory politics
with an attack on concentrated power"); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 53 (1991) ("Populist sentiment against concentrations of economic
power seems continuous •... "); see also Hans A. Linde, Introduction: Taking Oregon's Initiative
Toward a New Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 391, 397 (1998) (tracing the evolution of populist
support for direct lawmaking and its general distrust of representative government).
342. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 548-49, 557, 565-69 (1933) (Brandeis,
]., dissenting) ("Through size. corporations •.. have become an institution .•. which has brought

948

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 78:885

shelter of graduated corporate level rates on capital accumulations. 343
The incentive existed even before the graduated corporate rates were
introduced in 1935, because the fiat inside corporate rate was so much
lower than the top outside individual rate. "[I]n the year 1926 the number
of copartnerships and corporations were about equal. The copartnerships
have gradually gone down each year and the corporations have gone up,
until in this year, the past year [1935], it has resulted in 205,000
copartners,hips as against 500,000 and some corporations. "344 By the mid1930s, there were 450,000 active corporations (about fifty percent of which
reported income, with many suffering losses from the Great
Depression345), and there were 1.5 million proprietorships and partnerships (only 205,000 of which were partnerships). The corporations
reported about $140 billion in total gross receipts; the proprietorships and
partnerships reported $30 billion in total gross receipts. 346 On the
corporate side in the 1930s, ninety percent of the net corporate taxable
income was reported by ten percent of the corporations (presumably the
public and moderate income private corporations), fifty percent was
reported by five hundred to six hundred corporations, and one third by
sixty-seven giant corporations. 347 The stock in these public corporations
was disproportionally held by high income taxpayers. In 1936, Treasury
estimated that seventy-one percent of all corporate stock was owned by
individuals with more than $25,000 in annual taxable income, with fortyfive percent held by individuals with incomes in excess of $100,000. 348

343. See Kelvin H. Dickinson, Panners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legitimacy of
the Incorporated Pannership, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 598 n.208 (1984) (describing tax benefits of
the corpornte form).
344. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 20 (statement of Commissioner Helvering).
345. See Don Rosa & Dorothy Collins, Statistics ofIncome Studies ofBusiness Income and Taxes,
8 SOl BULL. 81, 84 fig. D (1988) (reporting that many corporntions reported no income during this
period).
346. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 20 (statement of Commissioner Helvering)
(presenting the numbers of partnerships reporting net income within various income classifications);
1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 141, 427-28 (statement of Commissioner Helvering) (quoting
these figures in response to questions concerning the amount of business done by copartnerships and
corporntions); id. at 890 (statement of Treasury Genernl Counsel Oliphant) (noting that the gross sales
or production of corporntions was $142 biilion and the gross sales or production of individual
enterprises and partnerships was $30 billion).
347. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text; infra note 385 and accompanying text.
348. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 21 (statement of Commissioner Helvering)
(estimating the numbers of individuals who own stock based on the fact that "71 [percent of the
increase in taxable income] would be received by individuals with net incomes of more than $25,000
a year, and that about 45 pereent [would be received] by individuals with net incomes in excess of
$100,000 a year"); id. at 29 (statement of George C. Haas, Director of Research and Statistics,
Treasury Department) (noting that if withheld corpornte earnings for the 1936 calendar year were
distributed, about 45% of these would go to individuals subject to income taxes rnnging from 58% to
75%); 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 21 (statement of Commissioner Helvering) ("Our
studies indicate that if corporntions were to distribute to their shareholders all of their 1936 earnin!!s.
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The long-recognized phenomenon of the inside tax shelter of a private
C corporation creates both horizontal and vertical inequities. 349
Horizontal equity requires similar tax treatment of taxpayers in similar
circumstances. 350 This would mean that high income taxpayers conducting a business through a passthrough entity should bear much the same
effective rate on that business income as similarly high income taxpayers
conducting the same business through a private C Corporation. 351
Vertical equity requires that the burden of taxation fall upon taxpayers
according to their ability to pay. This concept has been labelled progressivity or "fairness" in recent political discourse by the Democratic
Party. 352 Currently, vertical equity is violated by high and highest

the taxable income of individuals would be increased by approximately 4 billion dollars. Of this large
sum, more than 71 percent would be received by individuals with net incomes of more than $25,000
a year, and about 45 percent would be received by individuals with net incomes in excess of $100,000
a year."). The dollars are mid-1930s dollars probably corresponding to the top 5% and top .5% of
individuals by income in present purchasing terms.
349. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 67-68; see also Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings
on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means (Part 4), 9lst Cong., 1st
Sess., 1592 (1969) (statement of Assistant Secreta!)' of the Treasucy for Tax Policy Stanley S. Surrey)
("Fairness it seems to me comes down to two things-one, that as between people who have different
levels of income, one higher and one lower, the person with the higher income should pay a
progressively greater tax [i.e., vertical equity]; and, second, as between people who are at the same
level of income and who are similarly situated, they should pay the same tax [i.e., horizontal equity].");
Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Simplification I, supra note Ill, at 3, 14·6 (explaining that one of
the factors contributing to tax complexity is the principle that "similarly situated individuals should bear
similar tax burdens (horizontal equity) and that differences in ability to pay among individuals be taken
into account where necessacy and appropriate (verticle equity)").
350. See Allen Walburn, Comment, Depreciation ofIntangibles: An Area of the Tax Law in Need
of Change, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453, 454·55 (1993) (stating that the principle of horizontal equity
means "that fairness dictates that similarly situated people should be taxed alike" because a "tax law
that treats similarly situated taxpayers differently will probably be perceived as unfair and will likely
lead to increased taxpayer noncompliance").
351. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 95, 101.
352. See Lee, supra note 141, at 40, 54-56 (characterizing the Clinton Administration's "fairness
test" as being based on progressivity). I agree in the abstract that "the tax system should have little
to do with the welfare system or safety net enacted during the New Deal." Steven A. Bank, Origins
of a Flat Tax, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 329, 401 (1996). However, when ideology or political necessity
prevents Congress from enacting direct spending programs to keep the safety net from unraveling or
to educate and train the poor so they need such a net less, I would use the tax system to provide
meaningful tax expenditures for such purposes. I do not favor the current tendency to enact symbolic
provisions for those purposes often targeted more at middle than lower income taxpayers, particularly
when bi-partisan support is obtained by vecy expensive provisions primarily benefitting high income
taxpayers, as was the case in 1997. See Jonathan Alter, Hostage to the Winds, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11,
1997, at 29 (suggesting that "Clinton will be remembered as a president who saw widening gaps
between rich and poor, and helped widen them further. If [Clinton] hadn't caved on capital gains cuts
there would have been no deal," in which case the surging economy would have balanced the budget
the next year instead of five years later); Clay Chandler, Tax Cuts Across the Spectrum, WASH. POST,
Aug. 1, 1997, atA-14, available in 1997 WL 11976845 (positing that the deal rewards middle-income
families with children under 17 or in higher education and households with substantial capital gains
income); E.J. Dionne Jr., ... A Political Classic, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A21, available in
1QQ7 WT- 11Q7~Rd1 fnntino thE": inr.1in~t1nn nfthP. nPmnl"Mtir_ n~rtv tn C.nPnrl rP:VPniiP c::nm1nc::Pc::nn c:nt"'i~t
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income tax bracket individual taxpayers conducting a business through a
private C Corporation and thus garnering the same rate of Federal income
taxation on capital accumulations as sole proprietors (who tend to be
bottom income tax bracket) bear on their business income. Once, populists
were concerned over violations of both horizontal and vertical equity as to
partners and proprietors by use of a private C Corporation. Now their
concern is likely to be only with the violation of vertical equity.
Interestingly, today the fault line between conservatives and liberals
as to tax fairness is often over whether to favor horizontal or vertical
equity.
During hearings in front of the Committee on Ways and Means a
couple of years ago, I asked Jack Kemp, the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Dick Armey, and the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Dick
Gephardt what their definition [of fairness] was. Jack Kemp and the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Dick Armey, said, when everybody is
treated the same. The definition of the gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Dick Gephardt was, based on your ability to pay. 3~3

1. In the Beginning Thars: Focus on Horizontal Inequity.-Over the
years populist voices have railed against the inequitable subsidy of the
private C Corporation inside graduated tax rates. My favorite story comes
from the House Ways and Means Committee's hearings in 1936 on

programs); William G. Gale, The Budget Deal: An Opponunity Lost . .. , WASH. Posr, Aug. 1, 1997,
at A21, available in 1997 WL 11976839 (arguing that tax cuts for the wealthy, capital gains, and estate
taxes will have the greatest impact in future years but are not taken into account under congressional
budget calculation conventions); John B. Judis, Rubin Sandwich, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at
11 (stating that the tax bill gives the top 20% over 75% of the tax benefits, with the major beneficiaries
being individuals "who live in the affluent suburbs of Archer's Houston and Gingrich's Atlanta and
who now vote Republican"); Robert Kuttner, Clinton Has Stolen the GOP's Clothes; The President Has
Abandoned Democratic Principles in the Pursuit of a Balanced Budget, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, at
M5, available in 1997 WL 2234853 (noting that although both Democrats and Republicans supported
tax relief, Clinton, rather than the Republicans, made sacrifices to achieve a balanced budget); Wendell
Primus, et al., The Impact on Families in Different Income Categories of the Tax and Entitlement
Changes Approved by House Committees, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 25, 1997, available in Westlaw
at 1997 TNT 122-20 (explaining that a disproportionate amount of the benefits from the Housecommittee-approved tax entitlement changes would help wealthier taxpayers); Leo Rennert, Wealthiest
Americans the Victors in New Tax Bill, DENY. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 3, 1997, at 12G,
available in 1997 WL 6848725 (noting that the top 1% will receive more than 32% of the tax cuts, an
average yearly tax cut of $16,200, as contrasted with an average yearly tax cut of $148 for median
income families); Robert J. Samuelson, Good Theater, Bad Policy, WASH. Posr, Aug. 6, 1997, at A19, available in 1997 WL 12880043 (postulating that the budget windfall was devoted mostly to tax
cuts and new spending exhibiting "enormous contempt for the public's intelligence and integrity");
Robert Scheer, Congress Giveth and Congress Taketh Away; The Tax Changes Pit One Generation
Against Another, and Only the Rich Come out Winners, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, at B7, available
in 1997 WL 2235406 (deriding the agreement for enabling the wealthy to benefit from the lower capital
gains tax at the expense of lower-income families).
353. 143 CONG. REC. H10,035 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Ensign).

2000]

Business Tax Entities

951

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's ill-fated undistributed profits tax,
which would have reduced the inside corporate tax base by dividend
payments. 354 This was an integration provision intended to force out as
dividends otherwise low-taxed (12.5% to 15%) corporate profits so they
would go through the individual high "tax mill" (which again had been
raised to seventy-five percent at the top). 355 In 1936, the Supreme Court
had overturned an agricultural consumption tax with revenue yields of
almost fifty percent of the individual income tax revenue (or of the
corporate sector revenue, since the two sector's revenue yields were then
equal). 356 President Franklin Roosevelt proposed to replace this revenue
by enacting an undistributed profits tax. 357 The proposed rate turned on
the percentage of net income retained, but the base consisted of both the
undistributed and distributed income, with no shareholder level credit upon
any later actual distribution of income already taxed inside the
corporation. 358
Since most, but not all, publicly traded corporations then paid out, on
the average, dividends equal to about seventy to seventy-five percent of

354. See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
355. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 341 (statement of Rep. Hill); 1936 Senate
Hearings, supra note 124, at 4 (statement ofTreasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr.); accord, 1936
Confidential Senate Hearings (Part 1}, supra note 124, at 11 (statement of Commissioner Helvering).
For inside corporate rates see infra note 414 and accompanying text. For outside individual rates see
Pub. L. No. 74-407 § 101, 49 STAT. 1014, 1015 (1935).
356. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936) (declaring portions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1935 unconstitutional as improper applications of Congress's taxing authority); see
also Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Additional Information Concerning
the Budget for the Fiscal Year 1937, H. Doc. No. 418, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), reprinted in 1936
House Hearings, supra note 175, at 2; 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 33 (statement of A.S.
McLeod, Treasury Statistician) (estimating, for 1936, $1,132,000,000 in corporate tax revenue and
$1,153,000,000 in individual income tax revenues); id. at 17 (statement of Commissioner Helvering)
(suggesting that $500 million annually was needed to take the place of such agricultural consumption
taxes); 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122 at 2 (statement of Treasury Secretary Morgenthau)
(reporting that $517 million in revenue was lost with invalidation of Agricultural Adjustment Act or
"Triple A").
357. Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 2-4 (letter by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt) (recommending legislative actions to counteract the Joss of revenue caused by the
overturning of certain provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935), with id. at 33-34, 36
(statement of A.S. McLeod, Treasury statistician) (discussing revenue-raising estimates for various
options under consideration by Congress); accord S. REP. No. 74-2156, at 1-3 (1936) (reporting
favorably on the revenue bill, with reference to the President's message to the House of
Representatives).
358. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 6, 9 (recommending that the Ways & Means
Committee adopt corporate tax rate schedules with rates increasing along with the percent of
undistributed income, but also recommending relief for corporations that have insufficient accumulated
earnings to distrihute dividends even though they have net income for the year); id. at 53 (defending
the fairness of the president's proposed plan, and criticizing the committee's recommendations); id. at
278 (opposing the "burdensome double taxation" of the proposal that a shareholder receiving dividends
would get no credit for taxes already paid on corporate earnings).
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current earnings, and since the proposed undistributed profits tax would be
triggered by accumulations above thirty percent of current income for
larger corporations and forty ·percent for smaller corporations, the true
target of that tax was high income private corporations that did not pay out
much of their earnings. 359 An example recognized in the 1920 discussion
of a similar undistributed profits tax proposal seems to have been Henry
Ford and the then private Ford Motor Company. 360 Another instance
(not then recognized) was the author of the Tarzan series who formed
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc., in 1923, in part to lower personal income
taxes, "which in recent years had taken a sizable bite out of his six figure
earnings. " 361
Not only was the far simpler approach of corporate-shareholder
integration thought barred by Eisner v. Macomber/ 62 but a hidden agenda
for this "roundabout device, " 363 was to force out dividends in order to

359. See 1936House Hearings, supra note 175, at49 (exchange between Reps. Hill and Cooper)
(agreeing that corporations retain approximately 25% to 30% of earnings); 1936 Confidential Senate
Hearings, supra note 124, at108 (statement of A.S. McLeod, Treasury Statistician) ("[A] considerable
pan of that income comes from large income, closely held corporations.").
360. See Revenue Revision: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 66th Cong.
15 (1920) (statement of Ways and Means Chair Fordney) [hereinafter 1920 House Hearings] (using an
example of a man in Michigan who through his private C Corporation "added many million dollars'
worth of additions to his plant, invested several million dollars, and, of course, employ[ed] a large
number of men," but with an income of $30,000,000 to $50,000,000 a year "he did not pay taxes on
an income of more than $4,000,000"). Senator Hugo Black, D-Ala., specifically referred to Mr.
Morgan [apparently of J.P. Morgan & Co.], who paid no income taxes although his corporations were
very profitable and he was very wealthy. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at21, 159 ("You
have read where one man who [sic] everybody knew was very wealthy has paid no income tax at all,
even though the corporations through which he did business ... made profits, Mr. Morgan . . . . ").
Actually, as the widely publicized Pecora Hearings had just disclosed in 1934, partners in the "House
of Morgan" partnership paid no income taxes in 1930 and 1931 due to the then capital loss rules (under
which 12.5% of net capital losses offset ordinary income). See Jobn Lee, Pannership Profits Share
for Services: An Aggregate Exegesis ofRevenue Procedure 93-27 (Pan 1), 62 TAX NOTES TODAY 1733,
1754 (1994), available in WL at 94 TNT 61-27.
361. JOHN TALIAFERRO, TARZAN FOREVER: THE LIFE OF EDGAR RICE BURROUGHS, CREATOR
OF TARZAN 188 (1999).
362. 252 U.S. 189, 207-08 (1920) (emphasizing that a stock dividend is not taxable income in the
constitutional sense because income "derived from capital" has to be "received or drawn by the
recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal. . . . Shott of liquidation, or until
dividend declared, he has no right to withdraw any pan of either capital or profits from the common
enterprise .... "). It is commonly thought that the Supreme Coun has since abandoned the
constitutional realization requirement enunciated in Eisner v. Macomber. See Stanley S. Surrey, The
Supreme Coun and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL L.
REV. Nw. U. 779,793,781-94 (1941) ("Eisner v. Macomber was both the first and the last decision
declaring an application of the income tax unconstitutional under the Sixteenth Amendment."). But cf.
Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to
Market, 13 VA. TAX REv. 1 (1993) (re-examining the conclusions of Surrey and others about the
realization doctrine).
363. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 193 (statement of Rep. Lewis) ("I do not know that
it is fully understood by the public that this roundabout device of compelling the distribution of the real
income of the corporation to its shareholders ... is due to a decision of a divided coun. "); see also
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break up large concentrations of capital. 364 Integration in the form of a
shareholder level tax on imputed corporate income and repeal of corporate
level taxes would not have advanced this latter purpose as well as an
undistributed profits tax giving an inside deduction for dividends paid.
Senator Tom Connally, D-Tex., and other members of the tax writing
committees, fully understood at the time the inside shelter of
corporations. 365 Furthermore, Commissioner Helvering explained to
them that high income shareholders could "reduce their taxes by taking part
of their income in the form of so-called capital gains" after their
corporations had retained income for a number of years, taxed inside at
The
low rates and thus enhancing the value of the stock. 366
Commissioner viewed this as a violation of ability to pay. "It is
inequitable and it is a source of great loss to the public revenues to permit
the corporate form to be used by wealthy persons to avoid graduated

Internal Revenue: Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong. 9-10, 15
(Confidential Comm. Print 1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Adviser, Treasury Department,
and father of the Revenue Act of 1921, the first modem revenue act) [hereinafter 1921 Confidential
Senate Hearings] (expressing how it would arguably be unconstitutional to tax personal-service
corporations as partnerships under Eisner v. Macomber because the government would be taxing
shareholders on the undistributed profits of corporations). An undistributed profits tax passed the
Senate in the Revenue Bill of 1924, H.R. 6715, 68th Cong. (1924), but was rejected by the Conference
Committee and thus not enacted by Congress. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 13, 16
(statement of Commissioner Helvering). This provision was even more clearly intended as a means
of circumventing Eisner v. Macomber, since it permitted shareholders of a corporation subject to the
undistributed profits tax to elect to be taxed as partners, in which case the corporation was not subject
to the corporate tax. See H.R. 6715, 68th Cong. § 228 (1924).
364. See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
365. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at27-28 (statement of Sen. Connally) ("[U]nder
the existing law the operation is really favorable to corporate incomes as against individual incomes,
against individuals who might be engaged in the same business."). Commissioner Helvering had just
stated that the increased revenues from the proposed undistributed profits tax would come not from the
corporate level tax on undistributed profits, but instead from the increased individual level taxes on the
dividends forced out.
[The increased revenue] comes primarily from stockholders already enjoying large
incomes who would pay higher taxes on their incomes as these incomes are increased by
additional dividend distributions. It would come in other words, primarily from those
who are now able to avoid their just share of the burden of income taxation by holding
income-producing property in the corporate form, and having their corporations retain
very large proportions of these earnings subject only to the ordinary corporation income
tax. It is inequitable and it is a source of great loss to the public revenues to avoid
graduated individual income surtaxes.
Jd. at 24 (statement of Commissioner Helvering).
366. See id. at 22-23 ("What this means in simple terms is the privilege of reinvesting earnings
without the payment of surtaxes upon them, a privilege of very great monetary value .... ").
Individual capital gains were then taxed under a sliding scale dependent upon the holding period much
lower than ordinary income tax rates with a maximum rate of20.1% at the highest ordinary income
tax bracket after a ten year holding period. See Lee, Capital Gains Proposals, supra note 35; Lee,
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individual income surtaxes. " 367 Rather than selling the appreciated stock,
the taxpayer could hold it until death so that a stepped up (to then fair
market value) basis under the predecessor to section 1014 avoided the
second level of taxation altogether. "Thus, no special compensation is
received by the Federal Government for the loss in revenues suffered
during the lifetime of the owner by reason of his use of the corporate
form. " 368 Concrete examples in Executive Session also brought this
inside sheltering home to populist Senators Connally and Robert La
Follette, R-Wis. 369
General Counsel Herman Oliphant stated well the underlying tax
policy in the House Ways and Means Committee Hearings: "[B]usiness
profits, by whomever derived and from whatever form of business derived,
should all bear the same tax burden, just because it is right . . . . " 370
Democratic members of the House Ways and Means Committee expressly
articulated that an undistributed profits tax served to eliminate the then
preference in the tax law for small income private corporations over
partnerships and proprietorships with equal income. 371 House Ways and
Means Chair Bob Doughton, a Democrat from Alleghany County in the
Blue Ridge Mountains of northwest North Carolina, held long and grueling
hearings in which virtually no one supported FDR's proposal. 372 He
seems to have lost his temper when an opponent of the proposal evoked the
image of a "small fellow" beginning to grow, and then getting a helper

367. 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 24 (statement of Commissioner Helvering).
368. 1d. at 20 (statement of Commissioner Helvering); see also 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings,
supra note 363, at 307 (statement of Sen. Reed) (relating an anecdote of a publisher with a multimillion
dollar building who would rather give it to posterity than sell with 80% of the profits going to the
government).
369. See 1936 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 124, at 17-18 (statements of Sens.
Connally and La Follette) (discussing the tax advantages enjoyed by a shareholder of Great Western
Sugar Co., which had a total annual income of $7 million but paid no dividends).
370. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 607 (statement of Herman Oliphant, General
Counsel, Treasury Department).
371. See id. at 341 (statement of Rep. Hill) (emphasizing that the undistributed profits tax would
"put all the money earned in enterprise through the tax mill on a comparable basis"); id. at 139, 47071, 799-800 (statements of Rep. Dough ton) (pointing out the importance of the undistributed profits
tax to eliminate the preferential tax treatment of corporations). Opponents argued that very few
partnerships earned as much as the larger corporations (except for professional or securities
parmerships). See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 158 (statement of R.C. Fulbright,
representing the Southern Pine Association). There were 833 partnership returns filed for 1935
showing net income of $100,000 or more and 178,419 reporting less. See id. at 20 (statement of
Commissioner Helvering).
372. There was actually controversy as to whether only two or only three witnesses supported the
proposal. Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 800 (statement of Rep. Woodruff)
(observing that only two wimesses favored the proposal, one a government employee and the other a
Communist), with H.R. REP. No. 2475 (1936) (relating that only three wimesses testified in support
of the proposed system). For the actual testimony of the witnesses, see 1936 House Hearings, supra
nnt" 17<;
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"and that is the way the life of industry continues. " 373
THE CHAIRMAN. Of course, every man in business, every
corporation, or every indiviudal [sic] engaged in business, think
they would grow more rapidly, and probably could, if they had
no expenses; but the support of the Government is necessary and
a proper expense of business, on those who make money. Now,
they should be placed on the same level, should they not? The
corporation[s], those engaging in business in a corporate form,
have an advantage, over the individual, the partnership; a decided
advantage. They have an advantage in many ways, but the
special advantage they have is that they have a larger amount of
capital with which to do business, and the larger the capital is,
the stronger the organization they can perfect, and the more they
can have of mass production; and they can organize a more
extensive sales agency.
They have an advantage in both
production and in distribution that the man of small means does
not have.
MR. WALTERS. That helps everybody.
THE CHAIRMAN. Why should we still give them another
advantage in the matter of taxes? In that way, the big man can
always keep the little fellow down and prevent his ever getting on
his feet. . . . Should not all have an equal start? ... You want
to cripple him, start him out at a disadvantage, start him with the
other fellow miles ahead of him, and then expect him to keep up
in the race. 374
Note the focus of Chairman Doughton on the advantage of big capital
to the large corporation; a central idea was to force out current income,
reducing concentrations of capital. 375 While Treasury listed horizontal

373. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 343 (statement of G.L. Walters, representing the
Illinois Manufacturers Association).
374. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 343-44; see also citations to passages in the
Hearings in note 353 supra; Revenue Revision, 1938: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 75th Cong. 420 (1938) [hereinafter 1938 House Hearings] (statement of Chairman Doughton)
(suggesting that there is "no reason why [profitable corporations] should not pay taxes now"). The
sophistication of Chairman Doughton's sentiments may be seen by comparing Justice Brandeis's
contemporaneous dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,541,548-49,557,
565·69 (1933) (expressing his desire to preserve small, independently-owned businesses facing the
threat of competition from large chain stores, and his associated concerns about inequities in wealth and
opportunity). For Chairman Doughton's sentiments on ability to pay, see also 1938 House Hearings,
supra, at 420 (making light of the notion that a corporation's years of past "sacrifice" to create a large
investment, which is not generating tremendous profits, should be considered a reason for not taxing
the profits of corporations).
375. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 193 (statement of Rep. Hill) ("[T]his would
rather encourage them to pay out their net earnings."); id. at 193 (statement of Rep. Lewis) (referring
to a "roundabout device of compelling the distribution of the real income of the corporation to its
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equity between partnerships and sole proprietorships and corporations first
on its list of policy reasons for the undistributed profits tax, 376 its true
first goal appears to have been vertical equity: running all corporate sector
income through the individual (steeply progressive) "tax mill" one
time. 377
Members of Congress made similar observations as to a similar tax on
undistributed profits proposed in 1920 by Secretary of the Treasury
Houston to equalize tax treatment of corporations with partnersproprietors. 378 The next year, the new Secretary of Treasury under the
Republican Harding Administration, Andrew Mellon, while acknowledging
"an inequality in cases of partnerships," opposed an undistributed profits
tax because "it would have a bad effect on industry, and on the dividend
policy of corporations. " 379 Populist Representative John Nance, "Cactus
Jack" Gamer (D-Tex.), surely was not surprised at this melon-headed

shareholders, so that the shareholders may be called upon to pay taxes upon their income ..•• "); id.
at 321 (statement of Rep. Hill) ("[W]e cannot reach the net earnings of the corporation as earnings of
the individual stockholders until the earnings are distributed as dividends."); id. at 341 (statement of
Rep. Hill) (discussing the advantages of "amassing larger amounts of money for carrying on business");
id. at 581 (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue) (noting
that one of the main criticisms of the revenue act is that "such a tax will prevent corporation
management from accumulating reserves for a rainy day or for purposes of plant and business
expansion"). A minority Republican member of the Committee noted the partisan nature of the
Committee. See id. at 298 (statement of Rep. Treadway). Representative Daniel A. Reed, R-N. Y.,
"wondered" where the pressure in connection with the distribution of net profits was coming from and
quoted a passage from Rexford G. Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Ans
(1933), advocating governmental forcing of "corporate surpluses into the open investment market."
See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 42. Rexford G. Tugwell was one of the original
Roosevelt "Brain Trusters" temporarily leaving academia to serve in Government (as the
Undersecretary of Agriculture from 1934 to 1937). For a discussion of the influence of his and other
Brain Trusters' works upon the evolution of business-government cooperation theories in the early
1930s, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 34-35 (1963).
376. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 19 (statement of Commissioner Helvering).
377. See id. at 793 (statement of Rep. Hill) ("This whole proposal is based upon the proposition
that every dollar of earnings in the taxable brackets should go through the tax mill, whether it is earned
by a corporation or by an individual, and it should be on a comparable basis as between the two.");
accord, id. at 193 (statement of Rep. Lewis) (referring to a "roundabout device of compelling the
distribution of the real income of the corporation to its shareholders, so that the shareholders may be
called upon to pay taxes upon their income"); id. at 321 (statement of Rep. Hill) ("[W]hat we are
seeking to do here is to subject all income, both of corporations and individuals, to practically the same
basis for tax purposes."); 1936 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 124, at 12-13 (statement of
Commissioner Helvering) ("And the whole thing is based on the equity of all the money either being
paid on a rate comparable to the rates paid by the taxpayers, going through the tax mill, either by the
corporation or the shareholder, and that is where the equity of the bill comes through.").
378. See 1920 House Hearings, supra note 360, at 26 (statement of Chairman Fordney); id. at 22
(statement of T.S. Adams) ("If you desire to retain a progressive income tax, then you must impose
an additional tax on corporations to compensate for the surtaxes as applied to individuals.").
379. Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means
Together with Cenain Ponions of the Proceedings of the Comm. in Executive Session, Indexed, 67th
Cong. 403 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 House Hearings].

Business Tax Entities

2000]

957

opposition to the undistributed profits tax by his and other populists' archnemesis for the next dozen years. 380
Senate Finance Committee member Senator Hugo Black (D-Ala.), well
known as a populist, 381 also raised the policy of tax equity between sole
proprietorships and partnerships on the one hand and corporations on the
other, noting that "the natural tendency . . . has been a very coercive
influence in causing people to organize corporations. " 382 Commissioner
Helvering confirmed that there had been a substantial shift from the
partnership form to the corporate form over the preceding decade (from a
1: 1 ratio of partnerships to corporations in 1926 to two to five ratio in
1935). 383 Some members of Congress, including Senator Tom Connally

380. See 61 CONG. REc. 8,073 (1921) (remarks of Rep. "Cactus Jack" Gamer, ranking minority
member of the House Ways and Means Committee, subsequent Speaker of the House, and Vice
President during President Roosevelt's first two terms) (criticizing the Treasury Department's view of
taxation designed "to relieve the heavy taxpayer from his taxes and continue the taxes upon the masses
of the people"); 65 CONG. REC. 3,031-32 (1923) (remarks of Rep. Lankford) (expressing his opposition
to the "real Mellon plan" with an extended ditty that begins "Tax the people, tax with care, tax to help
the millionaire .•. "); H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 82, 77-82 (1924) (presenting the minority views of
11 Democratic members of the House Ways and Means Committee, who asserted that "[t]he proposed
Mellon bill is drawn for the purpose of giving principle [sic] relief to the large taxpayer and our plan
is based upon giving relief to all income taxpayers, but the larger percentage of relief to the small
taxpayer"); John Lee, "Death And Taxes" and Hypocrisy, 60 TAX NOTES TODAY (1993), available in
WL at 93 TNT 188-43 (concluding that "[i]n short, the 1920s (and the 1930s as well) saw consumption
taxes on the masses and both nominally and decreasingly progressive income taxes on only the rich and
well-to-do" because of the various revisions to the Revenue Act of 1921 effectuated by Mellon).
381. Senator, and later Justice, Hugo Black was a native of the Alabama hill country, often describing himself as "just a Clay County hillbilly." Woodard, supra note 335, at 573-74 n.l3. He
established a highly successful personal injury law practice in Birmingham, refusing to join a big law
firm or to represent large corporations and instead delighting in taking on the "big Mules" of industrial
Alabama. See id. Black next was a self-styled populist political candidate, who attacked banking and
corporate interests, was committed to improving the lives of all of his working class constituents, and
"instinctively shied away from manipulating the race issue" (two years before the 1925 Senate race he
had joined the Ku Klux Klan, which almost kept him off the Court). Dan T. Carter, "Let Justice Be
Done": Public Passion and Judicial Courage in Modem Alabama, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 553, 563 (1998);
James F. Simon, Judging the Justices, 49 STAN. L. REv. 173, 174 (1996) (book review).
[N]o one-not even Roosevelt-gave much, if any, thought to how ... [Hugo Black's]
populist upbringing, uncommon drive and intellect, and experiences as a county
prosecutor, police court judge, highly successful trial and appellate lawyer, and senator
(who had from 1928-1936 been an active member of the Senate Judiciary Committee)
would shape his performance on the Supreme Court.
Michael J. Gerhardt, The An of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1595, 1642 (1995) (book
review). Immediately following his appointment to the Court, Justice Black "shocked the legal world
by a series of unrestrained populist dissents." David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Coun:
The Second World War, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. I, 1-2 (1987).
382. 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 20; see also 1936 Senate Hearings at 144
(statement of Sen. Black) ("Now. as a matter of fairness, no system should be permitted to stand ...
if it gives certain individuals an exceptional rate by reason of their investment in a corporation and a
much higher rate on income from individual investment .... "); id. at 128 (statement of Chairman
Harrison) ("Does it not appear . . . that it is a fair thing from a governmental standpoint that a
corporation should not be put in a more favorable position than an individual in paying taxes?").
'lQ'l
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(D-Tex.), acknowledged the response by saying that the business person
could incorporate. 384
The mood of Senate Finance Committee Chair Senator Pat Harrison
(D-Miss.), was "to get the matter out of the way," and coming to realize
the "90:10 phenomenon," (that ninety percent of corporations report less
than ten percent of the corporate income), he suggested that the ninety
percent earning less than $15,000 not be subject to the undistributed profits
tax. 385 In the end, the Senate Finance Committee abandoned principle
in favor of a compromise of retaining the inside corporate income tax
(which, along with the much lesser capital stock and excess profits taxes,
the House and Administration would have replaced with a heavy undistributed profits tax), and instead called for a two-tier undistributed profits tax
with much lower rates than proposed and especially low rates on small
income corporations. 386 The Senate view prevailed in conference.
Ironically, even the greatly watered down undistributed profits tax did
force out dividends in 1937, thus reducing the potential corporate level
undistributed profits tax revenues, but many high income individuals
avoided outside taxation on such dividends through personal holding
companies and other "clever little schemes," in FDR's words. 387 Some
shareholders undoubtedly simply evaded the outside taxes by not reporting
the dividends. 388 In any event, implacable opposition of management, the

384. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 132; cf.1936 House Hearings, supra note 175,
at75 (statement ofMelville F. Weston, representing Raymond-Whitcomb, Inc.) ("[A]ny individual who
considers the corporate structure better adapted to their type of business, more suitable to level out the
fluctuations of income, can incorporate."). Senator Connally's apparent preference, however, was that
private corporations pay the same as individuals "instead of making them [i.e., individuals]
incorporate." 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 258 (statement of Sen. Connally).
385. 1936 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 124, at 38, 42 (statement of Chairman
Harrison).
386. Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 21 (statements of Commissioner
Helvering) (testifying that the President's proposal was more fair than the tax law in force at the time,
particularly to lower income shareholders), with S. REP. No. 74-2156, at 4 (1936) (recognizing
imperfections in existing tax law, but citing "fundamental defects" in the House Bill that would unduly
penalize corporations).
387. Message from the President of the United States, Tax Evasion and Evaders, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (H. Doc. 260 1937) ("'Clever little schemes' are not admirable when they undermine the
foundations of society."); see also 1936 Confidential Senate Hearings (Pan 2), supra note 124, at 108
(statement of McLeod, Treasury Statistician) (stating that, under existing law, minority shareholders
of large corporations were able to place their stock in the principal corporation in another corporation,
such as a personal holding company, thereby escaping taxation).
388. See 1920 House Hearings, supra note 360, at 60 (statement of Rep. Green) (suggesting that
greater dividends paid as a result of then proposed undistributed profits corporate tax might not be
reported by shareholders notwithstanding Form 1099 reporting, which in fact was not effective for
another six decades or so until computerized matching); cf. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at
47 (statement of Rep. WoodrufO (predicting correctly that little revenue would be raised by the
proposed tax bill). In Executive Session in 1936, A. S. McLeod, Treasury Statistician, initially claimed
that Treasury had a record of how much cash dividends were paid to individual shareholders, who
actually received them, and the income bracket in which they fell, but actually it did not have such a
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revenue shortfall, and the second crash of Wall Street and return of the
Great Depression led to the gutting of the already weak undistributed
profits tax in 1938 and to its repeal in the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. 389 All that remained of the undistributed profits tax was the model
for a preferential rate or credit for small income corporations, which
became the federal corporate income tax small net income base subject
ultimately to a preferential rate of only fifteen percent. 390

2. In the Middle

~ars:

Focus on Inside "Ultimate" Tax Shelter.-

Four decades later, when public391 and private C Corporations rejected
President Jimmy Carter's well-intentioned calls for corporate-shareholder
integration, Secr~tary of the Treasury Mike Blumenthal passionately testified against tax shelters before a Senate Finance Committee, describing
private C Corporations as
a device already advertised widely as the 'ultimate tax shelter', thus
a] graduated corporate rate structure raises troubling questions of tax
equity. . . . [I]ndividual owners of closely-held corporations ... are
generally in higher income tax brackets than the owners of publiclyheld companies. . . . To many owners of closely held corporations,
the corporate tax income tax-fur from being an additional burdenis actually a relief from taxes which they would otherwise pay if all
of the income of their corporation were attributed directly to
them. 392

Hearings, supra note 124, at 97, 134. Furthennore, repeated probing by Senator Harry Flood Byrd
(D-Va.), who was strongly opposed to the proposed undistributed profits tax as to specific large
corporations, made it painfully clear that Treasury had not done its homework and often could not tell
who received dividends or how much except as to particularly large shareholders in very large
corporations. See id. at 8-9, 21-22, 35 (statements of Deputy Commissioner Charles T. Russell).
389. Pub. L. No. 75-377, 50 STAT. 813; Pub. L. 75-554, 52 STAT. 447 (1939) (reprinting
testimony of numerous business owners as to the undistributed income tax's extremely detrimental
effect on profitability). The indices to the 1938 House and Senate hearings reveal that the undistributed
profits tax was the most frequent topic of witnesses. For examples linking the tax with lessened
revenues and the second stock market crash in 1937, see Hearings on H.R. 9682, Revenue Act of1938,
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 22, 26, 105, 127, 135, 180, 228, 233, 565,
593, 651 (1938); Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm. on Revenue Revision, 1938, 75th
Cong., 3rd Sess. 298-99, 484-85 (1938) and also Repon ofa Subcomm. of the House Ways and Means
Comm. on a Proposed Revision of the Revenue Laws, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 2-5 (1938).
390. See Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 14(a)(1), 49 STAT. 1648, 1656; 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note
122, at 36-37 (statement of George C. Haas, Director of Research and Statistics, Treasury Department);
infra notes 415-67 and accompanying text.
391. The Presidem's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94, 95, 102, 468-88 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 House
Hearings] (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal, Treasury Secretary) (defending the President's
proposal which retained the double taxation of corporate dividends, in favor of reducing corporate tax
rates); id. at 6144-51 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz) (analyzing the opposition by
corporations to the President's integration proposal).
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Why else do you think that adequately tax advised private C Corporations
were then, and are still, formed? 393 Why else did Congress fashion the
tax law this way? 394

3. In the Present ~ars: Focus-on Vertical lnequity.-Citizens for Tax
Justice well illustrates the vertical inequity today, from a populist
perspective, of the corporate graduated rates inside tax shelter in Hidden
Entitlements.
Although the special lower corporate tax rates are purportedly
designed to help the little guy, they are of no benefit at all to the vast
majority of business owners who make less than about $60,000.
Since married business owners stay in the 15 percent personal
income tax bracket until about that level, they get no tax advantage
from incorporating and paying the lower corporate rate rather than
not incorporating and simply paying taxes on their profits as
individuals.

shelter, benefitting high-income owners of small corporations); STAFF OF SENATE FINANCE COMM.,
98TH CONG., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS 88 (Comm. Print 1983) (slating that "present law often leaves laxpayers better off,
on balance, than they would be if no corporate level lax were imposed").
393. See Lee, supra note 147 (observing how, when compared to the income lax rates applicable
to alternative business forms, the "ridiculously low graduated bottom corporate [lax] rate" prompts
many entrepreneurs to incorporate their businesses rather than operate them as sole proprietors or
partnerships); 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 160 (slatement of Sen. Black) (noting,
incredulously, that "it is true the corporation has been used as a device to keep from paying as much
lax as they would have to pay doing business as a partnership or individual"); Proposed Revenue Act
of1921: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm., 67th Cong. 453 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 Senate
Hearings] (slatement of Robert M. Miller, formerly Solicitor of Internal Revenue) (warning that with
outside individual rates proposed to remain as higb as 40%, "it is clear that some balancing lax must
be put on corporations, so as to avoid forcing all businesses to incorporate"). The outside individual
rate initially was reduced from 72% to only 50%, no balancing lax was imposed, and such a general
shift did ~ccur. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
394. Cf. Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105
YALE L.J. 325,327 (1995) (noting that federal corporate lax structure was created in response to what
managers want). Professors Arlen and Weiss also fall into the double laxation of private C
Corporations bria·r patch. See id. at 346-47. I have long suspected that the corporate lax and capilal
gains lax structure were deliberately designed by Secrelacy Mellon in 1921 to preserve the appearance
of progressive individual rates while making a "faree" of them. Cf. WALTMAN, supra note 174, at 9899 (suggesting that the Revenue Act of 1921 represented the "beginnings of the use of symbolism in
the [lax] rates"); 65 CONG. REc. 2085 (1924) (remarks of Rep. Mills). Represenlative Mills railed
against high ordinacy rates when high income laxpayers could invest in lax exempt income bonds
(because the capilal could better be invested in corporate America than in things like schools and
roads). On the other hand, he favored preferential treatment of capilal gains (which did make a farce
of progressivity). Mills had practiced lax law in New York and later was to be the last Secrelacy of
the Treasucy under President Hoover. See Lee, supra note 380. He admitted in a congressional
grilling at the beginning of the Great Depression that the individual federal income lax of the day was
a class lax and the masses were subject to the heavier excise-consumption laxes. See id.; see also infra
note 504.
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But the lower corporate rates on smaller businesses do benefit
well-off business owners, who routinely split their incomes between
the personal and corporate rate schedules to minimize their tax rates.
For example, a business owner with $200,000 in total income can
save $9,200 in taxes compared to what he'd owe under the regular
personal income tax by paying himself a salary of $125,000 and
keeping the remaining $75,000 in his corporation. A business owner
making $500,000 can cut his taxes by $16,400 by arranging to have
20 percent of his income taxed at the reduced corporate rates. 395
Citize_ns for Tax Justice's clever exposure of the low effective rates of
the corporate giants in the early 1980s provided the political and rhetorical
fuel for the Thx Reform Act of 1986. 396 The 1986 Act was President
Ronald Reagan's now largely eroded great compromise of lower rates,
which were to be paid for by broadening the base, but which were actually
paid for, in large parte, by increasing the deficit. 397 Senator Bill Bradley
(D-N.J.), the conceptual father of that compromise, opposed President Bill
Clinton's 1993 rate hike on high income individuals398 which, as he
predicted, ultimately led to the 1997 restoration of a capital gains rate
cut. 399 The capital gains rate cut primarily benefited high income
individuals. 400 Bradley implicitly laid the blame for pulling the string
that began the unraveling of the compromise at the feet of President George
Bush who had "pushed, pushed, pushed, pushed, pushed" for a special
capital gains cut without an ordinary rate increase from 1988 to 1992. 401
Citizens for Tax Justice asserts that most non-farm sole proprietors are
taxed at the fifteen percent individual bracket. 402 Thus, it correctly
points out that there is no major tax incentive for them to incorporate to
use the graduated inside corporate rates also starting at fifteen percent on

395. RobertS. Mcintyre, Director of Citizens for Tax Justice, The Hidden Entitlements, TAX
NOTES TODAY, April24, 1995, available in Westlaw at 95 TNT 79·82.
396. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 11-13 (1987).
397. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 134-37 (noting that the projected increase
in corporate sector revenues designed to pay for the individual rate cuts was never realized).
398. See 139 CONG. REC. 13,781 (1993).
399. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive
Taxation, FLA. TAX REV. 1, 29-30 (1998) (discussing changes in the capital gains tax rate throughout
the 1990s and suggesting that, for high-income tax payers, the 1993 capital gains tax increase was
probably "just a temporary blip that was fixed by a sympathetic Congress shortly there-after").
400. See Lee, supra note 141, at 40-42 (noting the distributional effects of a similar proposal).
As I predicted therein, id. at 64, the resurrection of a substantial individual capital gains preference
reduced the top individual effective rate from 31.4% for 1996 to 29.5% for 1997. See CRS Report on
Individual Tax Returns for 1995-1997, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 27, 2000, available in Westlaw at
2000 TNT 18-22.
401. See 139 CONG. REc. 13,781 (1993).
402. See Mclntvre_ suora note 395.
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accumulations of net income. 403 As many as two-thirds of self-employed
individuals filing Schedule C are reporting "second jobs, that individuals
perform to make ends meet, " 404 in addition to being wage income
taxpayers. The Service itself considers the pool of self-employed taxpayers
to number around six to eight million. 405 For 1995, 16,423,900 sole
proprietorship returns were filed, reporting $166.8 billion. 406 Even if all
of that net income were attributed to the say 8 million full-time sole
proprietors, it would only average $20,850 per proprietorship, which is
below the breakpoint for the twenty-eight percent bracket for a joint
return. 407 With personal and dependency exemptions and the standard
deduction, the average proprietor's taxable income would be considerably
below the twenty-eight percent bracket.
Since LLCs are mostly used by real estate businesses and the
professions, horizontal inequity arising from other high income individuals
conducting other businesses in C Corporations is not likely to engender the
same populist concerns that it did. in the 1920s and 1930s. 408 The vertical inequity arising from high income entrepreneurs splitting their income
with their C Corporations (subject to a fifteen percent rate without wage
taxes), as contrasted with sole proprietors who are subject to the same
fifteen percent income tax rate (plus wage taxes) and thus use the private
C Corporation as the "ultimate tax shelter," does continue to raise populist
ire, as it did in President Carter's Treasury in the 1970s. The story of the
1960s and 1980s is told below.
V.

Political Perspective

A.

Origins of the Inside Graduated Corporate Tax Rates

Conventional wisdom traces the origin of the present gr~duated inside
corporate tax rates on small income to the Revenue Act of 1935. 409

403. See id.
404. See Oversight on Impact of Complexity in the Tax Code on Individual Taxpayers and Small
Business: Hearing Before House Ways & Means Subcomm., 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1998)
(statement of Steve Bafundo, C.P.A., in a three-partner, four-staff-member Connecticut firm serving
over 200 small businesses and nonprofit organizations). Service data indicates that only 50% of sole
proprietors report more than 50% of their income from self-employment. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFACE, GAO/GGD-99-76, TAXPAYERS FACE MANY LAYERS OF REQUIREMENTS 4 n.5 (1999).
405. The Service considers the pool of self-employed taxpayers to number around 6.6 miiiion.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-175, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS CAN BETTER
PURSUE NONCOMPLIANT SOLE PROPRIETORS 1 (1994); see also THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 21 (1992) (reporting that more than one-half of all American businesses
have only one employee, a self-employed owner).
406. See Therese Cruciano, Sole Proprietorship Returns, I995, 17 SOl BULL. 8, 9 fig. B (1997).
407. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (1994) (setting $36,900 as the breakpoint above which income is taxed at
28%).
408. See supra notes 365-83 and accompanying text.
409. Rev. Act of 1935, ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1014 (1935); see also 131 CONG. REC. 8375 (1985)
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Although technically true, the Revenue Act of 1921, by coupling a flat rate
with a tax credit of $2000 for small corporate incomes ($25,000 or less)
when the inside corporate rate was 12.5%, effectively imposed a graduated
rate. 410 Large, public corporations had, on the average, a lower return
on capital (in part due to larger amount of capital being invested or
acquired in acquisitions and greater amounts and percentages of retained
earnings, added to the capital base) and hence a lower effective rate. 411
The existing flat 12.5% corporate income tax applied to a base net of
excess profits with a $2000 credit. 412 This had the practical result of
graduated rates. Republican Treasury Secretary Mellon opposed the 1921
Act exemption, which was justified as providing parity taxation of partners
and sole proprietors, who had a similar exemption under the individual
income tax. 413 In 1932, the by-then $3,000 small corporate income

410. Pub. L. No. 67-98, §§ 230(b), 236(b), 42 STAT. 227, 257 (1921). The tax rate under the
original corporate tax was 1% of net income in excess of a $5,000 exemption. See Payne-Aldrich
Tariff Act, ch. 6, 36 STAT. 11, 112 (1909). See generally MaJjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate
Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 94-133 (1990) (giving the
history of the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909). Dr. T.S. Adams, later the father of the Revenue Act
of 1921, favored, in Hearings at the end of the Wilson Administration, replacing the then major source
of corporate revenues, the excess-profits tax-which favored large established firms with a 20%
undistributed profits tax-in order to promote tax equity between corporations and partnershipsproprietorships subject to individual surtax rates. See 1920 House Hearings, supra note 360, at 17-18
(statement of Dr. T. S. Adams, Tax Adviser to the Treasury Department) ("It is highly desirable that
the taxation of individuals, partnerships, personal service corporations, and ordinary corporations be
placed on the same basis."). The simpler mandatory passthrough treatment was thought precluded by
the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner. See supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text. The
Republican Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, while concerned about the disparate tax
treatment of partnerships and corporations, strongly opposed any tax on undistributed corporate profits
as a tax on prudence. 1920 House Hearings, supra note 360, at 24-25 (statement of Chairman
Fordney) (noting that the proposed undistributed profits tax would apply to profits retained "to add to
the plant and provide far greater production"). The revenue raising equivalent on the table was a flat
15% on corporate income. See 1921 House Hearings, supra note 379, at 397 (statement of Secretary
Mellon); id. at 405 (statement of T.S. Adams).
411. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 175, at 287 (statement of Rep. Hili) (recognizing that
the government loses significant tax revenue by imposing only a "comparatively moderate rate of tax"
on corporations and allowing corporations to "withhold the distribution of dividends" and, therefore,
avoid the higher personal income rates); Thomas Earl Geu, Professor T.S. Adams (1873-1933) on
Federal Taxation: Deja Vu All Over Again, 10 AKRON TAX J. 29, 33 (1993) (noting that even eminent
tax professor and influential tax policymaker T.S. Adams "perceived a breakpoint in the application
of the excess profits tax hetween large and small corporations").
412. See Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 236(b), 42 STAT. 227, 257 (1921). In 1921, Secretary of the
Treasury Andrew Mellon, under the new Republican Harding Administration, also favored repeal of
the excess profits tax and replacement with an equivalent tax. See 1921 House Hearings, supra note
379, at 398-99; 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 393, at 10-11 (letter from Secretary Mellon).
413. See 1921 House Hearings, supra note 379, at 397-400 (Chair Fordney) (noting that
partnerships currently pay less in taxes than comparable corporations). Ironically, it was later thought
that the corporate income tax was enacted to create parity with partnerships, which were taxed like
individuals. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 20-21 (colloquy between Sen. Gerry and
Commissioner Helvering).
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exemption was repealed for obvious revenue reasons, 414 but in 1935, the
Democratic Roosevelt Administration, as part of a broad package of
revisions, advocated replacing the then existing fiat 12.5% corporate
income tax with a graduated 10% to 15% inside income tax rate, ostensibly
to tax vast concentrations of capital heavier than small businesses. 415
Cynics (or perhaps realists) might note that the proposal cut inside
corporate income tax rates for the ninety percent of corporations with small
(or no) annual income. 416 Republican opposition to decoupling might
have been based upon the assumption that, with the masses of corporations
separated from the six hundred or so high income corporations earning the
bulk of the income, raising the rates on the big fellows (or Rockefellers),
while leaving the little fellows alone, would be easier politically. And so
it was. The final legislation contained much less graduation (12.5% to
15%), with no cut at the bottom, but by decoupling of the rates on small
and large income corporations, Congress raised the rates on the large
income corporations only. 417
B.

1954 Code

The 1954 ALI Draft Income Tax, generally the model for the 1954
Code, proposed in part a "two corporation" approach to Subchapter C.
Under this approach, sales of private held businesses were to be treated the
same regardless of whether conducted in proprietorship, partnership, or
privately corporate form. However, the rate structure as to operations of
private corporations would not be disturbed, as this was a political-policy
issue. 418 Thus, the 1954 Code initially imposed a "normal" corporate tax

414. See Rev. Act of1932, ch. 209,47 Stat. 169, 177 (1932). Corporate revenues had fallen off
considerably due to the commencement of the Depression-52% of corporations reported a deficit. See
H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 4 (1932). The House bill proposed to reduce the $3,000 exemption for
corporations with $25,000 or less in net income to $1,000 for corporations with $10,000 or less in net
income; the Senate repealed the exemption in its entirety because "every corporation having net income
..• is in a position to contribute to the revenue needs of the government." S. REP. No. 72-665, at
9 (1932).
415. Proposed Taxation of Individual and Corporate Incomes, Inheritances and Gifts: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1935) (June 19, 1935,
message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress) (proposing that it seems "only
equitable" to introduce graduated corporate tax rates, so that "vast concentrations of capital ... carry
burdens commensurate with their powers and their advantages").
416. See supra notes 122-24, 385 and accompanying text.
417. See Rev. Act of 1935, ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1015 (1935).
418. See 2 AMERICAN LAW lNSfiTUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE, FEBRUARY 1954 DRAFr
212 (1954); see also Edwin S. Cohen et al., A Proposed Revision ofthe Federal Income Tax Treatment
of the Sale of a Business Enterprise-American Law Institute Draft, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 161-71
(1954). This refusal to examine political issues was criticized. See William L. Cary, Reflections Upon
the American Law Institute Tax Project and the Internal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and
Reappraisal, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 259, 269 (1960) (stating that the ALI's failure to consider political
issues while working on their Institute Tax Project led to only "piecemeal" adoption of the ALI
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of thirty percent and a "surtax" of twenty-two percent on taxable income
in excess of $25,000. 419 The rationale for the lower tax on the first
$25,000 of corporate income was to aid in capital accumulation, 420 since
commercial financing is seldom available to private firms. 421
The
congressional policy of assisting small business can be traced back to the
Industrial Revolution after the Civil War, "in which big business flourished
and small business was threatened." The policy "crystallized when the
depression of the 1930's and 1940's focused attention on the nation's
economy and in the 1940's when the economic mobilization for World War
II began. . . . Congressional interest and concern was institutionalized in
1950 when the Senate and House of Representatives both established small
business committees. " 422
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy proposed tax cuts based upon
deficit financing, 423 including reductions in individual income tax rates
and "[r]eversal of the corporate normal and surtax rates, so that the tax
rate applicable to the first $25,000 of corporate income would drop from
30 to 22 percent, so as to give encouragement to small business. " 424
President Kennedy reasoned as follows:
Small businessmen with net income of less than $25,000, who
constitute over 450,000 of the Nation's 585,000 corporations, will,
under this program, receive greater reductions in their corporate
taxes than their larger competitors. Under my program, beginning
this year, the first $25,000 of corporate taxable income will be
subject to a tax rate of 22 percent rather than 30 percent, a reduction
of almost 27 percent. This change is important to those small
corporations which have less ready access to the capital markets,
must depend more heavily for capital on internally generated funds,
and are generally at a financial and competitive disadvantage.

419. See I.R.C. § ll(b), (c) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § ll(b)·(c) (1999)).
420. See Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Tax Policy of the Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1956)
(statement of John Lindner) (assening that applying the same tax rate to both small and large businesses
will more severely affect the small business because of reduced "opponunity to grow from retained
earnings"); General Revenue Revision, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means., 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48, 55-56, 62, 72-73, 82 (1958) (statements of Rep. Sheehan; Rep. Hill; Rep.
Seely-Brown, Jr.; and Spenser Smith, Ph.D.); cf. S. REP. NO. 85-1237, at 8-9 (1958) (recognizing
financing problems and the heavier burden of a flat rate on small corporations, the Senate
Subcommittee proposed a graduated reinvestment allowance for retained earnings).
421. See Lee, supra note 141, at 10 (noting that 1995 capital gain proponents "contended that
borrowing from financial institutions tends to be unavailable").
422. 1990 Commissioner's Advisocy Group Repon of Compliance Subgroup on Compliance and
Small Business, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 19, 1990, available in WL 90 TNT 257-21; see also
ZELIZER, supra note 341, at 97 (mentioning the effons of the Cabinet Committee on Small Business
to design tax reforms for small businesses).
423. See 1963 House HearinJ?s, supra note 121, at 7.
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Unincorporated businesses, of course, will benefit from the reduction
in individual income taxes. 425
Significantly, JFK's 1963 proposals broke down, by individual income tax
classes, the distributional effects of the proposed tax cuts, but for the
corporate rate cuts provided only the percentage decrease in rates. 426
The notion that each class of taxpayers is entitled to a share of tax cuts was
to be of great importance in ensuing decades. 427 The Revenue Act of
1964428 did lower the normal tax rate from thirty percent to twenty-two
percent, thus reducing the inside rate on the first $25,000 of corporate
income while generally lowering the individual rates as well. 429
The next increase in the subsidy of the graduated inside brackets
occurred against the backdrop of inflation-driven individual rate "bracket
creep," which allowed Congress to use budget "surpluses" created from
static revenue estimates, while inflation resulted in wage increases pushing
individual taxpayers into higher brackets, to fund tax cuts by adjusting the
break points for the brackets and while allowing even more tax
expenditures. 43 Consequently, in 1975, Congress further lowered the
rate on the first $25,000 of corporate income from twenty-two percent to
twenty percent and created an additional graduated inside corporate rate by
reducing the rate on the second $25,000 from forty-eight percent to twentytwo percent. 431
President Jimmy Carter campaigned in 1976 on reforming the income
tax; a campaign sound-bite was that the Federal tax system is "a disgrace
In 1978, the Conservative Coalition of
to the human race. " 432

°

425. /d. at 9.
426. See id. at 68, 70 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon). "For political
and ideological reasons" the Kennedy tax package, however, was not intended to change the
distributional impact of the individual income tax overall. ZELIZER, supra note 341, at 192.
427. See infra notes 448-49, 467-68 and accompanying text.
428. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § I, 78 Stat. 19 (1964).
429. See id. §§ 11, Ill, 78 Stat. at 19-23.
430. See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 128-29 (describing "a period in which
inflation-driven individual bracket creep permitted Congress to enact current spending programs,
depending on the revenue windfall of expected future bracket creep to produce a balanced budget").
431. See Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 303(a), 89 Stat. 26, 44 (1975). See generally 132 CONG. REC.
4,324 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers) (surveying the evolution of tax rate reductions for small
businesses from 1975 to 1986). Significantly, Senator Bumpers was an early mentor of President Bill
Clinton, who adopted in the Revenue Act of 1993 many of Bumper's ideas, particularly the § 1202targeted small C Corporation capital gains cut. See generally Lee, Capital Gains Proposals, supra note
35.
432. "It is time for a complete overhaul of our tax system. I still tell you: It is a disgrace to the
human race. All my life I have heard promises of tax reform, but it never quite happens. With your
help, we are finally going to make it happen! And you can depend on it!" See President Jimmy
Carter, Text of Carter's Speech Accepting the Nomination (July 15, 1976), in FAcrs ON FILE WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, July 17, 1976, available in LEXIS, News Library, All news File. Carter also proposed
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Republicans and Southern Democrats passed, in the first wave of the "tax
revolt, " 433 upper income-skewed tax cuts, over the objections of ineffectual House Ways and Means Chair AI Ullman (D-Or.). 434 On the ruins
of Carter's tax proposals, including corporate shareholder integration, 435
Congress reduced the inside corporate rates by five percent across the
board, resulting in a seventeen percent rate on the first $25,000 and twenty
percent on the next $25,000. 436
One of the structural signatures of President Ronald Reagan's tax cut
in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 437 (ERTA)-deficit financing
(also found in JFK's 1963 tax proposals, which Republicans had then
opposed43 ~-came to give the term a new meaning. In 1981, House
Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) attempted
(unsuccessfully) to out-bid Republicans for the swing votes of Southern
Democrats by granting tax preferences (including the Reagan-sponsored
rate cuts and investment incentives), 439 after being told by the

an increase in the capital gains preference in the Revenue Act of 1978. See Lee, Capital Gains
Proposals, supra note 35.
433. See Robert G. Kaiser & Mary Russell, A Middle-Class Congress-Haves Over Have-Nots,
WASH. Posr, Oct. 15, I 978, at AI ("[T]he concerns of the middle class and American business clearly
displaced the agenda of social and economic issues that has dominated congressional politics since the
inauguration of the New Deal45 years ago .... Majorities in both House and Senate were searching
feverishly for legislative Acts that could cater to a 'tax revolt' that many members believed was
sweeping the count!)'."); see also E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLmCS 246 (1991)
(describing the middle-class tax revolt embodied in California's Proposition 13). For discussion of the
political science notion of a "Conservative Coalition" of Republicans and Southern Democrats arising
on particular issues as a voting majority block allied against all other Democrats see Lee, Capital Gains
Proposals, supra note 35. With Republicans by and large replacing Southern Democrats in Congress
in the 1990s, the Conservative Coalition has largely been supplanted by a Southern-dominated
Republican majority. See Lee, supra note 141, at 27-28.
434. In 1974, Representative AI Ullman replaced Representative Wilbur Mills as Chair of a House
Ways and Means Comminee with a changed complexion: its membership had been increased by almost
50% and over half of the members were new to the Comminee. See Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303, 304 (1976). Ullman was perceived as a
"decent man," but a weak Chair. See Peter Milius, Ullman Shakes "Loser" Tag in Give-and-Take with
Long, WASH. Posr, Sept. 13, 1976, at C7 (explaining that critics of Ullman complained that he might
be "too decent to do the scheming and head-knocking necessary to produce legislation from Ways and
Means").
435. See 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 219 (1978) ("Almost all of his proposed 'reforms,' except for
a few tokens, had been scrapped, and the cuts were skewed much more towards the upper end of the
income scale than he had recommended.").
436. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, § 301, 92 Stat. 2763, 2820 (1978).
437. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 97 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scanered sections of26 U.S.C.).
438. See DIONNE, supra note 433, at 251.
439. See Melissa Brown, Democratic Strategy Backfires-GOP Wins in the House, TAX NOTES,
Aug. 3, 1981. Forty-eight Democrats defected to Reagan in adopting the Republican Substitute for the
House Ways and Means bill. See Congress Enacts Presidellf Reagan's Tax Policy, 37 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 91, 100 (1981); 126 CONG. REC. 18,261 (1980) (extension of remarks by Rep. Gephart)
("Senate Democrats, many of whom also must face the voters in the fall, caved in quickly to the
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Administration that an unblocked economy would pay for the tax cuts
through efficiency gains, an idea termed supply side economics. 440
Congress took a "Riverboat Gamble" and cut the tax rates while
fashioning, in effect, a consumption tax for capital-intensive industries. 441
The other major signature of the 1963 Kennedy tax proposals-enactment
by projected benefits to income groups-was written in reverse by the 1981
Reagan tax cuts. Ostensibly pro rata as to the individual rate cuts, ERTA
actually provided very disproportionate benefits to high income
individuals. 442 Higher income individuals and large corporations benefitted

in that a slim majority of Southern Democrats remained in the Democratic fold. Republicans supported
the alternative 190 to 1, while Southern Democrats opposed it 43 to 36 and Northern Democrats 151
to 12. See 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 58-H (1981).
440. See Tax Aspects of the President's Economic Program: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17, 54, 57, 61, 70, 396-400 (1981) [hereinafter 1981
House Hearings] (statements of Secretary of the Treasury Don Regan, OBM Director David Stockman,
and Arthur Laffler) (asserring that the proposed tax reductions would lead to increased savings,
investment, and tax revenues). Secretary Regan, in explaining how the Office of the Secretary of the
Treasury arrived at their economic forecasts, confessed that "[w]hat we did in fact was to create our
own scenario." Id. at 42. In addition, OBM Director Stockman admitted that supply side economics
was merely a cover for the trickle-down theory. See William Greider, The Education of David
Stockman, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1981, at 27, 47 (quoting a concession by Stockman that "[i]t's
kind of hard to sell 'trickle down,' so the supply-side formula was the only way to get a tax policy that
was really 'trickle down.'").
441. The Conservative Coalition prevailed in the vote on the House bill: Republicans and Southern
Democrats supported the bill 190 to 1 and 69 to 9, respectively, while Northern Democrats opposed
it 97 to 64. See 127 CONG. REC. 18,262-63 (1981) (rollcall vote); 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 58-H
(1981). In the Republican-controlled Senate, the Finance Committee bill, which was much closer to
Reagan's proposals, overwhelmingly passed 89 to 11 with majorities of Republicans and Northern and
Southern Democrats. See 127 CONG. REC. 17,983 (1981) (rollcall vote); 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC41-S
(1981). The backdoor consumption tax arose from the combination of accelerated capital recovery and
the investment tax credit, intended to be equivalent on a present value basis to a current deduction for
the cost of equipment. See Lee, Capital Gains Proposals, supra note 31 (noting that the "backdoor
consumption tax" deduction for real estate depreciation led many high-income investors to use various
tax shelters). Congress lost the gamble. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101sr
CONG. 2D. SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL BUDGET AND TAX POLICY FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1991 AND BEYOND 75 (Comm. Print 1990) (criticizing the Reagan Administration's tax
proposals, noting that as a result, "the personal savings rate actually fell," and moreover, "even if these
new proposals did increase private savings somewhat, national saving would not rise unless the higher
saving by individuals exceeded the government's loss in tax revenues, and that is not likely."); SupplySide Theory Revisited: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1985)
(statement of Barry Bosworth, Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institute) (concluding from the "failure
of the private savings rate in the United States to increase," the "tremendous decline in the national
savings rate," and the fact that "the richest country in the world has now become a net debtor nation,"
that "in terms of its primary goal of stimulating private capital formation in the United States[, the 1981
Tax Act] has been a failure.").
442. The Reagan proposals refused to follow the 1969-1976 approach of tax cuts slanted towards
the middle- and lower-income taxpayers to increase consumer spending as an economic stimulus, and
instead followed supply-side economic theories of tax cuts aimed more at upper income individuals and
corporations to encourage productive investments. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 440, at 13
(statement of Secretary of the Treasury Regan) (distinguishing the proposed tax cuts from prior tax
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disproportionally this time, giving investment, perhaps greed, and certainly
envy, new meanings in the Roaring 1980s and in the early 1990s aftermath
of that speculative boom.
In ERfA, Congress, through a Senate floor amendment introduced by
Senator Weicker (R-Conn.) and passed ninety-two to zero, reduced the tax
rate on the first $25,000 from seventeen percent to fifteen percent and the
tax rate on the next $25,000 from twenty percent to eighteen percent. 443
The 1981 Senate floor debate on the Weicker amendment, much more
extensive than the usual floor discussion of a provision contained in a
committee bill, details the arguments for preferential tax rate treatment of
small income C Corporations. Supporters of the Weicker amendment,
including Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), relied on standard
rationales 444 (or better rhetoric) for preferential treatment of small
business and in particular small C Corporations: (1) small business is the
most efficient source of new jobs, innovation, and productivity; 445 {2)
private C Corporations have a need for capital which they can not meet by
borrowing or issuing equity and that they therefore must rely on retained
eamings;446 and {3) small business bears a disproportionate cost of
government regulation. 447 Apparently, the most convincing reasons to
Congress in fact were (4) an appeal for equity in the "tax distribution
system, " 448 in that in the Economic Recovery Thx Act of 1981, large

not the customary one of providing consumption-oriented redistribution of income[, but] to provide
incentives to individuals and businesses in the private sector to work, save, and invest and thus to
increase productivity and employment .••. ").
443. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 231(a)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 249
(1981); 127 CONG. REc. 16,251-52, 16,254 (1981) (Weicker amendment and roll call vote).
444. For a list of standard rationales, see Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The Political
Influence of American Small Business, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 15, 29-33 (1996). See also Joshua E.
Husbands, Comment: The Elusive Meaning of "Small Business," 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
355, 361-62 (1998) (recounting generally accepted concerns regarding small business taxation); Note,
supra note 88, at 558 (suggesting that "small businesses provide the bulk of job creation and economic
growth in our economy"). Boolean searches of the Congressional Record in recent years for (1) small
business w/10 engine; (2) small business w/10 rais! capital; and (3) small business w/25 entrepreneurial
spirit, as well as the 1981 and 1985-86 Congressional consideration of graduated corporate tax rates
discussed below, confirm that the factors identified by these commentators are those most recurring in
that medium of political discourse.
445. See 127 CONG. REC. 16,247 (1981) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing that small business
has been "the greatest source of innovation, the greatest source of jobs, the greatest source of research
and development, and the greatest source of productivity in our society"); id. at 16,252 (statement of
Sen. Weicker) (observing that small companies "can be a major source of U.S. output, jobs, and
innovation"); id. (statement of Sen. Nunn) (noting that small business "accounts for nearly half of the
gross national product, 87 percent of all new employment, and half of the major industrial innovations"
in the country).
446. See id. at 16,252 (remarks of Sen. Weicker) (observing that small corporations "must rely
almost exclusively on internally generated capital from retained earnings, since they dare not borrow
at today's interest rates and, of course, cannot sell equity shares").
447. See id. at 16,246 (remarks of Sen. Riegle).
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income C Corporations were getting a tax cut through a very generous
capital recovery system and sole proprietors and individual partners were
getting substantial tax rate cuts, so it was only fair that small income C
Corporations, which tended not to be capital intensive, get a rate cut as
well; 449 and (5) small business, in a unified voice, had specifically asked
for cuts in the small income graduated inside tax rates. 450 The remaining
standard rationales were brought out in the 1985-1986 Congressional consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.

C.

1986 Code: The Hidden Hand (Fist) Is Revealed

In the Summer of 1984, Congress imposed a new technique of phasing
out the benefits of graduated brackets to higher income C Corporations by
imposing a five percent surtax beginning at $1 million of income451
"designed to ensure that a greater amount of the benefits of the lower rate
enacted in 1981 would accrue to small businesses. " 452 In sharp contrast
to this congressional small income C Corporation bent, later in November,
1984, the Treasury Department Report to the President, Tax Reform for
Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, proposed to tax all C
Corporations at a flat rate on taxable income, reasoning that
the current progressive rate structure for corporate income serves no
affirmative purpose and encourages the use of corporations to gain
the advantage of low marginal tax rates. The progressive rate
structure for individuals is premised on the ability-to-pay concept,
which in turn reflects an assumption that additional amounts of
income are increasingly available for discretionary, nonessential
consumption. These concepts have no relevance to corporate

of the benefits of a tax cut. Senator Kennedy, in the 1981 debate, pointed out that he and others had
urged that "at least 15 percent of any business tax [cut] should be especially designed for small
business." 127 CONG. REc. 16,247 (1981) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). See also infra notes 446, 465.
449. See 127 CONG. REC. 16,252 (1981) (remarks of Sen. Weicker) ("We have a 25-percent tax
cut for individuals, and a vastly improved accelerated depreciation program for capital intensive firms.
But we need to improve incentives for small business capital investment."); id. at 16,245, 16,247
(remarks of Sen. Riegle) ("It is vel)' troubling that many American businesses will not benefit from this
tax cut on an equitable basis because the proposed corporate tax cut relies almost solely on accelerated
depreciation."). Proprietors and parmers are taxed as individuals and get help under the individual rate
cuts.
450. See id. at 16,252 (remarks of Sen. Weicker) (noting vel)' strong, widespread support from
the National Federation of Independent Business, the National Small Business Association, Small
Business United, for lower graduated tax rates, and also noting that "small business corporate tax rate
reduction was the number one recommendation of the White House Conference on Small Business
convened in 1980").
451. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, 66(a), 98 Stat. 494, 585 (1984).
452. 131 CONG. REC. 8,376 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Weicker). See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEACIT REDUCfiON Acr OF 1984, at 197 (Comm. Print 1984) (explaining that the phaseout of
graduated rates for large corporations prevents them from taking advantage of a provision designed for
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income, all of which is either distributed or used to produce
additional income. Moreover, under current law a small corporation
can escape high marginal tax rates on corporate income by electing
pass-through treatment as an S corporation.
The current low rates of tax for certain amounts of
corporate income permit the use of corporations as tax shelters for
individuals. . . . Where the corporate rate is significantly below the
individual's marginal rate, the deferral advantage can more than
offset the extra burden of the corporate tax. 453
Of course, Treasury was correct as a matter of tax policy. Use of a private
C Corporation as an inside tax shelter is inconsistent with vertical equity
or ability to pay. 454 Tax politics, however, easily trumped tax policy.
A small business pressure group (National Federation of Independent
Business) was among the first in new Treasury Secretary James Baker's
door, "disturbed by the elimination of lower tax rates for small
businesses. " 455 The Senate Committee on Small Business held field
hearings in January, February, and March 1985 on the "Impact of Tax
Reform and Simplification Proposals on Small Business" 456 which
revealed "that one of the most important concerns that small businesses
have is whether the current graduated corporate tax rate will be retained
457
•••• "
In April, 1985, Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.) and
Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), with bi-partisan support, introduced a joint
resolution relating to graduated corporate tax rates458 which, together
with the accompanying political discourse, repeated the themes of the 1981
debate and aired the remaining standard small business rationales. The
resolution harkened back to the 1935 decoupling of small and large corporation inside income tax rates and President Roosevelt's rationale of the
equity of adjusting the corporate tax rates "in accordance with economic
capacity, advantage, and fact. " 459 The Joint Resolution repeated the
statistics as to small business's contribution to the gross national product

453. 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
PROPOSALS 128-29 (November 1984) [hereinafter Treasury 1].
454. See Yin, supra note 35, at 138-39.
455. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 396, at 80.
456. Impact of Tax Reform and Simplification Proposals on Small Business: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Small Business, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Small Business
Hearings].
457. See 131 CONG. REc. 8,376 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Weicker, Chair of the Senate Committee
on Small Business); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 99TH CONG. REPORT
SUMMARIZING THE COMMITTEE'S FJELD HEARINGS HELD IN 1985 ON THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION PROPOSALS ON SMALL BUSINESS 18 (Comm. Print 1985).
458. See 131 CONG. REC. 8,375 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Baucus); id. at 8,535 (1995) (remarks
of Rep. Rangel).
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and new employment and proclaimed that "this entrepreneurial spirit needs
to be encouraged, not stifled by Federal tax policies which run counter to
the interests of the Nation's small businesses. . . . [B]ecause of economies
of scale, small businesses compete at an economic disadvantage with larger
businesses and therefore bear higher capital and operating costs . . . . " 460
Senator Max Baucus' accompanying statement responded to the Treasury's
rationale for elimination of the graduated inside brackets:
First, the corporate income tax itself is partly based on the
notion that corporations are independent entities that obtain valuable
privileges from the Government and may, in return for these
pi:ivileges, be subject to tax. It follows, as President Roosevelt said
in his 1935 message to Congress, that "the advantages and the
protections conferred upon corporations by Government increase in
value as the size of the corporation increases," and that a graduated
corporate tax rate takes this into account.
Second, many small businesses have difficulty obtaining loans
for operating and expansion capital and must use retained earnings
instead. As the 1980 White House Small Business Commission
noted-while advocating a corporate rate structure that would be
even more graduated than the current one:
[a] more graduated corporate tax would help expand the
retained earnings available to a small company for
reinvestment, and retained earnings are the soundest and
most reliable source of business capital.
Finally, our graduated corporate rates are partly based on the
fact that we want to give small corporations a break. An economist
might argue that it's unfair and inefficient to tax a corner grocery at
a lower rate than Safeway or A&P. But we've long believed that
small businesses provide special benefits to our society and deserve
reasonable incentives that help them thrive. A system of graduated
corporate tax rates is a straight-forward way to provide such
incentives. Some might call graduated corporate rates a "tax
loophole." But even if that's true, it's one I'm not going to apologize
for. 461

460. 131 CONG. REC. 8,375 (1985).
461. 131 CONG. REC. 8,376 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Baucus). For early statemeniS of this
taxation in exchange for privileges notion see 1920 House Hearings, supra note 360, at 55 (statement
of R.G. Elliott, Chair Tax Committee, National Assoc. of Credit Men, Chicago) ("[I]n most States,
I believe, corporations are subjected to taxation, which does not apply to individuals or partnerships,
and presumably that tax is levied because the State has granted them certain privileges [such as
restricted shareholder liability]."); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 162 (1911) ("[T]he [1909
excise] tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with the advantages which
inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and which are not enjoyed by private firms or
individuals."). For the real story on the creation of the corporate income tax, describing it as an early
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These Hearings and the Joint Resolution were intended to send "a
clear and convincing signal to the administration [which was in the process
of rewriting the earlier proposals], and anyone interested in tax reform,
that retention of the current graduated corporate tax rates is indispensable
462
"
The signal was heard and heeded.
The May, 1985,
President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and
Simplicity (Treasury II Report)463 proposed using the existing bottom
graduated tax rates with a new top rate of thirty-three percent. This would
result in a tax of fifteen percent on taxable income up to $25,000, eighteen
percent on taxable income between $25,000 and $50,000, twenty-five percent on taxable income between $50,000 and $75,000, and thirty-three
percent on the excess, with a five percent surtax from $140,000 to
$360,000, recapturing the lower graduated rates so that corporations with
taxable income of $360,000 or more would pay a fiat thirty-three percent
inside corporate tax rate. 464 The Treasury II report simply stated that the
"graduated rate structure for corporations would be maintained, in order
not to increase the burden on small corporations. " 465 Otherwise, it
continued, complete elimination of the graduated rates would nullify the
positive effects for small corporations of the proposed reduction in the
maximum corporate marginal rate. 466
Even after Treasury II's about face as to repealing the inside graduated
corporate income tax rates, some supporters of small C Corporations
attempted to obtain further graduated rate reductions for small C
Corporations, arguing for a more equitable distribution of rate cuts. 467
Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) found it "hard to understand why every
individual and corporate taxpayer will receive a reduction in rate except
small businesses with less than $25,000 in income. " 468 Another Southern

government attempt at securities and corporate regulation, see Kornhauser, supra note 410. Moreover,
for a discussion of the absence of these "privileges" in the typical private corporation, see Lee, Entity
Classification, supra note 35, at 87 n.120.
462. 131 CONG. REC. 8,377 (remarks of Sen. Weicker) (1985); see also 1985 Small Business
Hearings, supra note 456, at 5 (prepared statement of Sen. Sasser) ("The comments and remarks heard
by the Small Business Committee will lay a firm foundation from which we can speak out in behalf of
small business in upcoming debates on tax reform.").
463. THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWfH, AND
SIMPLICITY 117, 119 (May 1985) [hereinafter TREASURY II].
464. ld.
465. ld. at 117.
466. ld. at 119.
467. See 131 CONG. REC. 11,840 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Sasser); id. at 24,791 (1985) (remarks
of Senator Sasser) (proposing a rate reduction for small businesses based on the view that under the
Treasury II proposal, "small businesses will face a broadened tax base and tax rates that are the same
as, or higher than those to which they are subject under current law" (quoting a letter from the National
Federation of Independent Business and other small business associations to Secretary of Treasury
James Baker)).
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Democrat Senator urged his "colleagues to join ... in promoting the
concerns of small business in the tax reform debate and thereby reaffirm
our national commitment to the entrepreneurial spirit and the spirit of free
enterprise which form the very backbone of our economic system. " 469
In the end, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 not only retained the 1954
Code's lowest inside corporate tax rate of fifteen percent but doubled the
favored tax base from $25,000 of annual income to $50,000. 470 This was
similar to an earlier proposal by Representative Charles B. Rangel (DN.Y.).471 The House Ways and Means Committee Report explained that:
"The present law graduated rates for lower income corporations are
intended to encourage growth in small business by easing the tax burden
on such businesses. " 472

D.

Beyond Political Rhetoric

CRS and commentators conclude that some, if not most, of the usual
rationales for granting subsidies (such as graduated rates) to small business
corporations are myths or rhetoric. 473
Americans love small business. Despite the notoriously high rate of
early failure, every year hundreds of thousands of undaunted

469. 131 CONG. REC. 24,792 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Sasser).
470. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2249 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § ll(b)).
471. See 131 CONG. REc. 2,319-20 (1985) (proposing a 15% rate on the first$50,000 of taxable
income, 25% on taxable income between $50,000 and $100,000, and 33% thereafter with a surcharge
from $100,000 to $200,000 in order to phase out this relief).
472. See H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 232 (1985) (detailing Congress's attempts to concentrate
benefits by phasing out benefits with taxable income in excess of $365,000); see also S. REP. No. 99313, at 220 (1986) (lowering the beginning of the phase out of graduated rates from $1 million in
income to $100,000). In 1987 Congress barred the graduated inside rates to service corporations: "The
personal service income of corporations owned by its [sic] employees is taxed to the employee-owners
at the individual graduated rates as it is paid out as salary. The committee believes that it is
inappropriate to allow the retained earnings to be taxed at the lower corporate graduated rates." H.R.
REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1097 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-712.
473. See TAX EXPENDITURES COMPENDIUM, supra note 144, at 255 (citing mixed evidence);
BRUMBAUGH, supra note 119 (debunking tax strategies favoring small business and the rationales often
given in support of them); see also Gravelle, Small Business Tax Subsidy Proposals, supra note 146
(outlining the major criticisms of "the justifications advanced for favoring small business"); Marc
Levinson & John M. Barry, Small Business: Myth and Reality, DUN'S BUSINESS MONTH, Sept. 1985,
at 30, 31 ("[T]he mythology of small business has outdistanced the reality."); Robert J. Samuelson,
The Great Pretender, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1993, atA19, available in 1993 WL2104779 (providing
statistics which illustrate that the impact that small businesses have on job creation is "somewhat
exaggerated"). But see James E. Ellis & Christina Del Valle, Tall Order for Small Businesses, Bus.
WEEK, Apr. 19, 1993, at 114 (noting that small businesses [employing 500 or fewer] accounted for3.2
million new jobs between 1988 and 1990, while big business had a net loss of 500,000 jobs). Nearly
all the new small-business jobs are generated by the smallest of the small; from 1988 to 1990, all of
the job creation came at companies with fewer than 20 employees which added more than 4 million
inhc
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Americans launch small businesses. The folklore of the independent
entrepreneur being the backbone of American self-reliance and work
ethic is a more persuasive argument for favorable tax incentives than
any reality-based economic consideration. 474
In addition, there is clearly a fair amount of cloaking taking place. 475
The Congressional reliance on data as to small business jobs, invariably
refers to all small business: sole proprietors, S Corporations, and partnerships as well as private C Corporations (with both small and moderate
income). 476 In the 1981 floor debate, Senator Durenberger (R-Minn.)
pointed out that small C Corporations were far outnumbered by small businesses (the sole proprietors), who were in greater need: 477 "The concern
here is for who gets what benefits we can provide and how much help we
are going to provide, and how much equity we are going to do for those
who really need it in this country. " 478
The claims for jobs, innovation, and often regulatory difficulty are
overstated as to small business in general, due to the high failure rate of
small businesses. 479 Moreover, the graduated brackets only apply to a

474. Wilson, supra note444, at64 (footnotes otnitted). Cf. Blatt, supra note 186, at316-17, 32024, 339-48 (discussing the role of the "family business symbol" in legislative support for the issue of
an estate tax freeze).
475. By "cloaking" I mean arguing for a tax preference on the basis of benefitting a popular interest group while really intending, or at least knowing, that the major benefits will go to another interest
group. See Lee, supra note 141, at 86, 18 n.57, 26 n.IOI.
476. At the time, private C Corporations constituted 20% of all small business entities, but
reported 65% of all small business net income. See Small Business Staff Report, supra note 457, at
16. Since that time, the portion reported by S Corporations has increased significantly and partnerships
have gone from a net loss (reflecting the shelter years) to substantial positive income. See Amy
Hamilton, Partnership Profits in 1995 Largest in History, IRS Data Show, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan.
6, 1998, available in Westlaw at 1998 TNT 3-3 (reporting that an increase in partnership profits to
$106.8 billion for 1995 compared with 1994 was the largest in history, continuing the trend of large
percentage increases in overall net income first observed in 1991); supra note 18 and accompanying
text. Thus C Corporations' share of total small business income has fallen sharply.
477. See 127 CONG. REC. 16,246-47 (1981).
478. Id. at 16,247. Senator Durenberger was arguing against Senator Riegle's proposal to cut the
graduated rates up to $200,000, which was defeated in a roll call by a vote of 51 to 41. See id. at
16,248. Senator Durenberger voted in favor of Senator Weicker's proposed cuts on the first $50,000.
See id. at 16,254; see also 142 CONG. REC. H9859 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Martini)
(referring to mom-and-pop sole proprietors as "true small businesses").
479. See Husbands, supra note 444, at 363 (noting that net new small business jobs are much
lower than claimed due to the huge numbers of small businesses annually their closing doors and a
smaller number actually failing). Professor Douglas Holtz-Eakin has stated:
[E]ven when small firms create a lot of jobs, they destroy nearly as many as these small
businesses fail. Because the failure rate among small businesses is so high, many of the
jobs they create today will not survive over a year or so. In the same way, there appears
to be little support in the numbers for a disproportionate role played by small firms in
product innovation. It is true that there are numerous examples of valuable innovations
from small firms. It is equally true that large firms innovate at roughly the same rate.
Hearing Before Senate Finance Comm. on S. 105, S. 161, S. 628, S. 652, S. 867, and H.R. 1215

976

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 78:885

fraction of the small business universe. 480 Furthermore, the appeal to
equity in the "tax distribution system" overlooked the fact that the high
income owners of most private C Corporations are splitting their income
between the private C Corporation and their individual returns and so were
already obtaining (in 1981 and 1986) the benefits of the individual rate
reductions. 481 The difficulty in obtaining capital is the only real difficulty
small private C Corporations (and private S Corporations and proprietors
as well) face. 482
Beyond the accuracy of the stated rationales for preferences for small
business, including graduated rates, are two political factors that are probably determinative. The first is the mystique of the entrepreneur as the
backbone of the American economy. "Socially and psychologically,
Americans (including politicians) are fascinated with the mystique of the
small, independent business entrepreneur. Historians have noted that a
'small-business ideology has been present throughout American history'
and politicians recently have proposed small business incentive packages
in the name of America's 'entrepreneurial spirit.'" 483 This mystique
appears closely related to Americans' positive feelings about money in the
form of earned income, identified by Professor Marjorie E. Kornhauser as
"moral economic individualism. " 484 Professor Kornhauser tells us that
"[b]ecause rhetoric must persuade, politicians use rhetoric that reflects
people's beliefs. " 485 The rhetoric of "entrepreneurial spirit" must,

identifies the basis for the claim that small business is "America's 'job generator'" by citing several
studies that reported higher net gains of jobs in small business than in large business in the early 1990s.
Wilson, supra note 445, at 29. However, he later refutes the widely held view that small business is
the nation's primary job generator and innovator as being based on economic myths. See id. at 59-63
(pointing out various flaws in economic studies supporting the "job generator" and "innovator" claims
of small business groups).
480. The inside graduated corporate income tax rates apply to around 750,000 mostly private,
small income C Corporations. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. In contrast, there are
approximately 2,000,000 S Corporations, 1,500,000 partnerships, and 6,000,000 full-time
proprietorships. See supra notes 132, 304-305, and 308-309 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 147-55, 167-68 and accompanying text.
482. See Lee, supra note 141, at 10-13. I recall that when I had first discovered the literature in
the hearings as to the inside shelter over a dozen years ago and mentioned it to Tax Court Judge
Lapsley Hamblen at a Virginia Tax Conference meeting, he immediately rejoined that they needed it
to accumulate capital, which I later found confirmed in the legislative history and political discourse.
Retired Chief Judge Hamblen always went to the nub of the issue. I have benefitted more than I can
ever express from his example, friendship, and mentoring.
483. Wilson, supra note 444, at 31 (footnotes omitted).
484. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality ofMoney: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and
the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 123-28 (1994).
485. !d. at 131. Professor William Blatt goes the next step and advocates that cultural archetypes
or symbols used in "public discourse" (news stories and legislative hearings) are evidence of social
preferences, which in a democracy should be translated into tax policy. See Blatt, supra note 186, at
292-93, 327-28, 330. Personally, I find it difficult to distinguish using symbols, such as small
hncinl'llcc-
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indeed, have been a major factor underlying the 1981 ninety-two to zero
Senate vote across party and ideological lines. 486 If anything, business
people tend to be more of a Republican constituency than a Democratic
one, 487 although small business has long been favored by Southern and,
The second, and probably
now, New Democrats as well. 488
determinative, political factor, is that small business people tend to be local
"opinion leaders" who influence local voting patterns and make political
contributions. 489 These are the people members of Congress of both
parties talk to about taxes in their visits home. 490
This history suggests some tax policy agenda for the future as to calls
for integration of private C Corporate-shareholder taxation. The first is to
be aware of the facts on the ground and political history of business tax
entities. Otherwise, well-intentioned reformers may unite small business
groups in opposition, who will then prevail with a greater preference ex
post legislation than ex ante, as in 1978 and 1986. Clearly, an appeal to
Congress to end the (rare) double taxation of unsophisticated small private

vertical equity, from symbols prevalent in a society, likewise based on false claims, used to support,
for instance, racial segregation.
486. See supra note 443 aud accompanying text.
487. One of the core Republican groups in the L.A. Times-Gallup Poll terminology of voting
groups is "enterprisers" (high-income professionals, business people). See Lee, supra note 380. Over
a decade ago the L.A. Times-Gallup Poll dissected the voting electorate into 11 factions, including
"enterprisers" who were affluent, highly educated, 99% white, 60% male, mostly married, and concentrated in the suburbs, with strongly probusiness, antigovernment, and antiwelfare spending attitudes.
See George Skelton, In-Depth Study Sees 'Very Close' Vote; Parties Nearly Even in 1988 Presidential
Race, L.A. nMES, Oct. I, 1987, available in 1987 WL 2266825; DavidS. Broder, The Campaign of

1988, GOP Seen Forming a Winning Coalition; Democratic Constituencies May Be on Collision
Course, Poll Finds, WASH. Posr, Feb. 5, 1988, available in 1988 WL 2074282. In the late 1980s,
enterprisers made up 16% of aU likely voters, and together with "moralists" (roughly equivalent to the
Christian Right), composed the core of the Republican coalition. See Broder, supra; Skelton, supra.
For discussion of the alignment of the Christian Right with the Republican Party, see Laurie Goodstein,
Mixing God and Politics Brings Out the Naysayers: Ties to GOP Worry Some Evangelicals, WASH.
Posr, Mar. 27, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2085446; Paul Starobin, Oh, Woe Is Us! Well, Maybe
Not, NAT'L J., Jan. 16, 1999, at 94 (noting that the Christian Right is arguably the most powerful
faction in the Republican party).
488. See Lee, supra note 141, at 27-28, 29-30 n.111 (stating that Southern Democrats supported
capital gains preferences for sma11 business owners and reporting statements made by Democratic
Representatives expressing support for sma11 business).
489. See Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation ofSocial Conflict, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 2079, 2108-09 (1996); Susan B. Garland, Small Business Rocks the Vote, Bus. WEEK, June
3, 1996, at 14 (providing examples of the political influence wielded by sma11 business leaders);
Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J.
45, 91 (1997) (noting that for small business owners, "money contributions are the primacy source of
political participation beyond voting"); Wilson, supra note 444, at 32-35 (discussing the significant
political impact made by small business).
490. See, e.g., I978 House Hearings, supra note 391, at 1253-54 (statement of Rep. Jenkins)
(sympathizing with the tax and regulatozy burdens faced by small business owners); id. at 2802-03
(statement of Rep. Jenkins) (explaining that small business owners in his district "showed great interest
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C Corporations is a nonstarter, even if only to test whether the private C
Corporation or LLC provides the better nontax attributes. 491 In fact,
lobbyists for small private C Corporations fight fiercely and effectively for
the preservation and expansion of the inside shelter from lower graduated
rates applicable to small income private C Corporations, which are much
lower than the outside, more progressive individual tax rates that their
owners would be subject to on additional marginal income.492
Nor do I expect that arguing that the transaction and exit costs of
private C Corporations, as contrasted with LLCs, may be so great as to
outweigh the inside shelter, would persuade ·Congress. Although inside
deductibility of (reasonable) compensation by the private C Corporation is
currently the single biggest business expense tax audit issue for such
corporations, according to the General Accounting Office, the tax writing
committees were also informed that this was the case two decades ago by
the Joint Committee on Taxation, also based on a General Accounting
Office study. 493 Yet Congress increased the inside graduated rate subsidy
three times after such notice. 494 Apparently Congress is willing to let
small business people buy their admission tickets to the tax shelter and take
their chances. 495
Congress might be persuaded that the fact that sixty-one percent of C
Corporations report no income, with a substantial percentage incurring
"trapped" operating losses, presents the true hardship. One indication that
private C Corporations do view this as a hardship is that a third of C to S
conversions incur losses in the first S Corporation year (and over twothirds of those first year loss new S Corporations go on to incur a loss the
next year as we11). 496 A possible (and ideal) Congressional response to
a full and accurate factual presentation of taxation of small business could
be mandatory passthrough of income and losses of private C Corporations
to prevent trapped losses. A more likely Congressional remedy, given its
small business private C Corporation bias, might be increasing the ordinary
deduction under section 1244 for losses on small business stock, 497 or
perhaps allowing small income C Corporation net operating losses to
491. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
492. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
493. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 436, 443, and 470 (describing rate increases in the subsidy in 1978, 1981,
and 1986 respectively).
495. The taxpayer's preference for the risks and chances associated with the purchase of that ticket
may, however, reflect misinformation or a lack of information. Cf. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy,
and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384, 411 (1985) (pointing out that consent to risk in general may be
grounded in misinformation or ignorance, and that this is ultimately detrimental to the "risk-buyer").
Or, even if taxpayers are fully informed, they may not be adverse to playing the audit lottery.
496. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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carryover to S Corporation years after a C to S conversion. 498 Perhaps
it might be best to leave bad enough alone, since these existing rules
increasing transaction and exit costs could be viewed as adding back a little
of the progressivity eroded by use of the inside shelter. Changing them
while leaving the inside shelter in place would only further erode
progressivity.
VI. Conclusion
Ironically, the question of equal tax treatment of small business and
the role of the inside corporate tax shelter was more clearly perceived three
and four score years ago than today. Treasury, members of Congress, and
witnesses in tax hearings all recognized that lower inside corporate rates in
comparison to progressive outside individual rates lead to businesses
choosing the C corporation form and resultant horizontal and vertical
disparity with partnerships and proprietorships. 499 Professor Edwin
Seligman pointed out to the Senate Finance Committee in 1921 that
Congress had gone off on the "wrong tangent" by taxing corporations
separately from other businesses. 500 The tax writing committees were
warned by Treasury and academic and business witnesses that taxing
partners and proprietors at steeply progressive individual rates while taxing
corporations at a lower inside rate would "force" all larger businesses into
corporate form. 501 Unfortunately for those seeking to put corporations
on a tax parity with partners and proprietors in 1920-21 and 1936, the ideal
true passthrough integration (passthrough and modified shareholder allocation methods in current terminology502) was thought precluded by
Eisner v. Macomber. 503

498. A C Corporation net operating loss does not canyover to an S Corporation tax year, except
to offset a realized built-in-gain. See I.R.C. §§ 137l(b)(1), 1374(b)(2) (1994); St. Charles Investment
Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 46, 49 (1998) (explaining that§ 137l(b)(l) precludes an S Corporation
from canying forward any suspended passive activity losses (PALs) incurred during its prior status as
a C Corporation); Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 451, 454 (1991) (stating that§ 1371(b)(1)
expressly forbids the carryforward of a net operating loss incurred by a C Corporation to a later S
Corporation year, and that the § 1371(a)(1) exception that allows application of Subchapter C where
not inconsistent does not allow an S Corporation to use the tax benefit doctrine to override
§ 1371(b)(1)). See generally Kaye A. Thomas, Built-in Gains Tax Under the Final Regulations, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Nov. 7, 1995, available in Westlaw at 1995 TNT 218-94 (offering a comprehensive
look at the application of § 1374 regulations to built-in-gain).
499. See supra notes 365, 371 and accompanying text.
500. 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 393, at 476.
501. 1920 House Hearings, supra note 360, at 24 (statement of Dr. Adams) (asserting that tax
laws should not force corporations to take a form of organization not suited to their business, and citing
Secreta!)' of the Treasucy Houston's 1920 Annual Report for the proposition that such a tax structure
would give a "heavy premium" to the corporate form of business).
502. See TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE, supra note 44, at 27. In contrast to a pure conduit
or passthrough model, Treasucy's shareholder allocation prototype does not pass through losses. See
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Secretary Mellon nevertheless opposed an undistributed profits tax
(dividend deduction method in current terminology504). He seemingly
wanted to undercut progressivity5°5 through corporate inside shelter and
outside capital gains preference, which were intentionally the same 12.5%
rate. 506 Thus, the status quo of much higher outside than inside rates
continued. And so it happened that business entities went from a 1: 1 ratio
of corporations to partnerships in 1924 to 2:1 a decade later. 507 At the
same time, the combination of capital gains preference, inside corporate tax
shelter, and stepped up basis at death made progressivity a farce. As
Texas populist Representative "Cactus Jack" Garner put it so well in the
context of another Mellon-backed revenue act provision undercutting
progressivity:
Why, it happened just as it always will as long as the Treasury
Department has the viewpoint of taxation that it now has. That will
happen as long as you have a House or a Senate that obeys the
mandates of the Treasury Department. It is the viewpoint of those
who desire to relieve the heavy taxpayer from his taxes and continue
the taxes upon the masses of the people, as they have done in this
bill. You will find it all the way through . . . .5os
By 1936, all of the larger businesses had become C Corporations and
disparity was once again recognized by hill country populists such as
Senator Hugo Black (D-Ala.) and Ways and Means Chair Bob Doughton
(D-N.C.), who supported the undistributed profits tax which Republicans
and business strongly opposed this time. 509 Even more unfortunately, the
ensuing enactment of the short-lived undistributed profits tax resulted in
one of the worst of all possible tax worlds as to corporate-shareholder
taxation. 510 Corporations distributed profits in 1937, avoiding the inside
504. See TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE, supra note 44, at 107.
505. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 So. CAL. L.
REv. 397, 438 (1987) ("While rhetoric and attention focused on nominal tax rates, real or effective
rates could be lowered more quietly by creating preferential capital gains rates .... "). Mellon also
persuaded Congress to cut the outside ordinary income rates. The Revenue Act of 1921 reduced the
maximum rate from 73% to 58%. See Pub. L. No. 67-98, §§ 210, 211, 42 Stat. 227, 233, 237.
Mellon directed further reductions in the Revenue Act of 1924, and the Revenue Act of 1926 reduced
the top rate to 25%. See Pub. L. No. 69-20 §§ 210, 211, 44 Stat. 9, 21-23.
506. See 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 363, at 37 (statement of Dr. Adams).
507. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
508. 61 CONG. REC. 8,073 (1921). This view is roughly accurate if it is understood that the taxes
on the masses at this time were regressive excise taxes and not the "class" income taxes. See Lee,
supra note 380; Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World Warn, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 685 (1988) (chronicling the expansion of
taxation during World War II).
509. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
· 510. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED SrATES209 (1954) {listing the objections
to the tax raised by the Ways and Means Subcommittee in 1937, including issues of unfairness,
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undistributed profits tax (as intended), but the high income shareholders
evaded outside taxation on the dividends as well. 511 In both of these
early debates proponents focused more on horizontal than vertical
equity.512
The next two considerations of corporate-shareholder taxation
integration were by Treasury in 1978, criticizing the private C Corporation
as the "quintessential tax shelter," and in 1984, specifically proposing
elimination of inside graduated small income private C Corporations
rates. 513 Both focused more on ability to pay than horizontal inequity,
in contrast to earlier decades. 514 Both resulted instead in Congress
increasing the subsidy by reducing the inside rates on small income C
Corporations further. 515 In contrast, starting with President John F.
Kennedy in the 1960s and reappearing in a bi-partisan fashion in the early
1980s with Representative Rangel and Senators Kennedy, Bumpers and
Weicker, the political rhetoric shifted from disparity of taxation between
forms of business entities to jobs and entrepreneurial spirit. 516 No longer
did populists rail in Congress against the tax advantages of the [private and
public] corporation over the partnerships and proprietors: "Gone from the
public rhetoric were terms such as 'redistribution of wealth,' 'social class,'
and 'economic justice.' The new language of tax reform played down the
discussion of income redistribution and social justice while focusing on
economic 'efficiency' and 'growth. "' 517
Populist Democratic rhetoric was revived in response to the "failed"
Reagan-Bush trickle down tax policies of disproportionally lowering the top
individual effective tax rates while the top captured most of the economic
gains, just as had happened under similar Mellon era tax policies.518 The

restrictiveness, and undue burden). Another worst of all tax worlds would result from an outside
individual flat tax on wage income coupled only with an inside consumption tax as to corporate income,
a bad idea in the air. See Samuels Says Flat Tax Would Help Rich, Hurt Middle Class, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Sept. 25, 1995, available in Westlaw 95 TNT 187-3.
511. See supra notes 387-88 and accompanying text.
512. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 392, 453 and accompanying text.
514. Contrast the authorities cited in supra note 370 with those cited in supra notes 392 and 453
for further discussion.
515. See supra notes 436, 471 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 425, 444-49, 458-61, and 467-69 and accompanying text.
517. ZELIZER, supra note 341, at 166. This change was probably related to the shift from the tax
policy of redistribution of income to horizontal equity and lowering the top rates epitomized in the tax
policies of House Ways and Means Chair Wilbur Mills, D-Ark, 1957-75. See id. at 141 (noting
economist Dan Throop Smith's remarks to the effect that reform no longer meant redistribution of
wealth, but instead the reduction of "excessive rates of individual income tax and tighten[ing] the
definition of taxable income to .•• assure more equal treatment of taxpayers.").
518. See Lee, supra note 380 (noting that during the boom year of 1925, almost 50% of taxable
income consisted of long-term capital gains, and that the top 10,000 individuals in income captured
over 90% of the caoitalnins oreference).
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Democrats, and in particular "New Democrat" Arkansas Governor Bill
Clinton, successfully revived the income redistribution rhetoric in the late
1980s and early 1990s.519 This resurrection was directed, however, only
at individual ordinary income and capital gains rates and did not address
the inside tax shelter of C Corporations.
The LLC literature focusing solely on the burden of double taxation
appears unaware of the violation of vertical and horizontal equity by the
inside shelter of private C Corporations and of the considerable modem
political support for the tax subsidy of graduated inside rates to small
income private C Corporations. Proceeding from a fundamental flaw, a
myopic focus on purported double taxation of private C Corporations, the
common assumption has been that taxpayers seeking to avoid private C
Corporation double taxation, while obtaining limitation of liability, would
rush to the new passthrough entity.
Conventional wisdom arguments of double taxation as to private C
As of 1993, sixty-one percent of C
Corporations are erroneous.
Corporations reported no income or losses and thirty-seven percent, or
around 750,000 small income (mostly private) C Corporations, reported
less than the phase out of the graduated corporate tax exemption total
($335,000), amounting to over five percent of C Corporation income, but
with average income of less than $40,000, thus subject, on the average, to

519. See id. at 1397-98 (noting that the "ultimate triumph of this rhetoric was the successful1992
Clinton presidential campaign"); Lee, supra note 141, at 40-43, 53-56 (reviewing the Clinton
Administration's rhetoric regarding the true beneficiaries of the capital gains preference and the
stagnation and drop of income in the lower 80% of families). This then resulted in the 1993 individual
rate increase at the top without any substantial new capital gains preference. See Lee, supra note 380.
After the Democrats lost control of Congress in 1994, the Clinton Administration and Democrats in
Congress used class warfare or fairness rhetoric to thwart Republican tax policies. See Leon Panetta,
White House News Briefmg, Mar. 21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 117855 (statement of White House
Chief of Staff Leon Panetta) ("Cuts in education programs, the school lunch and breakfast programs,
cuts in women's, infants', and children's feeding programs-are the examples of how the Republicans
are paying for, again, a tax program that largely favors the wealthy"); Robert Pear, As Welfare
Compromise Emerges, Clinton Aide Says Veto Is Cenain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at AI, available
in 1995 WL 9675280 (reporting that the administration objects that "Republicans are paying for tax cuts
for rich by taking money from child nutrition, child care and child protection programs"). Then, in
the 1996 presidential campaign, possibly in response to the fact that 1994 voting by suburban womena critical swing vote-had dropped off, Clinton dropped the divisive fairness rhetoric and emphasized
working together. See John F. Harris & Eric Pianin, Bipanisanship Reigns at Budget Signing: Clinton,
Gingrich Extol Benefits of Split Government at Ceremony, WASH. Posr, Aug. 6, 1997, at A-1,
available in 1995 WL 9675280 (describing an atmosphere of bipartisan excitement at the signing of the
budget which led Clinton and Gingrich to praise each other for working together to end the budget
feud). The logic of this strategy resulted in the 1997 balanced budget agreement and a tax bill with
cheap sound bite provisions for Democratic constituencies and, for the Republicans, a massive new
capital gains preference and estate tax cuts mostly benefitting high income individuals. See supra note
352.
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a fifteen percent rate. 520 The overwhelmingly high income individual
owners of such small income private C Corporations are mostly taxed from
thirty-six to forty-five percent on any marginal income, such as the income
they have split with their small or moderate income C Corporations. 521
A second, outside tax on that corporate income is largely avoided by (1)
holding the private C Corporation stock (or merging with a public firm and
holding that stock) until death, ideally without paying formal dividends; or
by (2) selling it at a long-deferred capital gain, taxed at eighteen to twenty
percent. 522 This gives rise to at least a $3 billion a year or more tax
subsidy. There also may be a similar subsidy for around 33,500 moderate
income mostly private C Corporations reporting an average income of
about $2,000,000 a year, taxed at thirty-four percent. 523 Thus, the true
tax policy issue for private C Corporations is not double taxation, but
whether the Treasury will get one tax, one time. It has not been able to
do so for the past eight decades. Nevertheless, the widespread but
erroneous claims of the clear tax advantage of LLCs over C Corporations
may have some dampening effect after 1998 on choice of a private C
Corporation as the tax entity for small businesses.
The LLC literature also assumes that, due to the various ownership,
capital structure and allocation of income and loss restrictions applicable
to S Corporations but not partnerships or LLCs, LLCs will supplant S
Corporations as well. 524 That clearly is not happening. The growth rate
of S Corporations exceeds the rate for all partnerships and comes from a
larger base. For 1997, there were 1,755,000 partnership returns, as
contrasted with 2,450,000 S Corporation returns. SOl projects the average
annual growth rate for 1999-2005 as 4.04 and 4.16% for partnerships and
S Corporations, respectively. 525
The story of the S Corporation's continued popularity, contrary to
Conventional Wisdom, apparently rests on (1) over fifty percent of S
Corporations in general (and probably much higher in newly formed S
Corporations) having only one shareholder, so that the S Corporation

520. See supra notes 130, 132 and accompanying text.
521. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. With the flat tax aspects of the 20%
individual capital gains rate cap under§ 1(h), installment reporting under§ 453 does not offer any rate
lowering potential to sellers, but may be demanded as a form of seller fmancing in a buyer's market.
See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis-Installment Method Repealed for Whom?, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Jan. 3, 2000, available in Westlaw, 2000 TNT 1-2 ("Large, strategic buyers pay cash, and often are
willing to buy equity. But when the buyer is another closely held business that does not have a lot of
cash or borrowing ability and wants assurances that it is not buying a pig in a poke, seller financingthe vernacular for installment sales-is the norm.").
523. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
524. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
525. See supra notes 286-88, 295 and accompanying text.
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capital, ownership, and income allocation restrictions are academic; (2)
substantial inertia toward the familiar and usually cheaper (as to formation
costs) S Corporation, motivating both tax advisers and their small business
clients; and (3) many, virtually all in my anecdotal experience, tax advisers
believing, probably mistakenly, that an S Corporation may be used to
reduce wage taxes in a services business by splitting profits between a
"reasonable" salary, subject to such taxes, and S Corporation "dividends,"
which are not so subject. 526 Also, in recent years, a quarter to a third of
new S elections are made by private C Corporations (i.e., C to S .
conversions), with almost a third of those conversions apparently being
made by loss C Corporations. 527
While formations of LLCs are increasing greatly, the types of businesses choosing that form appear largely to be the ones that historically
chose the partnership form-real estate businesses and professionals. 528
Thus, LLCs do not appear to be the wave of the future, supplanting both
C and S Corporations. To the extent that LLCs will partially supplant
private C Corporations in 1999-2005, it may be for the wrong reason (the
myth of double taxation). This is not a bad result, since all businesses
where the owners are not separated from management (roughly the publicprivate ownership dividing line) should be taxed the same as passthrough
entities, that is, at individual rates. 529 Similarly, while contrary to
conventional wisdom, LLCs are not supplanting S Corporations, due to
restrictions on capital and allocations (since such restrictions are largely
irrelevant to the single owner entity). To the extent that LLCs are chosen
more by professionals and real estate businesses, and S Corporations are
chosen more by other service businesses and retail businesses, taxpayers
are rationally self-selecting along complex or simple business lines-not a
bad result. A thesis of Taxation of Private Business Enterprises is that the
full complexities of aggregate Subchapter K are too much for small business practitioners and businesses to handle. 530 To the extent, however,
that the small and moderate income firms are still choosing private C
Corporations, both horizontal and vertical equity are being violated-a very
bad result.
A fundamental question is: Why did the conventional wisdom so err?
A possible answer is lack of practical experience in advising small
businesses. Yet the use of the small income private C Corporation as the
ultimate tax shelter was discussed in the practitioner and some academic

526.
527.
528.
529.
530.

See supra notes 254-62 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 217-23.
See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 35, at 83-93, 119.
See supra note 241-42 and accompanying text.
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literature and in myriad congressional hearings and staff reports. 531 (The
continued use of S Corporations for new businesses, as contrasted with C
to S conversion, was much less widely discussed. 532) I suspect that a
root cause was the adoption of a theoretical hook for an article first, and
then seeking to support it without thoroughly considering the actual
application of the Internal Revenue Code in taxland.

531.
532.

See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
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VII. Appendix
Each IACA Annual Report covers two years. Often the common year
for two years Reports contains conflicting data as to a particular
jurisdiction. Furthermore, many of the jurisdictions responded to the
author's February 1998 written request for data as to new entity filings for
1995-97 and often provided data somewhat at variance with the corresponding IACA Annual Report of the Jurisdictions data. Nevertheless, I
believe that the above table accurately shows the trends of new reportings.
Where entry is followed by an asterisk(*), no data was contained in
IACA Annual Report, and data reported in Questionnaires on file with the
Texas Law Review were used instead. In case of *N/A, data was supplied
in the IACA Annual Report but inconsistencies between the IACA Annual
Report, the Annual Report and the questionnaires were so great that the
data was treated as not available.

N
0
0

Data Derived From: International Association of Corporation Administrators Annual Report of the Jurisdictions
1997-1999
(LEXJS®-NEXJS® and LEXIS® Document Services Compiler)
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Alaska
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Arizona

13,978

15,402

15,362

14,237

5,189

6,601

Arkansas

N/A

8,445

8,344

7,925

N/A

1,420

1,717

2,047

California

48,309

51,841

55,757

57,815

8,373

12,151

17,979

23,190

Colorado

18,371

20,213

18,778

17,398

6,562

8,094

9,184

11,307

Connecticut

*8,770

8,747

8,600

5,225

*7,095

9,730

12,296

13,456

Delaware

48,168

51,600

53,030

48,885

6,933

10,888

20,731

30,793

N/A

2,813

3,158

N/A
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1997

1998

1995

1996
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Georgia

30,147

30,683

33,425

32,143

2,417

4,374

6,693

9,239

Hawaii

N/A

4,592

4,092

3,651

N/A

N/A

768

1,454

Idaho

3,830

3,886

3,954

3,883

1,107

1,449

1,899

2,323

Illinois

38,051

40,003

39,949

39,420

2,646

3,654

4,940

7,271

Indiana

14,089

14,247

15,928

15,224

2,465

3,152

4,022

5,115

Iowa

6,082

6,569

6,913

5,891

1,325

1,641

2,189

2,507

ri
•

Kansas

*6,305

7,985

9,791

N/A

*1,658

1,867

2,397

N/A

Kentucky

9,438

10,809

10,810

9,870

1,505

2,190

2,647

3,955

Louisiana

13,122

13,804

13,766

11,845

2,872

3,908

5,750

7,554

Maine

3,780

4,018

4,039

3,869

293

434

708

1,054

N/A

22,624

22,287

21,737

N/A

4,092

5,950

6,884
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15,251
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1995
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1997
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1995
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Michigan

N/A

28,670

28,213

25,449

8,868

7,955

11,053

17,589

Minnesota

13,943

14,620

14,803

14,607

1,403

1,987

2,549

3,844

Mississippi

6,460

7,065

7,589

6,814

859533

1,188

1,876

1,463

Missouri

12,188

13,100

14,821

17,163

2,991

4,078

6,887

7,043

~

Montana

8,798

3,417

4,475

4,616

500534

523

N/A

1,498

rn

Nebraska

4,412

4,630

4,915

N/A

610

742

1,113

N/A

~

Nevada

20,790

N/A

N/A

N/A

1,956

N/A

N/A

N/A

New Hampshire

4,199

4,451

4,249

3,807

660

861

1,495

2,525

New Jersey

42,221

38,261

36,710

34,732

6,374535

8,442

10,700

13,609

533. Includes LLCs, LPs, and LLPs.
534. Apparently combines LLCs and LPs.
535. Includes LLCs, LLPs, and LPs.
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Domestic and Foreign
For-Profit Corporations
State

0

Domestic and Foreign
LLCs

I

1995

1996

1997

1998

1995

1996

1997

1998

New Mexico

*4,568

*4,527

*4,353

N/A

*1,148

*1,485

*1,881

N/A

New York

77,533

79,725

80,529

78,912

8,431

11,170

14,454

18,101

North Carolina

*19,427

21,354

22,823

22,131

*3,267

4,494

6,001

8,162

North Dakota

2,254

2,273

2,508

2,253

269

304

370

477

Ohio

24,057

23,831

23,897

N/A

4,653

6,790

8,733

N/A

I:""'

Oklahoma

9,332

9,972

10,140

2,356

2,904

3,721

N/A

~

Oregon

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

*NIA

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

Pennsylvania

22,896

23,366

24,705

22,869

491

723

1,498

3,519

Rhode Island

3,690

3,626

3,626

3,472

510

785

1,018

1,448

South Carolina

9,977

10,592

15,485

16,149

1,270

2,143

3,645

4,826

South Dakota

2,414

2,670

2,600

2,685

399

478

550

600

Tennessee

10,546

10,798

10,139

9,203

3,340

4,855

6,456

7,702

-

*NIA
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Domestic and Foreign
For-Profit Corporations
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Domestic and Foreign
LLCs

State

1995

1996

1997

1998

1995

1996

1997

1998

Texas

45,024

44,191

45,656

47,026

5,446

6,628

8,664

11,935

Utah

N/A

8,046

8,710

8,497

N/A

6,067

6,574

7,191

Vermont

N/A

2,498

2,388

2,107

N/A

179

524

676

!

f§1
(ll

Virginia

23,035

22,712

23,063

22,555

4,215

5,398

~·

9,974

8,206

(ll

Washington

17,235

4,243

N/A

400

660

4,124

6,149

8,136

4,350

5,700

10,297

10,119

9,762

8,920

3,473

3,478

3,607

3,194

3,207
--

2,889

N/A

-----

---

-----

1,301
----

6,279

1,407
....

-

-

--

tr1

.....
('1)

(ll

1,879

1,841
-

~
:a.........

9,134

16,192

N/A

Wyoming
L_

15,852

N/A

West Virginia
Wisconsin

16,467

-

-----

-

\0
\0

